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ABSTRACT
The dominant aim of this thesis is to define a concept of 
natural expression the precise extension of which is left undetermined, 
being subject to empirical investigation. Nevertheless, paradigm 
examples with respect to which the question is raised : ’Are they 
natural expressions?' include smiling and other facial expressions.
In pursuit of this aim suggestions are made concerning the 
logical form of sentences about expression (expression is not, in my 
view, best regarded as a relation), comparisons are drawn between the 
interpretation of utterances and the interpretation of non-linguistic 
expressions (and both contrasted to explanation), and, subsequently, 
between the latter and what Davidson calls the 'causal redescription 
of actions'.
The task of defining expression is then conceived of as partly 
consisting in the specification of the cognitive effects such that when 
an action is truly described 'in terms o f  them, it is expressive. In 
the ensuing analysis, much of the work is done by adapting‘Christopher 
Peacocke's notion of 'prima-facie evidence'.
The notion of 'physiognomic perception', ie. the way in which
we see eg. anger in eg. a scowl, is critically discussed and related to 
the foregoing.
The relevance of correlations between emotion and behaviour to 
natural expression is then assessed.
In the penultimate chapter I argue that expressive behaviour is 
natural if there exist innate dispositions to exhibit it under certain 
conditions and innate capacities to interpret it correctly. The 
relevance of this to radical interpretation, concept-acquisition, and 
the explanation of action is considered. The contributions of some 
social scientists to this area are critically examined and broad pre­
scriptions are made concerning the nature of the evidence to be taken 
into account in determining the naturalness of a given type of behaviour,
I conclude with a tentative endorsement and formulation of
'immanent realism' with respect to other minds.
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I. IS EXPRESSION A RELATION?
1. Introduction
An initial survey of the diversity of ways in which the term 
'expression' and its cognates, 'expressive' and 'to express', are used 
is likely to induce considerable perplexity in the aspirant philosophi­
cal analyst and certainly ought to induce despair in anyone who hopes 
to isolate and elucidate the concept of expression. There is not one, 
but there are several such concepts, some of which are more deserving 
of philosophical attention than others. The aim of this thesis is to 
elucidate in some detail one concept of expression - a concept which 
is operative when we say that a smile is an expression of joy, or 
that a scowl is an expression of anger. A precedent for this choice 
of paradigm is to be found in Wollheim's articles of 1964 and 1966,
The primary criterion of adequacy which the following discussion is 
intended to meet is that it should be true at least of a certain range 
of episodic facial expressions, which includes smiles and scowls. 
Further applications of the ensuing analysis are to be welcomed as a 
bonus, but are not absolutely required for its confirmation. Neverthe­
less, there is room for reasonable optimism about its applicability to 
some gestures such as fist-shaking, foot-stamping, etc,, and, with 
relatively slight modifications, to gait and posture and physiognomic 
'sets' which express enduring psychological traits or propensities 
like cruelty and benevolence. This may appear to be rather an odd 
restriction to place on the subject-matter of what, after all, pur­
ports to be a philosophical thesis. Insofar as a justification really 
is called for, it lies, at least in part, in the ontogenetic signifi­
cance of facial expression in all human communication,  ^ Secondly - 
and it is very plausible that the two points are connected - if, as 
Wittgenstein ((1958)§54) thought, there are characteristic signs of 
correcting a slip of the tongue, the recognition of which is not 
impeded by ignorance of the speaker's language, or, as Quine thought 
((1960)Chapter 2), we can assume the ethnologist's ability to recognise 
the behaviour of native speakers of an alien language as indicative of
1. cp Taylor (1979) p,78. 'The smile plays a crucial role ontogeneti- 
cally in our being able to enter into communication as human beings in 
the first place.'
8assent or dissent, then these types of behaviour belong to an impor­
tant general category which also includes smiling.
The conspicuously unsystematic proliferation of concepts 
grouped under the heading of 'expression' apparently exceeds any 
plausible or interesting explanation of their generation even by 
"family resemblances". Recognition of this requires the abandon­
ment both of any reformist attitude towards the nebulously defined 
category of "ordinary language" and of any aspiration towards com­
pleteness. It is pointless to complain, but salutary to observe 
that, in Goodman’s phrase, we ordinarily 'play fast and loose' with 
the word 'expression', A protest, therefore, is to be recorded 
against those who, like Collingwood ((1938) pp, 121-124), urge a 
distinction between "betraying" and "expressing" emotions which 
requires us to refrain from calling laughter an expression of mirth 
and against those who, like Danto ((1973) Chapter 6), insist on the 
contrary that it is only such "spontaneous" manifestations of the 
inner life that should be classified as expressive. An exhaustive 
description of the meaning of 'expression' would take the form of an
extensive inventory, interesting mainly to lexicologists and not to 
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philosophers. Accordingly, when I have occasion to deny that a 
kind of event or object is an expression of some other kind of 
(mental) event, although they may be otherwise related, this should 
be taken to mean that the event or object in question is not to be 
described as expressive in the sense in which - and only in that sense 
- smiling and scowling, or smiles and scowls are properly describable 
as expressive.
Despite the chaotic diversity emphasised in the preceding para­
graphs some philosophers have, with a measure of success shortly to 
be estimated, distinguished two major categories of expression which 
correspond approximately, but only approximately, to the difference 
between artistic and behavioural expression. However, the kind of bi­
polar classification put forward by Goodman ((1976) p, 45f) and Tormay 
((1971) especially Chapter 2) is put under considerable pressure, at 
the level of logical form to which it applies, by precisely the kind 
of example which interests me. The surface grammar of sentences 
about expression is relational. It encourages construal in terms of
2. A recognition of this diversity is to be found in Sircello (1972), 
but it has, in my opinion, led Sircello to an over-fastidious 
attention to nuance.
an expressive and an expressed object; an 'expressans ' and an 
'expressandum' (Aldrich (1978) p. 203). In the case of behavioural 
expression, the relational form of the surface grammar is retained 
as a reliable guide to its logical form. I will argue in Section 2 
of this chapter that while this approach seems to work for some 
cases, it tends to justify negligence with respect to the expressive 
properties of some behaviour and cannot easily accommodate insincere 
expression. In Section 3, I briefly investigate some ways of retain­
ing the relational form of expression, but modifying the ontology of 
its relata. In Section 4, I examine proposals to eliminate the 
expressed object initially in their application to artistic expression. 
I then consider the extension of this procedure to the recalcitrant 
cases of behavioural expression and argue that it fails because of a 
highly implausible assimilation of insincere to fictitious or other 
kinds of "non-inferential" expression (cf. Tormey (1971) Chapter 2).
In the final Section, I introduce an altogether different conception 
of the logic of expression to deal with smiling, scowling, etc.. The 
basic proposal is to treat ’expresses’ as a kind of - or as based on - 
a sentence operator.
2. Expression as a relation
32.1 Sentences which take the form ’x ’s ^-ing expressed F-ness' 
appear to report a two-place relation between an action and an emotion. 
Given a general account of the logical form of action sentences some­
thing like the one in Davidson (1967), sentences of the form 
’x expressed F-ness by ^-ing’ appear to report the holding of a three- 
place relation between an agent, an action and an emotion. At this 
stage, it will be sufficient to concentrate on the two-place relation 
alone. There are various strategies that could be adopted in order to 
interpret sentences of the kind in question. I will start by exploring 
the consequences of taking seriously the idea that expression is a
3. When the subject taken by ’expresses’ is an action, object or non- 
intentional event, I will regard it as interchangeable with ’ ... is 
expressive of ... ’ and ’ ... is an expression of ... ’.
4o In general, I will be committed to the existence of mental items. 
I will talk of mental or affective events and states and assume that 
emotions, feelings, etc. are, like desires and beliefs, examples of 
them. I do not discriminate sharply between events and states. What 
governs my choice on any particular occasion will be no more than an 
intuitive feel for the duration of the item in question, states being 
less transitory than events.
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relation and treating possible replacements of 'F-ness' as names of 
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emotions. These consequences are exhibited particularly clearly in 
Tormey (1971), but they are also present in many traditional accounts 
of artistic expression as a relation (usually causal) between a work 
of art or certain properties of it and the artist's feelings. (This 
point is discussed in Wollheim (1968) section 15f.) If 'x's (J)-ing is 
an expression of F-ness' describes a relation between an action and 
an emotion, then it cannot be true unless the emotion exists. An 
emotion exists if and only if there is someone who has or feels or 
suffers from that emotion. Sadness, for example, exists when someone 
has a feeling of sadness and not otherwise. And people have feelings 
of sadness if and only if they are sad. So a person cannot express 
sadness unless he or she is sad; 'x's cj)-ing is an expression of F-ness' 
strictly entails 'Fx'. Thus the conception of expression as a relation 
which holds between token actions and token mental events is all that 
is needed to establish Tormey's 'inferential' concept of expression 
(Tormey(1971) p. 59f). The task for a theory of expression thus be­
comes the elucidation of this relation, involving decisions, for 
example, as to whether or not it is causal and a description of the 
causal route from emotion to behaviour.
It is important to stress that if expression is a relation 
between an emotion felt by a person and an action of which that person 
is an agent, or an unintended movement of the person's body, or an 
object or event made or produced by the person, then nothing about the 
nature of this relation, as distinct from other relations which might 
hold between similar items, follows from the observation that the 
ascription of the expressive action or object to a person entails the 
attribution of the expressed emotion to that person. This point needs 
to be mentioned because, though seemingly elementary, it is often 
over-looked in the intricacies of philosophical debate about the 
relation between mental events and behaviour. Tormey's apparent im­
plication that the non-contingency of statements about the relation 
between an expressans and an expressandum indicates some special 
feature of the relation itself is comparable to a certain kind of 
argument which is designed to show that mental events such as desires 
cannot be the causes of behaviour (eg. Taylor (1964) p. 33,
5. Replacements for 'F-ness' will not, of course, always include 
the suffix '-ness'. Its function in the schematic context is to 
indicate the relation which 'happiness' bears to 'happy' which is, 
semantically, the same as the relation born by 'anger' to 'angry'.
11
Kenny (1963) p. 109). The point can be seen to turn on the opacity 
introduced by modal operators. 'It is necessary that if a #-ing is 
performed then its agent is F' plainly does not sanction an inference, 
even given identity of the #-ing with a Y-ing, to : 'It is necessary 
that if a ^-ing is performed then its agent is F'. If this were a 
reasonable inference, then any causal relation between two events 
such that the first could be picked out by a description of it as 
the cause of the second (and this is surely true of all causal re­
lations) would not be a causal relation. This is plainly contra­
dictory. One could not argue, therefore, that because 'if x (f)'s and 
cf)-ing is an expression of F-ness then Fx' is necessary, then there is 
a certain kind of relation, eg. causation, which cannot hold between 
instances of <j)-ing and instances of F-ness. At its simplest, the 
point is that one should avoid confusing relations between sentences 
with relations between things. One of the causes of this kind of 
muddle is allowing one's variables to range indiscriminately over 
descriptions and their descripta. If one refrains from doing this, 
then the question : 'Is the relation between X and Y causal o t  logical?' 
is readily seen to be nonsensical. Therefore the question as to 
whether 'x's (})-ing is an expression of F-ness' entails 'Fx' is 
equivalent (subject to a qualification to be introduced shortly) to 
the question of whether it expresses a relation.
2.2 An example which appears to meet the requirements of Tormey's 
strictly "inferential" concept is the following ; 'John expressed his 
sympathy by smiling', or (i) 'John's smiling expressed his sympathy'. 
Tormey correctly maintains that 'It would seem to be, prima-facie, 
meaningless to say that I am expressing my belief when there is 
admittedly no such belief that can be attributed to me' (Tormey, 
ibid, p. 68n), Analogously, it would be contradictory to assert that 
John expressed his sympathy and to deny that there was any sympathy 
felt by John. But this fails to establish that 'expression' describes 
a relation between the items mentioned, ie. John's smiling and John's 
sympathy. The failure is due to the entailment being adequately 
accounted for by the presence of the possessive pronoun, 'his'. The 
verb, 'expressed', in 'John expressed his sympathy', could be re­
placed by any other verb - eg. 'concealed', 'talked about', 'ignored'
- without removing the implication that John felt sympathetic. There 
is an analogy with reference to objects literally possessed or owned 
by the subject. 'John sailed his boat' is true only if there is a 
boat which belongs to John. The same applies to ; 'John dreamed about
12
his boat’, or : 'John dreamed that he was sailing his boat'. But 
there is no temptation to infer from this that there are two senses 
of 'dreams', one of which justifies inferring the existence of y from 
the fact that x dreams about y , and one of which does not - or such 
that one of them allows quantification into the context introduced by 
'dreams that ... ' and the other does not. The explanation of the 
implication lies in the fact that sentences of the form 'x ^'s x's y ' 
are equivalent to conjunctions, one of whose conjuncts asserts the 
possession of y by x.  ^ No doubt the idiom of possession is applied 
metaphorically to people and their emotions. Its logical pattern, 
however, is unaltered. It is simply carried over in its entirety from 
the domain of owners and the commodities they own to the domain of 
persons and the beliefs, desires, emotions, etc. which are attributable 
to them. However, considerable pressure is generated here to consider 
expression as an existentially quantifiable relation. The same pressure 
is not generated by sentences which lack a possessive pronoun. This 
strongly suggests that there cœe two senses of 'expression'. A 
similar problem arises for many propositional attitude sentences, but 
we are prepared to tolerate a high degree of complexity in their 
analysis because of the strength of our initial intuition that there 
is only one concept of belief or of dreaming (cp. Quine (195 6) p. 188 
in (1976)). A parallel intuition with respect to expression appears not 
to be very widespread. To avoid complicating matters unnecessarily, 
it may, therefore, be better to rest with a relational concept of 
expression applicable where the emotion expressed is actually felt 
and devise a totally autonomous concept for other cases.
This approach will be reinforced if examples are available which 
fit the relational pattern without depending on the antecedently 
established existence of the emotion expressed. An example which could 
plausibly be interpreted as meeting this requirement is the following :
(ii) William expressed resentment by staying away for three 
days.
(ii) appears to differ from a third kind of example in the way in 
which one can imagine it being used.
(iii) John expressed sympathy by smiling.
6. The possessive pronoun does not always function in quite this way. 
A different interpretation of 'his' is given in Section 5, but I see 
no alternative in the present context.
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(i) and (ii) seem to exemplify Tormey’s inferential concept of 
expression while (iii) does not, or at least need not. It is not 
obviously contradictory to deny that John felt sympathetic while 
assenting to (iii). But do (i) and (ii) differ in the same way from 
(iii)? I submit that they do not, and that there is some feature 
shared by (i) and (iii), but not by (ii). There is some intuitive 
support for this. If it is true that William expressed his resent­
ment by staying away for three days, it may also be true that, in a 
different sense of 'expresses', William stayed away not only because 
he felt resentful, but also because he was too shy or too polite to 
express his resentment. In the first sense of 'expression’, 
expression^^^, William's staying away was an expression of resentment. 
In the second sense, expression^g^, resentment can only be expressed 
by such activities as scowling, sulking, rude utterances and so on.
It appears that there is something that John does in both (i) and 
(iii) which is the same, and which can be described as expressing 
sympathy, and which is not equivalent to what William is reported to 
have done in (ii) with respect to resentment.
Expression^^ describes the relation between William's 
resentment and William's staying away for three days. If one admits 
causal relations between mental states such as resentment and behaviour 
such as staying away, then it seems that expression^^ is reducible 
wholesale to this kind of causation. This seems to conform to Tormey's 
inferential concept of expression which he is prepared to apply to 
the relations between desires and the actions to which they give rise 
and to the relations between actions and the beliefs which justify them 
(ibid. p. 30). This paves the way for the claim that there is no 
'descriptively distinct class of behaviour that constitutes expression' 
(ibid. p. 44). But there is no very pressing need for such a concept, 
since it does not enable us to say anything that could not equally 
well be said in terms of causation or explanation. The important 
point here is that expression^^ is not only inappropriate to (iii), 
but also to (i). For while (i), unlike (iii), asserts some kind of 
(eg. causal) relation between John's smiling and his sympathy, it is 
not thus fully characterised. What is missing, unsurprisingly, is 
that (i) also entails (iii). There is no equivalent entailment by
(ii). An approximate account of the differences between the three 
examples mentioned can be given in terms of the difference between 
tokens and types. Thus (i) asserts the conjunction of a relation 
between an action-token, John's smiling, and an emotion-type, sympathy.
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with a relation between John's smiling and an emotion-token, John's 
sympathy. It presupposes an association of a certain type of action, 
smiling (sympathetically), and a type of emotion. (ii) asserts only 
a relation between an action-token, staying away, and an emotion- 
token, resentment. It presupposes no antecedent relation between 
the types of which the items mentioned are tokens. (iii) asserts 
only a relation between an action-token and a type of emotion, imply­
ing nothing as to whether the latter is tokened.
(i), therefore, appears to combine elements taken from (ii) 
with elements taken from (iii). It seems that the analysis of the 
first must be postponed until after analysis of the third. The latter 
will re-import the expressive properties of behaviour like smiling 
sympathetically which are effectively eliminated by the construal of
(i) on the model of (ii). The problem faced by the token-relational 
account is initially exposed by its failure to accommodate (iii). In 
other words, it cannot account for expressive behaviour in a way that 
leaves it open whether or not the behaviour is sincere. It works only 
for examples like (ii), where the authenticity of the emotion is 
assured. It makes sense to ask whether a smile is sincere. It does 
not make sense to question the sincerity of staying away for three 
days. Tormey is prepared to equate the questions : 'Is x's ^-ing an 
expression of F-ness?' and : 'Is x's ^-ing a sincere expression of 
F-ness?' in the domain of behavioural, including linguistic, expres­
sion (ibid. p. 68). What is needed here, however, is a concept which 
will generate an intelligible interpretation of the following, 
obviously reasonable remark of Anthony Kenny's :
An assertion ... may be the expression of a belief. Of course,
an assertion may be a lie. In that case it expresses a belief
which the utterer does not have. (Kenny (1976) p. 40)
And, of course, a smile may be insincere, in which case, it expresses 
a feeling the smiler does not have. Moreover, because (i) entails 
(iii), the relational concept fails to account for sincere as well as 
insincere expression. In short, it cannot explain expressive be­
haviour of the kind that is sincere or insincere, but only behaviour 
which cannot be evaluated on this scale. A supplement to the theory 
is required, and the most natural source in which to search for this 
supplementary material is the theory of artistic expression, which 
provides the only other concept of expression available to those who 
opt for a bi-polar general theory.
2.3 Before proceeding to an examination of the prospects for a
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relational theory thus supplemented by a theory of expressive proper­
ties, a possible objection to the arguments of the preceding paragraphs 
needs to be recorded. The argument depends on the assumption, which 
is, prima-facie, plausible enough, that where ’F-ness’ ranges over 
emotions such as anger and ’F ’ over properties such as the property 
of being angry, ’x has a feeling of F-ness’ is equivalent to ’x is F ’. 
Given this assumption, to show that on a relational construal ’x 
expresses F-ness’ entails that x has F-ness is simultaneously to show 
that it entails that x is F, and hence that the relational concept 
corresponds to relatively few of the interesting things that can be 
said using the term ’expresses'. (As always, 'x' ranges over people 
and not their performances or what they achieve by them.) This 
assumption has been questioned by Wollheim ((1968) p. 45 in the 1970 
edition). Wollheim maintains that there are ways in which a man can 
stand in a 'possessive relation' to his feelings, eg. fear, which do 
not entail that he is actually afraid. We can experience feelings in 
something other than the 'primary sense'. Recognition of this is 
certainly required if an adequate phenomenology of emotion, and 
particularly of the role of emotion in both the spectator's and the 
creator's relation to the work of art, is to be achieved. The primary 
and secondary senses in which a man can be said to have a feeling 
correspond, perhaps, to the difference between having a belief and 
merely entertaining a thought. Thus, the objection continues, a man 
can express the belief that p even if he does not believe that p, so 
long as he stands in a secondary possessive relation to that belief.
His utterance then stands in an expressive relation to the belief which 
he possesses, albeit only in a secondary sense (the thought which he 
entertains).
There are two reasons why I think this objection is weak. First, 
the suggestion upon which it is based is, as it stands, very obscure 
indeed. It is merely adumbrated by Wollheim and there is no reason to 
suppose that, given the metophorical sense of 'possession' operating 
here, a detailed theory of this aspect of emotional experience would 
support the relational theory of expression. Anyway, the onus is 
squarely on the defender of that theory to expand the suggestion before 
any use can be made of it. Secondly, I doubt whether Wollheim's 
observation is relevant in the present context. Though prima-facie 
plausible in the aesthetic context, it is highly unlikely in the 
behavioural context that a person stands in any relation to an exist­
ing feeling when his behaviour is insincere. The aesthetic context
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includes the stage and it is often alleged that a good actor is 
obliged to feel the emotions of the characters he plays. The same 
hypothesis is rarely put forward to explain mundane hypocrisy about 
which Aldous Huxley once remarked that it is merely bad acting.
3. Alternative relata
A method of avoiding the less desirable consequences of the 
relation theory could be based on an ontological modification of what 
is expressed. Words like ’sadness’, ’anger’, etc., exhibit a certain 
ambiguity - an ambiguity not shared by words like ’redness’, largeness’, 
etc.. Both are substantives which are related systematically to pre­
dicates in such a way that the predicates are in some sense more 
semantically primitive. But terms like ’sadness’ and ’anger’ acquire 
a life of their own as names of states, or occurrences,which people 
can be in, or which happen in or to people. These terms function as 
names of emotions at least some of the time. But there is no equivalent 
kind of individual which is ever named by a substantivised colour ad­
jective. However, substantive emotion words also, some of the time, 
function in the same way as substantive colour words. Sometimes, 
'sadness' is the name of a sad thing - an emotion. At other times, 
'sadness' stands to 'sad' as 'redness' stands to 'red'. In order to 
preserve the relational concept of expression, all that is required is 
a broadly nominalist strategy for the interpretation of substantivised 
adj ectives.
If a neat solution to the problems of Section 2 could be 
achieved by platonising, then perhaps parsimony should not be insisted 
upon. The proposal would be to postulate the existence of universels 
to replace individual emotions in cases of expressive action, where 
no emotion is genuinely felt by the agent. However, there are grounds 
for pessimism about the prospects for this approach. The goal is to 
construct an integrated theory applicable at least to (i) and (iii) 
discussed above, if not to (ii) also. Expression is to be construed 
in (iii) as a relation holding between a piece of behaviour, John's 
smiling, and a universal, sympathy. (ii), accordingly, is to be 
construed as a relation of the same kind holding between a piece of 
behaviour, William's staying away for three days, and an emotion, 
resentment, actually suffered by William. But, while the notion of 
the relation (eg. identity) holding between a pair of universals being 
of the same kind as the relation holding between a pair of individuals 
is at least comparatively perspicuous, the notion of the same relation
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holding between an individual and either another individual or a 
universal is thoroughly obscure. Still, the requirement that the 
same relation is exemplified in both (ii) and (iii) can be dropped, 
since it is not unreasonable to assume that if there is any concept 
of expression applicable to (ii), it is not the same concept as that 
which operates in (iii). This still leaves (i), where John expresses 
the sympathy he actually feels by smiling. It looks as though (i) 
instantiates both kinds of relation at once. This is likely to prove 
cumbersome, to say the least, since it raises the further question of 
how the two relations are related. I will not pursue this. The 
same difficulties attach to the identification of the referent of 
'sympathy' in (iii) as a type or, with added implausibility, as a 
class.
There is, however, no absolute injunction against naming properties 
as such, insofar as this can be achieved by higher order quantification.
And quantification over properties is not straightforwardly reducible to 
ordinary quantification; witness the non-equivalence of '3F (tj)Fx)' and
'3x ((f)Fx)'. This might seem to encourage an attempt to construe expression
as a relation between behaviour and emotional properties as such.
However, such a proposal both seems to be open to the same objection as 
the previous one to treat expression as a relation between abstract objects 
and behaviour and is faced with the further problem of showing that 
properties (emotional or otherwise) can exist independently of there being 
any individuals which bear them. If it fails in the latter task, then 
the objectionable entailment from 'x's #-ing expresses F-ness' to 'Fx' 
will not have been effectively blocked.
4. Expressive properties
4.1 In the philosophy of art, there is a school of thought according 
to which, a work of art is expressive not because it is somehow related 
to the artist's state of mind anterior to, or during its production, but 
in virtue of certain features it possesses and which are accessible to 
viewers, however ignorant of the artist's biography. A well-known
statement of the position is the following by Bouwsma :
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As the life and the light describe (respectively) the 
geranium and the sun, so too does the sadness describe _ 
the music. (Bouwsma (1971) p. 248-9 in Hospers (1971))
The point is perhaps rather oddly put, but it is reasonably clear and 
it has an obvious application to facial expression. When a man smiles, 
his face is happy. When he scowls, his face is angry. The man whose 
face it is may be neither happy nor angry. (Wollheim (1966) pp. 90 
and 99 in (1973), Goodman (1976) p. 50.) The predicates ' ... is 
happy', ' ... is angry', clearly function here in a way which is not 
equivalent to the way in which they function when they are satisfied 
by feelings or by people who have those feelings. A face, or a work 
of art, cannot feel happy or angry, but they can, in a sense, be 
happy or angry. Predicates used in this way have been designated in 
various ways by philosophers who have noticed them; 'physiognomic' 
(Hampshire (1960) p. 153 in (1972) and Wollheim (op. cit.) p. 92); 
'anthropomorphic' (Sircello (1972)); and, wrongly I think,
'metaphorical' (Goodman (op. cit. p. 51). By extension, certain verbs, 
eg. 'to scowl' and certain descriptions of facial configurations, eg.
'a scowl', are physiognomic in that, although they do not explicitlyg
mention anger, they entail descriptions which do. '"To scowl" is 
to "produce an angry lie of the face".' (Wollheim (op. cit.) p. 97) 
There are no scowls which are not angry lies of the face, though there 
may be angry lies of the face which are not scowls. 'Scowls', then, is 
an implicit physiognomic predicate. 'Angry', applied to a face, is an 
explicit physiognomic predicate.
The physiognomic role of some predicates must be recognised, 
but it is far from certain that a physiognomic description can be 
found for every case of artistic or, more generally, non-inferential 
expression, nor that any important clarification could be achieved 
by doing so. A work of art might express a profound longing for the 
Kingdom of God. Does this make it a profoundly-longing-for-the-Kingdom- 
of-God work of art? In certain circumstances, a face might express an
7. See also Gurney (1971) p. 117 in Hospers (op. cit.) and Beardsley
(1971) p. 302, also in Hospers (op. cit.). A discussion of this view
is to be found in Aldrich (1978) pp. 203f.
8. I am not sure that 'smiles' is a physiognomic predicate in this
sense. Although 'x smiled' apparently implies that x's face was happy, 
I think that this implication is conversational in Grice's (1961) 
sense. One can also smile sadly. (I am indebted to Mark Sainsbury 
for insisting on this point.)
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avid desire for caviar. Does this make it an avidly-caviar-desiring 
face? Even if the invention of complex predicates like these is 
tolerated, it is not clear that they serve any purpose in the absence 
of an analysis of the notion of a physiognomic description. For 
Bouwsma is surely wrong to claim that ' ... is sad' is satisfied by 
a piece of music in exactly the same way as ' ... is living' is 
satisfied by a geranium. In fact, the concept of a physiognomic 
predicate can be elucidated only by appealing to the concept of 
expression it was introduced to explain or, in the case of Beardsley 
(op. cit.), to replace. A lie of the face or a piece of music is sad 
if and only if it expresses sadness. A predicate, F , when it occurs 
physiognomically, means 'is expressive of F'.
Goodman has made an attempt to characterise physiognomic
predicates without mentioning expression. According to Goodman, a
work of art expresses F-ness only if 'F' metaphorically denotes the
work of art. (Goodman (1976) pp. 50-52. At this stage, I am concerned
only with the first half of Goodman's analysis.) A piece of music, a
9
face, or a gesture expresses sadness or joy only if it is meta­
phorically sad or joyful. But the idea that sadness is even meta­
phorically ascribed to faces or works of art faces considerable 
intuitive resistance. When emotions are metaphorically attributed, 
they are attributed to entities, such as machines, which we do not 
believe to be capable of genuine mental activity. To say, in the case 
of machines, that emotion-predicates denote metaphorically, is to say 
that mental states are metaphorically ascribed to them. But mental 
states are never in any sense, metaphorical or otherwise, attributed 
to faces or works of art, though they are sometimes appealed to in 
their explanation. To say that an item of this kind metaphorically 
feels sad is only minimally less absurd than saying that it literally 
feels sad. Of course, in insisting that physiognomic predicates are 
literal, I do not mean to deny that they are somehow derivative. To 
that extent I agree with Goodman. But this derivation cannot be 
explained without using the operative concept of expression.
The 'descriptivist' programme, therefore, is best understood 
as an attempt to explain artistic expression; not as an attempt to 
abolish it. Descriptivism is designed to meet the need for a
9. On p. 58, Goodman indicates that he takes his theory to be 
applicable to facial and gestural as well as artistic expression.
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non-relational concept of expression applicable primarily to art. But 
this need is not met by focusing on a straightforwardly one^place 
predicate, 'expressive’ (as Tormey seems to do at, eg. p. 109). The 
aim is to block the question ; 'What does the work of art express?' 
only insofar as this question invites a token-relational interpre­
tation. But it can also be construed, as Aldrich puts it, as a 
request for further specification of the expressive property or 
properties attributed (Aldrich (op. cit.) p. 204). Any description 
of a work of art as expressive presupposes the availability of such 
a specification, or would presuppose it if a rich enough language 
existed. (It is, perhaps, part of the critic's role to enrich our 
linguistic resources in precisely this area.) The concept of speci­
fication resembles the move from 'coloured' to 'red'. If an object 
is reported to be coloured, a question is automatically raised as to 
what colour it is. This would not ordinarily be regarded as a request 
for the identification of an object, say redness, to which the coloured 
object stands in some relation.
The concept of expression in art can be clarified by applying 
to it the treatment Goodman applies to the representation of non- 
existant objects (Goodman (op. cit. pp. 21f.). Representation, as it 
occurs in portraiture for example, is a two-place concept. A portrait 
is a representation of its model. But many representational paintings, 
such as pictures of unicorns, do not have a model. Goodman suggests 
that a complex single place predicate should be introduced to deal 
with these cases. A painting of a unicorn is a unicorn-representing 
picture. This specifies the kind of picture it is, not the thing it 
is a picture of. No reference is made to unicorns. Similarly, a
painting may be a sadness-expressing picture and a smile may be a
sympathy-expressing smile. These descriptions specify the kind of 
picture and the kind of smile without referring to emotions. The task
for a theory of artistic expression, then, is very different from the
task for a theory of behavioural expression as initially perceived.
The aim of the latter was to describe the relation between behaviour 
and emotion when the first expresses the second. The aim of the former 
is to formulate the conditions under which it is proper to ascribe 
expressive properties to objects, to compare ascriptions of expressive 
properties to ascriptions of non-expressive properties and to provide 
an adequate account of how the expressive properties of an object 
are related to its non-expressive properties.
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4.2 The unanswered question at the end of 2.2 was whether the 
relational theory of behavioural expression could usefully be supple­
mented by something like the property theory of expression applicable 
primarily, but not exclusively, to art. The examples given in Section 
2 were such that (ii) , William’s expressing resentment by staying away 
for three days, was adequately accounted for by a purely relational 
concept of expression, if (ii) exemplifies any useful concept of 
expression at all. (iii), John’s expressing sympathy by smiling, was 
left totally unexplained insofar as John may or may not have been 
feeling sympathetic at the time. (i) was partly dealt with by the 
relational concept, but appeared to require further explication because 
of the similarity intuitively discerned between (i) and (iii). The 
difficulty encountered by the relational theory led to pessimism about 
the prospects of an integrated theory of expression sufficiently power­
ful to deal with examples of all three kinds. But a straightforward 
combination of the relational and the property concepts of expression 
may provide a solution. The property theory will apply to cases of 
expression, artistic or otherwise, which are inaccessible to the 
relation theory. Thus (iii) will be interpreted as the explicit 
ascription of a physiognomic or expressive property to John’s be­
haviour. (ii) is purely relational and (i) will be rendered as a 
conjunction, one of whose conjuncts will assert that John has a feel­
ing of sympathy, while the other attributes the physiognomic property 
of sympathy to John’s behaviour. 'John expressed his sympathy by 
smiling' becomes : 'John was sympathetic and John's smile was sympathy- 
expressing'. This would allow the relational concept to be dropped 
altogether, at least for the purposes of facial expression. It is 
applicable only to cases like (ii) which do not constitute a fundamental 
concern of this thesis. The property theory will account for (i) and
(iii) in such a way that (i) is equivalent to (iii) and an assertion 
that John feels sympathetic. More formally, where 'x' is a variable 
ranging over persons, 'a' ranges over actions, 'G' is a predicate 
variable ranging over expressive properties and 'F' over emotional 
properties or states, the following structures correspond to (i) and
(iii) :
(i ) 3x 3a ; Action (x,a) & Ga & Fx (alternatively : Possesses 
(x, F-ness)).
(iii ) 3x 3a : Action (x,a) & Ga.
This, of course, leaves open the relation between predicates 'G' and 
'F', which is a matter of semantics.
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But this interpretation of (i) is plainly incomplete, since the 
original sentence certainly seemed to indicate a relation between 
John's smiling and his feeling of sympathy. Should we then simply 
tack on an additional clause : r(F-ness, a) and leave open the nature 
of r, which is to be determined by a general theory about the relation 
between mental events and actions? Or should the concept of expression 
as a relation be restored as a potential (to be filled out) definition 
of r? Neither proposal is very promising. The first fails to account 
for the fact that in (i), the term 'expresses' seems to relate John's 
smiling and John's sympathy. The second implausibly represents (i) as 
the combined operation of two otherwise autonomous concepts of 
expression. (iii) raises difficulties of a complementary nature.
(iii ) has the advantage of cancelling the apparent implications about 
the agent's emotions by rendering 'expresses F-ness' as a one-place 
predicate, 'G'. But the motive for cancelling that implication is that 
'a' may denote an insincere expressive action. This is not strictly 
comparable to the motives which encourage descriptivism in art. In 
the former case, but not in the latter, there is something wrong or 
unusual in the agent's not feeling what he expresses. Such behaviour 
is insincere and ought to be understood as an instance of a kind of 
behaviour most of whose other* instances are sincere. The theory of 
artistic expression extends straightforwardly to the fictitious 
expressive behaviour of the actor on stage. But it is as wrong to 
assimilate insincere to fictitious expression as it is to assimilate 
lies to novels. A unitary concept of expression must be found which 
is neither relational, in the existentially quantifiable token-token
sense considered until now, nor predicative in an unstructured way.
At the same time, the concept must do justice to the relational and 
predicative elements in expression.
5. Expressing that ...
5.1 At the beginning of his discussion of expression, Goodman 
introduces a distinction which superficially resembles and has the 
same motive as other distinctions between relational and non­
relational expression.
That a person expresses sadness may mean that he expresses the 
feeling of sadness or that he expresses his having of that 
feeling ... a person may express sadness he neither has nor 
claims to have, or may have or claim to have a feeling he does
not express. (Goodman (1976) p. 45)
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This passage runs together two distinctions which, once separated 
and combined with earlier suggestions, will provide the material for 
a rudimentary three-way distinction. One of the concepts thus 
isolated is more promisingly applicable to facial expression than 
anything considered hitherto. In the phrase, 'his having of a 
feeling', 'his' can be understood in two ways. If it is treated as a 
literal possessive pronoun as in §2.2, this may yield 'the having of 
a feeling which he has' as an interpretation of Goodman's phrase, thus 
generating the same pattern of entailments as the earlier preoccupation 
with the expression by a person of his feelings. But Goodman's phrase 
can also be interpreted ; 'the having by him of a feeling'. This is 
a new suggestion. A person may express the having by him of a feel­
ing of sadness. There is no obvious implication that the person is 
sad.
In the gloss on his distinction Goodman again runs together 
two points. A person may express sadness he does not feel (have).
That is one point. But a person may also express sadness he does not 
claim to feel. This is a separate point. The artist, when he expresses 
a feeling in his work, may not have and does not, solely in virtue of 
what his work expresses, claim to have that feeling. But there is a 
sense in which a person who expresses sadness in his behaviour does 
thereby claim to be sad - whether or not he genuinely is. Linguisti­
cally there are a variety of ways of expressing sadness, one of which 
is simply to say, 'I am sad'. An utterance of this sentence is usually 
an assertion by the utterer that the utterer is sad. However, it is 
not, on that account, never an expression of sadness (cf. Alston (1965) 
who criticises the expressive/assertive dichotomy as it was understood 
by the Emotivists). I submit that some behavioural expression contains 
a non-verbal but assertoric element of this kind and I suspect that 
this is partly what Goodman had in mind. A happy smile is a kind of 
non-verbal claim or assertion that the person smiling is happy. It 
may be true or false because smiles may be sincere or insincere.
It is clear that Goodman's distinction does not correspond to 
Tormey's distinction between an inferential and a non-inferential 
(relational and predicative) concept of expression. It is consider­
ably more sophisticated. If there is a use for Tormey's inferential 
concept then we now have three kinds of expression, ie. three kinds 
of statement that can be made using the word 'expression'. First 
there are reports, like (ii) which entail that what is expressed is
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genuinely felt. Secondly, there are reports like (iii) which do 
not carry this entailment but do involve the attribution to the 
agent of something like a claim to feel what is expressed. Finally 
there are descriptions of artistic and fictitious (histrionic) 
expression, which carry no implications either about what the artist 
or actor genuinely feels, or about how he claims to feel. It is 
the second kind of description that applies to facial expression.
The natural way to represent Goodman’s notion that one can 
express one's having of a feeling in a familiar form would be to 
treat 'expresses' as a sentence-operator. This would give the 
following structure :
(iv) x's #-ing expresses that (Fx).
Again, it is immaterial whether the sentence operated on is repre­
sented as 'Fx' (eg. 'John is (feels) sympathetic') or as 'Has 
(x, F-ness)' (eg. 'John has a feeling of sympathy'). 'John's 
smiling expresses that John is sympathetic' will now translate the
(iii) example. The (i) example will become : 'John is sympathetic 
and John's smiling expresses that John is sympathetic'. (iii') and 
(i/) in Section 4.2 will now become :
(iii ) 3x3a : Action (x,a) & a expresses that (Fx).
(i ) 3x3a : Action (x,a), Fx & a expresses that (Fx).
The relation between the two conjuncts, 'Fx' and 'a expresses that 
Fx' is now far less obscure than it was. The conjunction is equivalent 
to the statement that the sentence operated on by 'expresses that' 
is true. In general sentences that assert the performance of sincere 
expressive behaviour will say of some action, a, that : a expresses that 
p and p is true - where p is some proposition about the agent's 
emotional or mental state.
The proposal may well fail to account for cases like (ii) and 
for artistic expression. If there is a concept of expression which 
is such that use of it entails the existence of what is expressed 
then it could still be represented as a sentence operator with the 
added stipulation that 'expresses' in this sense belongs to a class 
of verbs which includes 'reveals that', 'shows that', and so on, which 
is such that if  ^ is a member of it, 'x (f)-s that p' entails the truth 
of its embedded sentence. (cf. Unger (1972) p. 301, McDowell (1980) 
p. 126.) This would then just be a semantically different concept
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of expression from that which applies to smiling and which, like 
’means that’, ’is prima-facie evidence that’, does not entail the 
truth of the sentence it embeds. This conforms to our intuition that
(ii) does indeed exemplify a different concept of expression from 
the one which is exemplified in both (i) and (iii). Similarly, 
artistic expression just is different from facial expression, so 
the failure of my proposal to account for the former is not an 
objection to it. All that is required is an integrated theory that 
works for cases like (i) and (iii). If, furthermore, it distinguishes 
these from (ii) and artistic expression, then this is an advantage, 
not a disadvantage.
5.2 However, there remains a difficulty with this proposal.
Construed as a sentence operator, ’expresses that’ closely resembles 
’says that’. But many would find the following form of ’says that’ 
statement unacceptable :
3x : X says that Fx.
The objection to the proposal in §5. 1 is that, like sentences in the 
above form, it involves quantifying into a referentially opaque context 
from outside. There are three possible responses to this objection.
One might first attempt to answer it by pointing out that the objection 
presupposes that the presence of ’that’ invariably introduces opacity 
in the subject position of the embedded sentence. Since the pre­
supposition is false, the objection could be met by treating ’expresses 
that’ as an addition to a class of operators, which includes ’it is 
true that ... ’, whose members do not interfere with reference. 
Alternatively, we could concede that there is opacity and proceed to 
deal with it by applying to ’expresses that’ statements whatever method 
is preferred for the analysis of opaque sentences in general, eg. 
Davidson’s ’paratactic’ analysis or Quine’s (1966) proposals.
I do not propose to choose between these strategies or to 
describe either in detail because the issue of opacity is, in the 
present context, of negligible importance. Even if it is conceded 
that ’expresses that’ is opaque, the main concern of this thesis is 
with comparatively primitive kinds of expressive behaviour, kinds of 
activity in which not only humans but also unsophisticated, languageless 
creatures can participate. This is relevant because if replacements
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for X in 'x expressed that (Fx)’ are to include primitive creatures 
then ordinary inferences which assume the applicability of Leibniz'
Law to the second occurrence of x will, in any conceivable case, derive 
true conclusions from true premisses even if they are not formally valid.
This is true not just for primitive creatures, but for sophisticated 
ones using primitive means. Thus if it is true that 'John expressed 
that John was sympathetic', and John turns out to be Mr Smith, then 
it is difficult to imagine circumstances under which the results of 
substituting 'Mr Smith' for either or both occurrences of 'John' would 
be false.
5.3 Finally, something should be said about the way in which 
applying the 'expresses that' concept to physiognomic behaviour allows 
the element of truth in the relational theory to be preserved. For, 
while persisting in the denial that the relevant concept is to be 
defined as a relation between an emotion and a piece of behaviour, it 
now seems that what distinguishes behavioural from artistic expression 
is that the former involves a relation between an expressive agent and 
his behaviour which is not duplicated by the latter. Behavioural expression 
attvthutes what is expressed to the agent. No such attribution characterizes 
artistic expression. The point can be put in quasi-semantic terms : 
expressive behaviour "refers" to its agent. Artistic expression, which 
might be supposed to carry a certain aspiration towards universality, 
does not "refer" to the artist. True, this insistance on self-reference, 
while it allows for the coherence of insincere expression, imposes a 
certain complexity on the analysis of its histrionic counterpart. The 
complexity will match that of analyses put forward by Tormey and others 
(Tormey (1971) p. 52). It is misleading to say that Olivier expressed 
Othello's jealousy. Rather, we should say that Olivier portrayed Othello 
expressing jealousy. This is not, as Tormey thought, because the
relevant concept of expression asserts a relation between an emotion 
and the expressive product, but because it asserts a relation between 
the product and its author which significantly transcends the given 
relation of authorship or production.
10. Histrionic expression, therefore, like fictitious as opposed to 
poetic expression, is not strictly comparable to aesthetic expression 
in general, where that is understood to apply only where we say that 
the work of art expresses F-ness. A better comparison is between 
histrionic/fictitious expression and cases where a painting is said 
to represent a person expressing F-ness.
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This concludes my survey of the grammar of the concept of 
expression in which I am interested. For the sake of verbal facility, 
however, I will continue to use idiomatic constructions in the rest 
of this essay. The assumption is that the sense of my usage will 
conform to the requirements of this chapter despite its idiomatic 
surface grammar.
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II. INTERPRETATION AND EXPLANATION
1. Utterances
1.1 To interpret an utterance is to assign a meaning to it. The 
same utterance, given the truth of assumptions about the speaker's 
truthfulness and literalness, is partially explained by the attribution 
of a relevant belief to the speaker. There is an obvious parallel 
between this distinction and the contrasting conceptions of expression 
discussed in Chapter 1. To explain an utterance, or any other kind 
of action, is to indicate how it is (causally) related to the beliefs 
and desires of the speaker or agent. To interpret an utterance is to 
say in some detail what kind of action it is without saying anything 
about its causation. The effect of the previous chapter was to supply 
a purely formal adumbration of a hermeneutic rather than an explanatory 
construal of descriptions of behaviour as expressive. But this 
ostensibly perspicuous distinction is repeatedly threatened. The 
source of the menace lies not only in what appear to be explicitly 
reductive programmes in the philosophy of language - the traditional 
target of this kind of criticism being, perhaps unfairly, the Gricean 
programme - but also unexamined confusions pertaining to non- 
linguistic theories of interpretation. Confusions of this kind are 
prevalent in theories about action, especially in the philosophy of 
the social sciences, where two paths can be discerned which lead to 
the same predicament. First there is the hermeneutic tradition, 
traceable to Dilthey, which is based on the model of textual exegesis.  ^
In its cruder manifestations, this school of thought seeks to replace 
psychological explanation altogether with a species of interpretation. 
Less crudely, its exponents still purport to have isolated an inter­
pretative element, or presupposition in all psychological explanation. 
More recently, some philosophers, fascinated by the work of Davidson 
and Quine, have focused exclusively on the interpretation of behaviour. 
A failure to distinguish interpretation from explanation also obscures 
certain questions about perception, where a clarification of the 
distinction will yield results interestingly germane to the theme of
1. See, for example, Ricoeur (1971).
2. eg. Hookway (1978).
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behavioural expression. The present chapter will proceed via some 
initial remarks about radical interpretation to a consideration of 
the extent to which similar techniques are applicable to non-verbal 
behaviour and an attempt to disambiguate a class of action-descriptions 
by reference to the interpretation/explanation dichotomy. Finally, a 
parallel dichotomy is exposed which applies to perception.
1.2 There are features of Davidson's (1973, 1974) writings on 
radical interpretation which may partly explain the conflation of 
interpretation and explanation by subsequent writers. It must be 
stressed, however, that no confusion on this score is imputable to 
Davidson himself. The latter has discerned two analogies and two 
connections between explanation and interpretation; both the analogies 
and the connections fall short of equivalence. First, the former.
To interpret a German speaker's utterance of 'Es regnet' is to re­
describe it as an action of saying that it is raining (Davidson (1973) 
p. 314 & (1974) p. 309). Decision theory, the function of which is 
to explain people's actions as the product of their desires and beliefs, 
also 'allows us to redescribe certain events in a revealing way'. But 
Davidson explicitly warns against taking the analogy any further, at 
least in one inviting direction.
For decision theory can also explain actions, while it is
not at all clear how a theory of interpretation can explain
a speaker's uttering the words 'Snow is white'. ((1975) p. 13)
A theory of interpretation will yield a different kind of information 
from that yielded by an explanatory theory such as decision-theory, 
even where both types of theory are brought to bear on the same material 
The analogy, therefore, is strictly incomplete.
Nevertheless, there are finer structural features which the two 
kinds of theory share. The organisation of the conceptual material 
required for radical interpretation maps onto that of the material 
required in the explanation of choices. In the latter, the agent's 
subjective probability and the relative strength of his desire conspire 
to determine his preferences vis-a-vis a specific context of choice.
His preference then unilaterally determines his choice. In the 
explanation of speech, the speaker's belief and the meanings he attaches 
to the sentences of his language conspire to determine which sentences 
he holds true at any particular time. It is to be assumed that evi­
dence that a speaker holds a certain sentence to be true is unproblema- 
tically accessible in advance of knowledge both of the speaker's
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beliefs and of the meaning of his utterances (Davidson (1974) 
p. 312-313). Holding-true unilaterally explains the speaker's 
linguistic behaviour, at least within an extensive, assertoric 
fragment of his language; it determines which sentences he will pro­
duce when interrogated and which sentences uttered by others he will 
assent to. Utterance, holding-true, belief and meaning in radical 
interpretation map onto choice, preference, subjective probability 
and strength of desire, respectively, in decision theory (ibid. p. 314)
The two connections between interpretation and explanation are 
partially implicit in the structural analogy. The first concerns the 
need, in experimental choice situations, to establish a common 
language uniting the subject of the experiment and the investigator 
(ibid. p. 315). This need not preoccupy us here and I mention it 
only in order to distinguish it from a second connection which is more 
germane to the present theme. As Davidson understands it, the radical 
interpreter's problem consists in the impossibility of determining the 
beliefs of members of a community under investigation before he posse­
sses a theory to interpret their utterances, but such a theory is not 
available in the absence of prior information about their beliefs. 
Consequently, 'we must somehow deliver simultaneously a theory of 
belief and a theory of meaning' (ibid. p. 312). The function of the 
holding-true attitude in the theory is to show how this is possible.
It is assumed that the conditions under which native speakers hold 
sentences of their language to be true are accessible to the inter­
preter. Instances of holding-true, therefore, can be substituted for 
utterances as the evidential base, the explananda of the theory. The 
fact that speakers hold a sentence to be true under specifiable con­
ditions will provide evidence simultaneously for the ascription of a 
belief to speakers under those conditions and for the assignment of 
meaning (truth-condition) to the sentence.
What does this imply about the connection between meaning and 
belief, between interpretation and the doxastic component in the 
teleological explanation of speech-acts? There is a puzzle here. The 
procedure which allows us to interpret radically alien linguistic 
performances is the same as the procedure which allows us to ascribe 
beliefs to the speakers of radically alien languages. Both are a 
matter of correlating linguistic behaviour with 'stimulus conditions', 
where linguistic behaviour includes utterances as well as assent to, 
or dissent from utterances by others. This seems to suggest that the
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connection between interpretation and belief ascription is not mere 
simultaneity, but equivalence. How could there be a difference of 
substance between two theories with a shared evidential base? The 
question is, of course, manifestly verificationist in tone, and one 
could, in the spirit of Quine, answer that there is no difference. 
Quine, indeed, does not always distinguish between questions about the 
reality of the mental and questions about the determination of 
semantic facts (eg. Quine (1969) p. 27f). But this would be alien to 
the spirit of Davidson's philosophy, which includes a commitment to 
an ontology of mental events (Davidson (1970)). There seem to be 
two options here. Either one can retain a commitment to a form of 
behaviourism, but hold that there can be behavioural evidence for 
belief which is independant of language. This is the strategy adopted 
by Jonathan Bennett in (1976). Or it can be denied that the dependence 
of two theories on the same evidence entails the equivalence of the 
theories with respect to their substance.
Davidson's position conforms to the second alternative. It is 
not meant to justify a reduction of thought to speech. The fact that 
interpretation and belief-ascription share the same evidential base 
is not explained by their theoretical equivalence but by the reciprocal 
nature of the evidential links between them. ' ... is evidence 
that ... ' is a transitive relation between sentences. If p is 
evidence that q, then whatever evidence there is for p is also 
evidence in support of q. If, in addition, q is evidence that p, then 
whatever evidence there is for q is also evidence in support of p.
This describes the situation in radical interpretation, when p might 
be a sentence assigning a meaning or truth-condition to a sentence of 
the object language and q a sentence ascribing a belief to the utterer 
of the sentence. There is no temptation to suppose that p and q are 
in any sense equivalent.
Davidson's own conception of his theory is definitely non- 
reductive ((1975) p. 9). The connection between interpretation and 
first-order belief-ascription is displayed in a description of the 
role of interpretation in the teleological explanation specifically of 
utterances. The passage quoted on p. 29 continues as follows :
' ... uttering words is an action, and so must draw for its 
teleological explanation on beliefs and desires. Interpre­
tation is not irrelevant to the teleological explanation of 
speech, since to explain why someone said something we need 
to know, among other things, his own interpretation of what
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he said, that is, what he believes his words mean in the 
circumstances under which he speaks. Naturally this will 
involve some of his beliefs about how others will interpret 
his words. ((1975) p. 13)
In general, the explanation of action requires information about what 
kind of action the agent takes his behaviour to be. In the case of 
speech this primary information is provided by the theory of inter­
pretation. The product of the theory of belief is not the same as the 
product of the theory of interpretation. The first picks out the 
speaker's first-order beliefs about the world. The second picks out 
his second-order beliefs about how others will interpret his behaviour.
1.3 It will be pertinent at this point to mention some of the dif­
ficulties which afflict the Davidsonian conception of radical interpre­
tation. The nature of the criticisms to follow is not such as to 
entail rejection of the theory on the ground that it connot avoid 
reduction. The point is rather that certain conspicuous silences in 
the Davidsonian theory seem to encourage the search for a supplementary 
or even an alternative theory elsewhere. The obvious direction in 
which this search will lead is towards the theory of communication- 
intentions and this, notoriously, introduces a new risk of reduction.
For the Gricean programme appears to construe interpretation as the 
explanation of an utterance_ as the outcome of a complex set of 
intentions vis-a-vis an audience. This kind of programme is not, in 
fact, as pernicious as the last sentence makes it appear. This is 
seen once it is supplemented by a distinction between the interpretation 
of token-utterances and the interpretation of utterance-types 
(cf. Schiffer (1972) p. 3f).
A theory of interpretation is bound to assume the existence of 
a high correlation between the beliefs actually held by speakers of 
a language and the beliefs they express in their linguistic behaviour.
It is not, therefore, an objection to Davidson that his account is 
firmly based on this assumption. But mental events in general cannot, 
given 'the holism of the mental realm' (Davidson (1970) p. 217 in 
(1980)), be attributed singly.
Beliefs and desires issue in behaviour only as modified and 
mediated by further beliefs and desires, attitudes and 
attendings, without limit. (ibid.)
The ascription of a belief to an agent will explain his behaviour, 
verbal or otherwise, only in conjunction with a specific desire. If 
there is reason to believe that the relevant desire is absent and that
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some other desire is operative, then the same action will require for 
the completion of its explanation the ascription of an altogether 
different belief to the agent. It is a corollary of this that if 
instances of a certain kind of behaviour are regularly associated 
with the same belief, then they must also be associated with a whole 
set of beliefs and desires. The objection to Davidson’s account of 
radical interpretation is now seen to be not that it imports too much 
explanatory material into the theory of interpretation, but that it 
contains too little. If Davidson's description of holism is literally 
true, then it seems that the amount of explanation required before 
interpretation can begin is limitless. But the limitlessness of the 
antecedents of action is, I think, an exaggeration. In many cases 
little more is needed than pairs of desires and beliefs (cf. Bennett 
(1976) p. 80), and in all, explanation 'must come to an end somewhere'. 
The relevance of many of an agent's attitudes to particular actions 
will be highly attenuated. What, then, is required for the explanation 
of speech beyond the attribution of the belief expressed? At the 
very least the speaker must want his interlocutor to be correctly 
informed. The radical interpreter must assume a certain complicity on 
the part of his informer. And Davidson himself has conceded (in the 
passage quoted on p. 31) that the speaker must have certain beliefs 
about how his words will be interpreted by others. It is difficult to 
see, in the light of these remarks, what objections remain to the in­
corporation of the notion of communication-intentions into the 
interpreter's theoretical apparatus.
A similar conclusion can be reached by a slightly different 
route. The argument of the previous paragraph is compatible with the 
view that no evidence for a person's beliefs is obtainable in advance 
of an adequate interpretation of his utterances. The argument to fol­
low puts that claim in doubt. It could be argued that all that 
Davidson has shown is that, in Peacocke's (1979) phrase, no belief can 
be attributed to a person in advance of the application of other 
concepts belonging to some scheme of holistic explanation. Radical 
interpretation is not the only such scheme in which the concept of belief 
has an explanatory function, the other being the scheme of action- 
explanation. A defender of Davidson could offer two answers to this 
challenge. The first answer would depend on the first-mentioned 
connection perceived by Davidson as holding between interpretation 
and explanation. In experimental situations devised to test a subject's 
preferences between options, the values of which are not straight­
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forwardly discriminable, the experimenter must be able to check that 
the subject correctly understands his instructions (Davidson (1974) 
p. .315). This raises anew the problems first raised in connection 
with interpretation alone. Ideally, therefore, one must aim for an 
integrated theory of decision and interpretation (ibid. p. 316), and 
the interpretation and action schemes should be seen to constitute a 
single scheme of holistic explanation. However, the suggestion that 
all preferences are inaccessible in the way in which they are in the 
experiment discussed by Davidson is implausible. In general, where 
there is a choice between two options which are manifestly different, 
preference is straightforwardly exhibited in the choices made. Of 
course, this does not settle which of several possible explanations of 
the preference exhibited is true. This is still a matter of attri­
buting sets of beliefs and desires to the subject, but it was not at 
this point that Davidson saw a need for interpretation, and it is 
highly unlikely that there is a specific need here (cf. Bennett (1976) 
Chapters 3 and 4). Precisely which set of attitudes will truly 
explain an agent's activity on a particular occasion is a question the 
answer to which is determined by the agent's behaviour in different 
but comparable contexts. This may include his linguistic behaviour 
but need not do so.
It will not help Davidson's case to point out that these 
objections entirely ignore the role of the holding-true relation in the 
theory. For an additional difficulty in the theory concerns the 
explanatory weight placed on that concept. The burden is more than it 
can bear for the following reasons. First, the concept of holding- 
true is itself an explanatory concept which is impotent outside an 
appropriate scheme of holistic explanation. It is true that we can 
sometimes tell whether a man holds a sentence to be true without 
knowing either what belief of his the sentence expresses or what the 
sentence means. But Peacocke ((1979( p. 199) has argued that this 
ability presupposes that applications of the entire scheme have had 
successful results with the same person in the past. If, for example, 
we can tell that a speaker is being honest from his tone of voice,
3. In developing his theory of holistic explanation Peacocke argues 
that Davidson's characterisation of the holism of the mental realm 
fails to capture the distinctive nature of holistic explanation in 
general (Peacocke (1979) p. 20). But the arguments of this section 
require only that Davidson's characterisation should be true of the 
mental realm, which Peacocke allows. The other details of Peacocke's 
highly intricate theory need not detain us here.
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this can only be because we have been able in the past correctly to 
attribute beliefs to him on the basis of his utterances in a simi­
lar tone, of sentences we do understand. This is plainly unlike 
the situation in radical interpretation. The impasse which faced 
interpretation at the outset has not been removed. This particular 
objection could be met if there were evidence of a different kind to 
support the claim that there are natural signs of honesty, the 
recognition of which is not impeded by cultural barriers. The nature 
of the evidence required is discussed in the final chapters of this 
thesis.
However, if such evidence were available, it would not just be 
evidence in favour of the holding-true attitude, but would have to 
support the simultaneous ascription of a much more complex set of 
attitudes to the speaker. For holding-true simply does not determine 
linguistic behaviour unilaterally in the way in which preference 
determines choice. This is not just because of the obvious point 
that at any one time there are several sentences a person holds-true, 
most, if not all, of which he does not voice. The relevant linguistic 
behaviour does not only include a speaker’s spontaneous utterances but 
covers the sentences produced by the speaker under interrogation and 
the sentences to which he assents. Such behaviour is still not 
exhaustively explained by the speaker's holding the sentence in question 
to be true. For he will not produce or assent to an appropriately 
true sentence of his language unless he is predisposed to supply his 
interlocutor with correct information about his present beliefs and, 
in the context of radical interpretation, about the meanings of 
sentences in his language. It is here that a proponent of the Gricean 
theory might be expected to discern a suitable aperture through which 
to infiltrate his theory. A crucial component of that theory has 
already been admitted, albeit in an imprecise form. The notion in 
question is that of the speaker's attitude towards the interpreter, 
mention of which is required to supplement the attitudes towards 
sentences already mentioned in the explanation of linguistic behaviour. 
It is deeply plausible to argue that the nature of the native speaker's 
complicity is best captured by a description of the speaker's inten­
tions vis-a-vis the interpreter. Remaining within the context of 
indicative utterances, the speaker's attitude will be characterised as 
an intention to produce or 'activate' a true belief in the interpreter 
about what he, the speaker, believes at the time of utterance; and 
this intention will, itself, be intended by the speaker to be 'overt'.
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ie. recognised by the interpreter. ^ The aim of the theory will then 
be to specify the extent of the overtness required, that is, the 
extent of the knowledge the interpreter must possess if he is to inter­
pret the speaker's utterances.
1.4 This development introduces a deeper threat to the interpretation/ 
explanation dichotomy which it is the aim of this discussion to preserve. 
This new threat is, in a sense, the opposite of that which was discerned 
in a behaviourist concept of radical translation at p. 30 above. There 
it began to look as if the concept of belief could be made redundant 
in the explanation of speech. It seemed to add nothing to what has 
already been achieved when meanings have been assigned to utterances.
For completion of the latter task is reached when speakers' dispositions 
to assent to sentences of their language have been correlated with 
observable conditions. To maintain that speakers beli,eve what they say 
is to contribute nothing further to the explanation of their linguistic 
behaviour since belief, too, is exhibited only in observable disposi­
tion to assent to sentences. The communication-intention theory 
reverses this tendency. Now it seems that the attitudes of the speaker 
to the world (beliefs) and to an audience are sufficient to explain 
his communicative behaviour. Nothing further is contributed to the 
explanation by an independent notion of sentence-meaning. The explana­
tion of an utterance on the basis of the utterer's intentions 
constitutes its interpretation.
As thus summarised, however, this style of theory has little 
chance of providing a complete account of linguistic meaning. The 
theory is construed as a straightforward reductive proposal involving 
a single step from the concept of what a speaker means by what he utters 
on a particular occasion, which is defined in terms of his intentions 
vis-a-vis an audience, to the meaning of his utterance. In this 
form the theory is vulnerable to the objection, raised by Mark Platts 
((1979) pp. 88-90), that it makes no mention of the belief held by 
the utterer of a sentence, a, which fulfuls the essential role of 
justifying or rationalising the utterance of a by a speaker who intends
4. This formulation is intended to be approximate since the text would 
be uselessly cluttered by a detailed exposition of the analysis of the 
speaker's intentions. It follows Strawson ((1970) at p. 172 in (1971)), 
with the modified notion of the 'activation' of belief imported from 
Schiffer ((1972) p. 51) and the stipulation that the belief intended 
by the speaker to be activated in the interpreter be true, imported 
from McDowell ((1980) p. 125f).
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to communicate that p. This belief, so the objection continues, can 
only be specified as the belief that o means that p. But this objection 
is effective, if at all, only as directed against a theory produced 
by an extraordinarily uncharitable interpretation of Grice’s earliest 
(1957) article (p. 46 in Strawson ed. (1967)), and also against 
Bennett’s conception of ’one-off’ cases of S-meaning, insofar as the 
latter, as initially introduced, is explicity meant to be independant 
of any behavioural regularity and no explicit reference is made to 
an alternative semantically explanatory concept, such as iconicity 
(Bennett (1967) p. 13).
The programme of the communication-intention theorists, however, 
constitutes a reduction which proceeds via at least two stages. It 
cannot proceed without the introduction of the concept of an utterance- 
type as distinct from that of an utterance-token. The order of logical 
priorities, for the communication-intention theorist, runs from the 
concept of what a speaker means by an utterance on a particular occasion 
through the concept of the meaning of a whole-utterance type to the 
concept of the meaning of a whole-utterance token (Schiffer (1972) p. 7). 
A whole-utterance type, a, means that p only if that is what people 
generally mean when they utter tokens of a. The concept of speaker- 
meaning, then, enters only indirectly into the definition of the 
concept of the meaning of a whole-utterance token. Mark Platts' 
objection is met, therefore, by agreeing that what justifies a 
speaker's belief that his intentions will be realised is the meaning 
of the utterance type, a token of which he utters. This will then be 
analysed on the basis of the complex intentions with which tokens of 
that type are normally uttered. The account still depends, of course, 
on there being cases of S-meaning which are successful but do not 
depend on language. That cases of this kind are possible ought not to 
be seriously disputed, but no doubt a reductive programme of the Gricean 
variety needs to say something about how they are effected. Such an 
account will need to appeal to some broad concept of 'iconicity'
(cf. Bennett (ibid.) p. 139f) or 'salience' (cf. Lewis (1979) p. 35f).
At this point the details need not concern us further. The relevant 
consequence of the preceeding precis of the Gricean programme is that 
even if that programme is reductively construed, it still admits a 
distinction between interpretation and explanation in relation to 
utterance tokens. To interpret an utterance is to specify the type of 
which it is a token. To explain an utterance is to attribute a complex 
set of beliefs and intentions to the speaker. However, there remain
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grounds for dissatisfaction with this proposal.
2. Facial expression and the linguistic analogy
2.1 In insisting on the difference between interpreting and explain­
ing utterances it has not been necessary to introduce the possibility 
of a systematic discrepancy between the beliefs held and the beliefs 
expressed by the speakers of a language. To countenance such a 
hypothesis is to sabotage radical interpretation which can be initiated 
only on the basis of an assumption that there is a reasonable corre­
lation between belief and speech. This assumption is not purely 
methodological. The predicament of the radical interpreter is com­
parable to that of the child acquiring what is to become his native 
language. Unless considerable success in attributing beliefs on the 
basis of the linguistic behaviour of others is achieved it is difficult 
to see how a language could be learnt, how, that is, language could 
exist. But it seems that the initial assumption must include far more 
psychological material than Davidson was apparently prepared to allow. 
The right kind of supplementary material is supplied by the concept of 
S-meaning. Even if this is correct however, a
distinction can still be preserved between explanation and interpre­
tation, interpretation being defined as the standard explanation of 
utterances of a certain type.
Nevertheless, the correlation between belief and assertion, or 
between what a speaker means by uttering a sentence and what that 
sentence means is, though indispensable, far from perfect. A theory 
of interpretation cannot have as one of its consequences that people 
never assert what they believe to be false and never deny what they 
believe to be true. The assumption required by the interpreter cor­
responds rather to the apriori notion that dishonesty is possible only 
against the background of widespread honesty. This is recognisably a 
version of the principle of charity (cf. for example, Davidson ((1974) 
pp. 320-321); one which provides not only for a general reasonableness, 
but also for a general propensity to honesty. The imperfection of 
the correlation involved is a prima-facie reason for rejecting a 
reductive construal of radical interpretation, should one ever literally 
be suggested. The reduction of sentence-meaning to speaker-meaning 
might seem better off in this respect. But the prevalence of non­
literal uses of language is an obstacle to a total reduction of this 
variety also. Metaphors are not always original. The sage cliche
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which discourages putting all one’s eggs into a single basket is 
rarely offered as advice about how to gather eggs. What people mean 
by their words may, for a minority of sentences, fail to tally with, 
what their words mean. The justification for sustaining the idea that 
there is a contrast in such cases between literal and metaphorical 
meaning will appeal to the notion of semantic structure, the idea 
that there are antecedently established principles which determine 
the meanings of sentences on the basis of the meanings of their com­
ponents.
Semantic structure, and the meanings it determines, must be 
allowed at least this degree of autonomy even from standard linguistic 
practice. I do not mention this point in order to revive the debate 
between theorists of formal semantics and theorists of communication- 
intentions. I doubt whether there is a substantial issue here. ^ The 
role of truth-conditions in the statement of a theory of meaning for 
a language is not put in question by any of the earlier discussion of 
interpretation. Their admission here does not imply doubts about the 
relevance of speakers' attitudes. The point here is entierly free 
from polemical motivation. The more thoroughly the elementary 
principles of a natural language are entrenched (by which I mean 
whatever is described by the axioms of a semantic theory), the more 
its semantic potential outstrips its actual use and the less is it 
subject to modification under the influence of alterations in the 
linguistic practice of its speakers. Compatibly with this it is quite 
reasonable to maintain that what determines the correcness of the basic 
axioms is the way most speakers use the sub-sentential components they 
define in most of the sentences in which they use them. What is not 
acceptable is the assertion of a straightforward reductive link between 
whole-utterance types and linguistic practice for highly developed 
natural languages.
2.2 A potentially fruitful analogy with non-linguistic expression 
suggests itself at this point. The counterpart in the theory of non- 
linguistic expression to the Gricean account of linguistic meaning, is 
the idea that the meaning of (or what is expressed by), for example, 
laughter is determined by what people standardly feel when they laugh.
5. Cf. Strawson (1970), Peacocke (1976) and McDowell (1980). There 
is still room for debate, of course, about the exact nature of the 
contribution of structure and of speakers' attitudes, about how they 
collaborate and about how they diverge.
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However, Wollheim ((1964) p. 284) suggests that it is by no means 
absurd to suppose that there are people who always laugh when they are 
aad without thereby expressing sadness. There could exist a form of 
'pathognomic disturbance' such that, for a certain range of emotions, 
people invariably expressed the contrary of the emotion they felt.
This raises the following question : what is it that contributes to 
the determination of the meaning of facial expressions what semantic 
structure contributes to the determination of the meaning of 
utterances? If there is no answer, then Wollheim's hypothesis must 
by dismissed as absurd. If there is an answer, it must specify an 
attribute of facial expression which is autonomous in relation to 
psychological determination to the degree to which semantic structure 
is so autonomous. Two proposals have been put forward which I discuss 
in Chapters 6 and 7 respectively. The first, and by far the most 
plausible, is Wollheim's own view that facial expression is charac­
terised by a kind of appropriateness or matching of the expressans 
to the expressandum; an appropriateness, however, which obviously 
falls short of literal iconicity or resemblance. The second idea, 
which prevails in the anthropological literature, is that facial 
expression and gesture are determined by their own brand of semantic 
structure which is closely akin to the structural features of language. 
I do not pursue these questions here, leaving open for the time being 
the question of whether the interpretation of behaviour is wholly, 
partially or not at all determined by its standard explanation.
3. Describing Behaviour
3.1 How vague or trivial a doctrine is Behaviourism? I do not pro­
pose to offer a detailed evaluation here, but merely to draw attention 
to a certain confusion exhibited in some attempts to settle this 
question. It will emerge that clarification can best be achieved by 
applying the distinction between interpretation and explanation to the 
description of action. The challenge is to find some general statement 
of the relation between behaviour and its psychological antecedents 
which would appeal to behaviouristically-minded philosophers and which 
is not either uninterestingly true or plainly false. I do not believe 
that this challenge can be met, and this is not a new thought. The 
contrast between what follows and what has been written in the past 
concerns descriptions of behaviour which are such that the claim that 
they entail psychological descriptions has previously been dismissed
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as true but uninteresting. 1 will argue that the claim could equally 
be regarded as interesting but on the whole false, depending on how 
the descriptions of behaviour are interpreted. There are two legiti­
mate options.
Paul Ziff ((1958) p. 157 in (1966)) has shown that it is impos­
sible to refute Behaviourism on the ground that there is a principled
objection to the statement that one can always find out whether someone 
is angry but that the same objection does not bear on the claim that 
one can always find out whether someone is behaving in a certain way,
eg. gnashing his teeth. Ziff’s point is simply that one cannot in
principle always find out whether someone is behaving in a certain 
way. True, one can establish by means of observation alone that 
someone’s teeth are gnashing, but one cannot establish that someone 
is gnashing his teeth with the same facility. The difference is be­
tween an instance of a bodily movement in a transitive sense and an 
instance of a bodily movement in an intransitive sense. 'To gnash' 
belongs to a class of verbs, lucidly identified by Jennifer Hornsby 
((1980) p. 2) which function transitively and intransitively and which 
are such that transitive uses of them entail intransitive uses but not 
vice-versa. 'John gnashed^ his teeth' entails 'John's teeth gnashed^'. 
But the gnashingjof John's teeth does not entail John's gnashing^ of 
them. Ziff's point, with which I agree, is that if behaviour consists 
in bodily movements^ then it cannot be known to occur by means of 
observation alone. For Behaviourism to be a substantial doctrine, it 
would have to identify behaviour with bodily movements^, thus 
degenerating into blatant falsehood.
3.2 However, too much is apparently conceded to Behaviourism in 
the following remark :
I deny that there is a difference between finding out whether
or not I am behaving in certain ways and finding out whether
or not I am angry. (Ziff (ibid.) p. 160)
This seems to suggest that there is no difference between finding out 
whether or not John is gnashing^ his teeth and finding out whether or 
not John is angry. This is wrong because to find out whether John is 
angry is not merely to find out whether he is gnashing his teeth, but 
to find out why he is doing so. He may be doing so for some other 
reason - in order to look as if he is angry, or merely in order to 
exercise his jaw. But gnashing^ of teeth is not, perhaps, among the 
ways of behaving, the kinds of behaviour Ziff had in mind at this point. 
There is a class of descriptions of actions, members of which are
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formed by prefixing the noun 'behaviour' with the name of a mental 
state or event : 'anger-behaviour', 'pain-behaviour', etc.. The 
first example occurs several times in Ziff's article, whose point, 
therefore, is that there is no difference between finding out whether 
I am anger-behaving and finding out whether I am angry. Is anger- 
behaviour the same as angry behaviour and are gnashings^ of teeth 
always, nearly always or only sometimes instances of it?
These questions signal an ambiguity in descriptions of the
general form : 'F-ness-behaviour'. They could be used either to 
interpret or to explain the behaviour they denote. On an explanatory 
construal the passage quoted above will come out true. 'F-ness- 
behaviour' is equivalent to 'behaviour exhibited because the agent is 
F'. Finding out whether John is angry is almost the same as finding
out whether he is acting in a certain way because he is angry - not
quite, however, because one could conceivably establish that John is 
angry without establishing that this is why he behaves as he does.
But this does not block the relevant entailment which runs from 'x 
is F-ness-behaving' to 'x is F '. But an interpretative construal will 
make the quoted passage come out false. As an interpreting descrip­
tion, 'anger-behaviour' is equivalent to 'anger-expressive behaviour', 
or 'angry behaviour'. Gnashings^ of teeth are sometimes, perhaps even 
nearly always, instances of anger-behaviour explanatorily construed. 
They are always instances of anger-behaviour interpretatively construed 
More precisely, teeth-gnashing, scowling, fist-clenching, etc. are 
timeless kinds of anger-behaviour.
Behaviourism is not obviously false if it is the claim that 
there is no difference between finding out whether someone is in a 
certain psychological state and establishing that a certain interpre­
tation of his behaviour is correct. An observer could stand in a 
relation to an anger-behaving subject which is akin to the relation 
in which the radical interpreter stands to the speaker of an 
uninterpreted language. This is the predicament of the anthropologist 
investigating radically alien communities and refusing to suppose 
that there are any cross-culturally constant patterns of behaviour 
(cf. Chapter 7). The problems of the anthropologist are comparable in 
certain ways to those of the field lexicographer. However, they are 
in other respects both less complex and more complex. The psycho­
logical explanation of much expressive behaviour may be less complex 
than that of rational intentional action including speech (see 
Appendix) being less than fully intentional. But ensuring a correct
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description of eliciting stimuli may be more difficult (see 
Chapter 7). Given the first point, the obstacles to a reduction of 
comparatively simple psychological facts to facts about behaviour may 
seem to be diminished. But given the second point, the epistemological 
value of such a reduction will be negligible.
However, the familiar objection remains that people are not 
always honest or sincere. They disguise emotions they feel and 
simulate emotions they do not feel. A distinction, therefore, must 
be sustained between the interpretation and the explanation of instances 
of expressive behaviour. However strong the pragmatic case for a 
purely methodological behaviourism as a basis of the anthropological 
attitude - an attitude which can be adopted at home just as radical 
interpretation can be practised on our native tongue - a conceptual 
behaviourism is not justified. Equally cogent practical reasons tell 
against the latter, a strict adherent to which would leave himself open 
to perpetual deception. There is, I submit, some difference between 
finding out whether our neighbours are anger-behaving and finding out 
whether they are angry. The difference is partially exhibited in the 
common-place fact that we do not ordinarily register a need to investi­
gate at length what people's behaviour means, but we are frequently 
conscious of such an exigency with respect to what people mean by their 
behaviour.
3.3 I indicated (on p. 28) that one consequence of the failure to 
discriminate between interpretation and explanation is that the 
explanation of action is mistakenly taken for a species of interpre­
tation. The less extreme version of the hermeneutic proposal might 
still appear to be compatible with what has been said so far. The 
weaker hermeneutic claim may be put thus : just as speech-acts cannot 
be explained without antecedently or simultaneously being interpreted, 
so all forms of human behaviour require interpretation as a stage or 
component of their explanation. I believe that we are now equipped 
to show why even the weaker hermeneutic position is wrong, or at least 
highly implausible. The concepts of interpretation and expression are 
complementary with respect to non-linguistic behaviour as are the 
concepts of interpretation and meaning in connection with language.
It is the contention here that (pace Charles Taylor) not all actions 
are expressions, natural or otherwise, of 'tryings to get' (Taylor 
(1971) p. 81), and the idea that only expressive behaviour is a proper 
subject for interpretation is sufficient to settle this in advance of
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any decision about the precise nature of interpretation. If inter­
pretation depends on some notion of appropriateness or iconicity then 
an immense range of actions are excluded. True, an action will be 
appropriate as a means to a desired end : but it will not match the 
desire in the relevant sense. Smiling, however, is felt to match 
happiness in some way (Wollheim (1966) p. 99 : (1968) p. 48 in 1970 
edition). If interpretation is characterised in terms of standard 
explanation, then the range of behaviour admitted as expressive will 
be somewhat wider. It would have to include, for example, eating as 
an expression of hunger since eating is standardly explained by hunger. 
But much is still excluded in virtue of the fact that most actions, 
qua bodily movements^, do not have standard explanations. (cf. Chapter 
6, §3.4)
4. Describing perceptual experiences
4.1 There is an analogue to the interpretation/explanation
dichotomy in the theory of perception, and there is a striking parallel
between the tendencies introduced by its neglect here and those 
introduced by its neglect in the theories of meaning and action. In 
the latter areas failure to observe the distinction gives rise to a 
form of behaviourism. In the context of perception, the species of 
reductionism which conflation encourages is phenomenalism, initially, 
but in speaking of the perception of human behaviour, the risk of 
behaviourism is repeated. The source of the problem is an ambiguity 
in standard formulations of a fundamental question concerning the role 
of inference in perception. The question is about the nature of the 
cognitive act or acts which constitute perception of objects - is it 
purely a matter of the operation of the senses, or does perception 
require the intervention of a further, more intellectual cognitive 
faculty? In Chapter 5 I pursue a comparable question raised 
about the recognition or perception of expressive behaviour. At this 
point, the question is left unanswered while an attempt is made to 
formulate it more perspicuously. The statement of the issue is 
silent as to the nature of the cognitive product of the act in question,
and it is at this point that the distinction between interpretation
and explanation reappears.
Two questions must be distinguished accordingly. First, for 
any cognitive act we must ask : how does it provide its subject with 
an interpretation of its raw input? Applied to the issue of percep­
tion the questions are : how much intellectual work is demanded from
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the perceiving subject if he is to have an experience as of there 
being some physical object, eg. a chair, before him? and : how much 
intellectual work is demanded from the perceiving subject if he is 
to have an experience of a physical object, eg. a chair, before him?
I may as well declare my prejudice in favour of one answer rather than 
another. I believe that no intelligence is required for the percep­
tion of physical objects or for the having of experiences as of 
physical objects of fairly elementary kinds. First, any visual 
impression that is appropriately (non-deviantly) caused by a physical 
object, whether or not the description of the former fits the descrip­
tion of the latter, is a perception. Furthermore, the account of its 
causation will not mention any propositional attitudes. Secondly, 
any experience, hallucinatory or veridical, as of a physical object 
will be interpreted to a degree independently of the operation of some 
other cognitive faculty. All seeing is seeing-as (as the following, 
among others, have said : Howell (1972) : Ishiguro (1967) : Vesey 
(1956)) and every illusion is an illusion that an object of a certain 
kind is present. In each case the actual or putative object is at 
least seen as having a certain colour, shape and size. (To the extent 
that they are relevant, these themes are developed in Chapter 5.)
4.2 Radical interpretation has its analogue in perception. The 
situation can arise where we neither know how to interpret nor how 
to explain a certain experience. It is clear how this could be the 
case for someone else's experience. I may want to know what someone 
else can see but be ignorant of what lies within his field of vision. 
The situation is such that I neither know which object or objects are 
being perceived nor what they are being perceived as. Both questions 
can be answered simultaneously by means of an elementary description 
of an object in terms of its basic perceptual properties. The 
evidence sought might consist in the perceiving subject's response to 
an appropriate question. In normal conditions, evidence which supports 
the statement : 'x sees an F' will also support the statement : 'There 
is something which x sees as an F' or 'x is having an experience as of 
an F'. For example, once it is established that there is a red, 
spherical object in x's field of vision then, given normality of light 
conditions and of x's sensory equipment, nothing further is required 
to support the attribution to x of an experience as of there being a 
red, spherical object before him.
Could a man be in the position of a radical interpreter in
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relation to his own experience? A positive answer is available only 
if it is admitted that a man could have an experience as of an F 
without knowing that that is the kind of experience he is having.
This possibility will be resisted both by those who prefer a doxastic 
analysis of perception (eg. Howell (1972) pp. 409f) and by those who 
find persuasive the idea that our beliefs about our experiences are 
incorrigible. Both ideas are threatened, however, by the lack of 
evident absurdity in claims of the form : 'x is having an experience 
as of an F without knowing what an F is’, or : 'There is a y which 
X sees as F but without believing that y is F'. (The quantification 
into 'x believes that ... ' can be eliminated by whatever method is 
generally preferred without altering the point.) In principle, then,
I might be in the following predicament : I have an experience of an 
object which is F and this experience is an experience as of something 
which is F but I do not know either of these facts. I cannot obtain 
information about the one without obtaining information about the other 
In finding out, for example, that the object I am seeing is mauve 
rather than violet, I will also find out that I am having an experience 
as of a mauve rather than as of a violet object. The interpretation 
and the explanation of the experience are delivered simultaneously.
Phenomenalism is reached by arguing that this, or anything else, 
justifies the claim that there is an entailement from interpretation 
to explanation. Such a claim is implicit in some arguments against 
the view that the perception of physical objects requires an inferen­
tial process. The mistake lies in supposing that by denying that the 
interpretative element in perception is a separate cognitive act one 
has done away with the transcendence of material things. This is a 
mistake just because, whether or not the interpretation of sensory 
material is separable from perception, it does not supply a means of 
escaping from a purely phenomenal space. It is probably true that the 
initial data of perception are not mere colours and shapes on which 
we consciously impose a conceptual organisation. But the fact that we 
unreflectively have experiences as of chairs, rabbits and houses does 
not itself warrant the assertion that we see chairs, rabbits and houses 
without having recourse to some kind of induction. The latter claim 
may also be true, but it depends for its justification on different 
considerations.
4.3 Once the question of the inferential contribution to the 
perception of physical objects and their elementary properties has
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been settled, a parallel question is raised about the perception of 
more complex properties, including those of expressive behaviour.
Many philosophers, with whom I agree, believe that the recognition of 
behaviour as expressive is perceptual rather than inferential, that we 
see anger in a scowl rather than first seeing the scowl and then infer­
ring that the person scowling is angry. Donagan pointed out the 
problem that this poses for anyone who is concerned to avoid a reduc­
tive account of statements about other people's emotions and sensa­
tions (Donagan (1966) p. 325). The difficulty is discerned in the 
context of a discussion of Wittgenstein. But reductionism is not a 
result of the non-inferential nature of the apprehension of pain in 
others. It is a result of this in conjunction with a failure to 
maintain a clear perspective on the distinction between interpretation 
and explanation, both as it applies to perception and as it applies to 
descriptions of behaviour. Confusion here closely parallels confusion 
between the acquisition and the justification of knowledge. Knowledge 
of others' mental states is obtained, if at all, by seeing their 
emotions, etc. manifested in their behaviour. We see behaviour as 
angry, sad, happy. But there remains the question of how this 
justifies the ascription to people of anger, sadness and joy. The 
challenge of solipsism, if earnestly pushed, cannot"be met at all.
It is certainly not met by pointing out that we unthinkingly have 
experiences as of human beings and not as of senseless bodies about 
which we conjecture that they may be human (cf. Cooke (1969)).
Behaviour is interpreted when it is described as an expression 
of something. This may be a description of what such behaviour is 
typically seen as. Behaviour is explained when its psychological 
causation is given. This may also be a description of what is seen 
when sincere expressive behaviour is seen - but it is likely to require 
a theory of indirect perception which is not required for interpre­
tative seeing. In Chapter 5 I attempt to work out an acceptable theory 
of both aspects of the perception of behaviour. The effect of this 
chapter is to stress their non—equivalence. Seeing anger in someone's 
behaviour is not the same as seeing behaviour as angry. It is 
theoretically possible that what we see as human beings are merely 
senseless bodies. It is also possible to see a human being, but to 
see him merely as a senseless body. A form of behaviourism can be cast 
as the claim that there is nothing more to an emotion than the 
physiognomic properties an action is observed to possess.
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III. THE EFFICACY OF EXPRESSIVE BEHAVIOUR
1. Behaviour and bodily movements
1.1 The act of smiling is not the same as the smile which appears 
on the agent's face whenever such an action is performed. The action 
of gnashing one's teeth is not the same as the resulting gnashing of 
one's teeth (cf p. 41). The existence of two components in expressive 
behaviour has been noted by Alston ((1965) p. 18), Ziff ((1958) p. 157 
in (1966)) and Wollheim ((1966) p. 93 in (1973)) among others. The 
latter presents the difference in terms of a distinction between 
'activity' and 'trace'; a distinction whose most graphic application 
is to the plastic arts. Painting is quite naturally understood to 
comprise two elements; the manual activity which consists in spreading 
paint on a canvas, and the traces of that activity, the pigmented pat­
tern which remains on the canvas. Similarly, smiling is an activity 
the product of which is a certain 'lie of the face'. Wollheim stresses 
that the comparison is not absurd since the difference between physio­
gnomic and artistic phenomena is due to the relative narrowness of the
gap between activity and trace in the former, not to the absence of
1such a gap ((ibid.) p. 97).
Designating the two components of expression in this way allows 
certain interesting questions to be raised concerning the primary 
bearer of the property of expressiveness and the direction of its 
'transmission' between activity and trace. It seems that in artistic 
expression, the trace is what is primarily expressive, the creative 
activity being itself expressive, if at all, only insofar as it results 
in the existence of the expressive trace (Wollheim (1964) p. 281).
The opposite is the case with behavioural expression. Here it is the 
activity which is primarily expressive, while its traces, if it has 
any, are expressive only in a derivative sense, if at all. Wollheim 
((ibid.) p. 280) illustrates this by enquiring as to whether a foot-
1. This seems to represent a modification of the view expressed in an 
earlier article. In 1964, at p. 285, Wollheim wrote of :
... the extreme intimacy of the connection between an 
emotional state and the natural process of expressing it : an 
intimacy we might characterise by saying that there is no gap 
between the two.'
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print, left by a child stamping with rage, is itself expressive. It 
seems not to be, constituting merely a ’souvenir’ of rage, not an 
expression of it. However, considerable strain is imposed at this 
point on the analogy between behaviour and art. The source of the 
strain lies in the fact that in talking of expression outside the 
aesthetic context, the subject of our discourse appears to consist in 
actions. We do not mention traces at all ((ibid.) p. 278). But why, 
in that case, attempt to preserve the analogy as Wollheim does in the 
later (1966) paper?
1.2 The difficulty arises because we naturally take the concept of 
a trace to be the concept of a continuant. But, while in some 
varieties of behavioural expression certain very transitory continuants 
seem to be relevantly present, for example, facial configurations, in 
others there appears to be nothing sufficiently enduring to be thought 
of as a trace. Gnashings of teeth and stampings of feet are consti­
tuted by movement alone. They are, as Wollheim observed, events or 
processes. This, however, does not automatically mean that they are 
activities. We need, at this point, the distinction between transitive
and intransitive verbs, due to Hornsby (1980), introduced at p. 41 
2
above. Gnashings^ of teeth are distinct from teeth-gnashings^.
The event of the child stamping^ her foot is not the same event as the 
stamping^ of her foot. These are descriptions of actions as bodily 
movements^, which exemplify the same pattern of entailment as the 
latter with respect to bodily movements^ : ac{)^ m mc^  ^but it is not the 
case that mc})^ acj)^ m.  ^ Of course, many of the verbs which describe 
expressive behaviour, physiognomically or otherwise (cf. pp. 18f) 
do not readily fit this pattern. Consider, for example, ’smile’.
2. I am indebted to Mark Sainsbury for the suggestion that Hornsby's 
distinction might be relevant here.
3* This is Hornsby's notation. 'a' and 'm' stand for individuals such 
that 'a' is the subject and 'm' the object of the verb, '(f)', as it occurs 
transitively, and 'm' is the subject of the same verb as it occurs in­
transitively. Eg. 'The flames boiled the water' entails 'The water 
boiled', but not vice versa (cf. Hornsby (op.cit.)p. 124). Note that 
replacements for ’cj)^' are not always typographically identical to their 
intransitive counterparts, replacements for ' c() ' (cf. op. cit. p. 125). 
Thus, for example, the pair reflects the same pattern of
entailments.
50
'scowl’, laugh', which are always intransitive. The same, however, 
applies to 'walk'. This need not raise a problem, since when a man 
walks he moves^ his body in a certain way, and his body moves^ in a 
certain way (Hornsby (ibid. p. 135). Similarly, when a man scowls 
he moves^ his face in a certain way and his face consequently moves^ 
correspondingly.
This will allow the analogy between artistic and behavioural
expression to be preserved. In the former, the activity is expressive
only insofar as the static object or trace it produces is expressive. 
The traces of behavioural expression do not disappear, however, but 
are presented as processes or events, not as static objects or states 
of objects. It can then be admitted that all there is to behavioural 
expression is movement, but there are two events or processes involved, 
one of which constitutes the trace, the movement^. The question about
the transmission of expressiveness will then obtain the same answer
in the behavioural and the artistic case. A gnashing^ of teeth is 
expressive only insofar as the teeth-gnashing^ which accompanies it 
is expressive.
An alternative strategy, however, would be to isolate three 
components in both kinds of expression, an activity, a process and a 
trace (or several traces). Thus there is the activity of putting 
marks onto the canvas, the event which is the appearing of those marks, 
and the trace which comprises the marks which appear. There is the 
act of scowling - the bodily movement^ - the appearance or coming into 
being of the scowl on the face - the bodily movement^ - and the scowl 
itself which is a more or less static facial configuration. It is 
difficult, but not impossible to analyse all behavioural expression 
in this way, including the earlier examples of teeth-gnashing and foot- 
stamping. The traces will not be identified as foot-prints or other 
enduring items, but as fleeting states observable at any moment during 
the performance of the expressive action. Traces of expressive be­
haviour are identifiable as aspects of it that can be recorded in 
still photographs. With traces, events and actions thus identified, 
the direction in which expressive properties are transmitted between 
the last-mentioned items in behavioural expression will be the reverse 
of the direction of transmission in artistic expression. The latter 
'^ iil remain as it was earler conceived, substituting the process of 
appearing for the action of making appear. The process of appearing 
is expressive, if at all, only insofar as what thus appears is
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expressive. The hypostasised smile is expressive of joy only insofar 
as it is part of a process of facial expression, or a configuration 
which has a certain duration. A smile that is too rapidly terminated 
or too lastingly fixed is transparently insincere.
1.3 The division of expressive behaviour into three elements is, 
however, cumbersome and, though it serves certain interests, it is 
largely superfluous. For the rest of this discussion, therefore, I 
will assume only two components, both of which will usually be con­
ceived of as events. A scowl is treated as the combination of a 
facial movement^ and a facial movement^. The latter, of course, is 
described physiognomically when it is described as a scowl. Purely 
by extension from this, so is the former, which thus yields the 
concept of a ’physiognomic verb’. This calls for a slight modifica­
tion of Wollheim's definition of physiognomic verbs according to which 
' ... to scowl would be "to produce an angry lie of the face"’ ((1966) 
p. 97). I prefer : 'To scowl' is 'to bring about an angry movement^ 
of the face', for most occasions, but it would be unwise to force a 
choice. A person's face might be frozen in an expression of terror in 
such a way that the very rigidity of the configuration contributes to 
its expressive power. The idea introduced by the last few paragraphs 
is that expressive actions are distinguishable from expressive move­
ments^; that the relation between the action of scowling and the 
appearance of a scowl on the agent's face is comparable to the relation 
between a shaking^ by someone of his fist and his fist's shaking^.
These points serve only to indicate that expressive behaviour 
conforms, up to a point, to certain familiar theses about action in 
general. Davidson has shown that all actions are actions of moving 
our bodies (Davidson (1971) p. 23). This is certainly true of expres­
sion. Much of the credit for the idea that many descriptions of 
actions as anything other than bodily movements are descriptions of 
bodily movements in terms of their effects is also due to Davidson 
((ibid.) p. 25). To this, Hornsby has added the observation that 
even when we describe actions as bodily movements^, we are describing 
them in terms of their effects, namely, bodily movements^ ((op. cit.) 
Chapter 1 §4). I have suggested that the same is true of physiognomic 
movements. More precisely, physiognomic or bodily movements^ cause 
physiognomic or bodily movements^ and descriptions of events as 
physiognomic or bodily movements^ entail the truth of corresponding 
descriptions of other events as physiognomic or bodily movements^.
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There is thus a relation between events and a relation between 
descriptions of events which together give Hornsby's concept of the 
'introduction' of effects by descriptions true of particular actions. ^ 
In general a true interpreting description of a particular action, 
ie. a description of it as expressive, introduces an event of some­
thing being expressed.
It is crucial to maintain a clear grasp on distinctions familiar 
from the philosophy of action when talking about expressive behaviour. 
The following passage taken from Alston (1965) illustrates the risks 
incurred by failure to take these distinctions seriously :
The presence of a certain facial expression or a certain 
demeanour is not a sufficient ground for saying that the 
person expressed determination or indignation, while having 
said something of an appropriate sort would be. (Alston 
(1965) p. 18)
The failure of the intended contrast between linguistic and non- 
linguistic expression is a consequence of the incomparability of the 
contrasted items. The first claim can be cast in the idiom of the 
present discussion thus : the observation that a certain expressive 
facial movement^ has occurred does not provide a (logically) sufficient 
ground for saÿing that the person expressed something. The second 
claim can be rendered thus : if a particular action is of one kind 
(for example, an utterance-kind) then it is also an action of some 
other kind (such as an expression of determination). The ground for 
the latter claim is that all actions of uttering, eg. the sentence 
'I am determined', are actions of expressing determination. I agree 
with this. I also agree that not all determination-expressing facial 
movements^ are caused by determination-expressing facial movements^ 
and also that no instances of the former are identical to any instances 
of the latter. But this does not support a contrast between language 
and expressive behaviour since an emission of sound from a person's
4. In fact Hornsby (p. 70) initially defines introduction as a relation 
between a description, d, possibly true of an action and a further 
description, d^, which must be true if d is true, d introduces à' iff 
d entails à'. I do not follow this usage, but reserve the term 
'introduction' for the more interesting concept of a relation between 
a description d, true of a particular action, a, and some effect, e, 
of a; or, as Hornsby puts it, between the pair <a,d> and e. For the 
initial concept I will adhere to the concept of entailment. Thus, 
given a further description, à', true of e, we have the definition : 
<a,d> introduces e iff a causes e & d entails d^.
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mouth, even if the sound emitted constitutes a well-formed sentence, 
need not be caused by a vocal action (or even a speech—act) of which 
the source of the sound is the agent.
My agreement with Alston extends no further. For Alston needs 
to deny that the presence of a certain facial expression is a pretty 
good reason for supposing that the person expresses what his face 
expresses. The idea seems to be that facial movements^ are not 
typically, though perhaps they sometimes are, caused by facial move­
ments^. Emissions of sentence-constituting sounds, however, usually 
are caused by utterances. The plausibility of the belief that this 
establishes an opposition between linguistic and non-linguistic 
expressive behaviour depends partly on the assumption that any sentence 
which contains a transitive verb and in which the subject-place is 
taken by the name of a person attributes an action to the person named. 
The other source of its plausibility is the conviction that actions 
are properly defined as events which are intentional (under some 
description). I deny, however, that all movements^ are intentional.
Thus it may be that most speech is intentional and that much expressive 
behaviour of other kinds is not. If this is Alston's point, then, 
while not fully agreeing with it, I will postpone detailed discussion 
of it (see Chapter 4 & Appendix). This requires, if only for ease of 
formulation, a general term for movements^which are not intentional. 
Terms such as 'behaviour' are most appropriate if one is to avoid 
distinguishing a weak from a strong sense of 'action'. In the present 
context, however, there is little risk of confusion in the adoption 
of the latter strategy, most of what remains to be said in this chapter 
being applicable equally to action and behaviour which is not fully 
intentional.
A related point needs to be mentioned here. A strong case can 
be made for the withdrawal of interpreting descriptions of movements^
- descriptions of them as expressive - if the discovery is made that 
they are not caused by movements^. Part of Alston's point may have 
been that this is so for language but not for other kinds of expression.
5. cf. Kenny ((1976) p. 44) : 'Words written by my hand do not express 
my desires if my hand was in the irresistible grip of another; if 
Cardinal Mindzenty at his trial was merely uttering words like a 
ventriloquist's doll (ie. not himself uttering words at all) then they 
did not express his remorse for his alleged crimes against the state.' 
The gloss in parenthesis is my own. Note the stressed possessive 
pronoun; perhaps Kenny would allow that the Cardinal's words expressed 
remorse, but not remorse actually felt by anyone.
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I see no ground for such a distinction, but either way the concept of 
an expressive movement^ is required if the question is to be raised at 
all. This question has no bearing on the direction in which expressive 
properties are transmitted. The suggestion is that a movement^ is 
expressive only if it is caused by some movement^, whatever its nature, 
and not, say, by galvanisation.
2. How basic are interpreting descriptions?
2.1 If perspicuous talk of expressive behaviour is to be achieved
then a considerable amount of conceptual material derived from con­
temporary philosophy of action must be deployed. In particular, the 
following questions are not only worth asking, but must be kept distinct. 
These are questions about relations between different items :
(a) The relation between particular actions and particular 
events which are not themselves actions. If the events in question 
comprise a bodily movement^ and a bodily movement^, then the first is 
the cause of the second.
(b) The relation between action-descriptions and other event- 
descriptions. For example, ’x moves^ his hand' entails 'x's hand 
movesj.'
(c) The relation between descriptions true of a particular 
action and some effect of that action. If we have descriptions d and d' 
related as in (b), true of an action, a, and an event, e, related as in
(a), then the pair <a,d> introduces e.
(d) The relation between one description of an action and another 
description of the same action.
Alston failed to distinguish questions about (d) from questions about 
(a) or (b), There are, indeed, descriptions true of a single action 
such that one of them entails another. An action, arguably, is a 
saying that the speaker is determined only if it is an expression of 
determination (on the assumption that a person will sometimes say 'I 
am determined' without saying that he is determined).
A more fundamental issue concerns which of two descriptions of 
a single action is the more basic, and the criteria by which this is 
determined. The intuitive concept of basicness has its source in 
sentences of the form : 'x i^-ed by i/;-ing'. For example, if I turn on 
the light by flicking the switch then 'a flicking of the switch is a 
more basic description of my action than 'a turning on of the light'.
The relation ' ... more basic than ... ' is not, of course, a relation
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between actions. Nor is it a straightforward relation between 
descriptions; a description, d, is more basic than a description, d %  
only relative to a single action of which both are true. There could 
be some other action of which d and d' are also true but relative to 
which d' is more basic than d (cf. Hornsby (op. cit.) p. 71). 
Generalisations about expressive behaviour can be cast in this familiar 
form. People express happiness by smiling, anger by gnashing their 
teeth and beliefs by uttering sentences of a language in which they 
are competent.
A concept of relative basicness has been defined by Davidson 
on the basis of causation. A description, d, of an action, a, is more 
basic than a description, d', of a, iff d describes a as the cause of 
an event, e, and d' describes a as the cause of an event, e', and e is 
the cause of e' (Davidson (1971)). Or again, in the idiom supplied by 
Hornsby : if d and d"' are true descriptions of a, then d is more basic 
than d' if the effect introduced by <a,d> causes the effect introduced 
by <a,d"> (Hornsby (loc cit.) p. 71). The concept thus defined, how­
ever, lacks a universal application in the elucidation of 'by'-sentences 
and should, therefore, be designated 'basic^' as Hornsby suggests. It 
seems obvious, prima facie, that among the 'by'-sentences to which the 
concept of basicness^ is inapplicable are included just those generali­
sations for which an explication is presently sought. The descriptions 
applicable to a particular action may include 'x's gnashing^ of his 
teeth' and 'x's expressing his rage', thus introducing the event, the 
gnashing^ of x's teeth and the event, x's rage being expressed. It is 
intuitively clear, I think, that x expressed his rage by gnashing^ his 
teeth; x's action is more basically a gnashing^ of teeth than an 
expression of anger. But apparently the events introduced are not 
related as cause to effect. Surely the teeth-gnashing^ and the anger 
being expressed are the same event. The same applies to every other 
mode of expressive behaviour. A smile appearing on a face and the happy 
expression appearing there are identical. The fist shaking^ and the 
appearance of fury are not separate events. Yet to describe an action 
as a smile, or a fist-shaking^ is to give a more basic description of 
it than that given by saying that the action is an expression of 
happiness or anger.
6. The point is too familiar to require further justification here. 
It is, in my opinion, conclusively established in Davidson (1971) and 
Hornsby (1980) Chapter 5, to mention but two possible sources.
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2.2 The most natural strategy to adopt at this juncture would be 
to cast about for an alternative concept of what it is for a descrip­
tion of an action to be more or less basic than some other description 
of the same action. This would involve the invention of an indépen­
dant concept or an appeal to some notion already available in the 
literature not in order to replace ’basic^’ altogether, but simply 
to accommodate those cases to which it is inapplicable. In favour of 
this strategy there is the fact that 'by' belongs to a range of 
quasi-causal vocabulary to which such expressions as 'because' and 
'in virtue o f  also belong (Hornsby (ibid.) p. 76). To say that these 
terms are quasi-causal is to say that the concept of causality con­
tributes nothing to the elucidation of many occurrences of them. Some 
occurrences, of course, are genuinely causal.
Recognising the need for a supplementary concept of basicness 
if justice is to be done to all the ways in which we discriminate 
intuitively between kinds of which a single action is an instance, 
Hornsby supplies the additional notion - 'basic*' ((ibid.) pp. 72-77). 
This new concept is designed to perform several rather different duties. 
It must account for descriptions of actions felt to be in some sense 
their most basic descriptions but which are nevertheless less basic^ 
than other descriptions of the same actions. The intuition that we 
'directly' move^ our limbs is well established despite the obvious 
fact that limb-movementsj are caused by muscle-contractions^ ((ibid.) 
p. 72). Also, we make finer discriminations between descriptions of 
actions with respect to basicness than those yielded by the causal 
concept ((ibid.) p. 74). Finally, 'basic*' is meant to cover suitably 
modified versions of Goldman's concepts of non-causal 'level-generation'; 
conventional, simple and augmentation generation ((ibid.) p. 75, and 
Goldman (1970) pp. 26f). It would seem, therefore, that the relation 
' ... more basic* than ... ' is amply qualified to explain the non- 
basicness of physiognomic or interpreting descriptions relative to 
purely physical descriptions.
However, if our aim is to elucidate the meaning of 'by' in 
'He expressed anger by shaking his fist', then the concept of basic* 
will provide very little assistance. For Hornsby's definition depends 
on the assumption that 'by' is intuitively clear. Given two descrip­
tions, d and à', of a single action, a, then d is more basic* than d 
iff d appears on the right and à' on the left of 'by' in a 'by'-sentence 
true of a (Hornsby (ibid.) p. 73). To say, therefore, that 'his
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shaking^ his fist' is a more basic* description than 'his expressing 
anger' as applied to the same action, isj if true, more or less un­
informative. In fact it may be worse than uninformative. 'Basic*' 
was meant to capture the intuition that an action is more basically 
described as a limb—movement^ than as a muscle—contraction^ despite 
the fact that the former is a less basic^ description than the latter. 
According to a matching intuition, we also want to say that scowling 
is something we do directly. Suppose we coin the expression 
's-movement' as designating in a non-physiognomic way the movements 
which constitute scowling. Then we do not know how to s-move^ our 
faces except by scowling. Stuart Hampshire makes the same point by 
drawing attention to the imitation of facial expression (Hampshire 
(1960) p. 147 in (1972)). In imitating the facial expressions of others 
we do not attempt meticulously to reproduce the purely physical move­
ments by which facial expressions are realised. It seems, therefore, 
that 'x s-moved^ his face' is less basic* than 'x scowled' for much 
the same reason as 'x contracted^ his muscles' is less basic* than 
'x moved^ his limb'. Given the obvious asymmetry of the relation 
' ... more basic than ... ' for any one concept of basicness, 'x 
s-moved^ his face' cannot also be a more basic* description of an action 
than 'X scowled'.
2.3 The concept of basic* cannot, therefore, be applied in the 
present context without jeopardising the success of its other appli­
cations. A more promising approach might consist in an attempt to 
modify Goldman's concept of conventional level-generation to meet the 
present need.  ^ A suitably modified representation of conventional 
generation will render it as a relation between properties or types of 
actions, not between tokens. More precisely, an operative convention
7. Goldman ((1970) p. 26) defines conventional generation thus :
Act-token A of agent S conventionally generates act-token A^ of 
agent S only if the performance of A in circumstances C 
(possibly null), together with a rule R saying that A done in C 
counts as k', guarantees the performance of k'.
As it stands this definition not only presupposes a theory of action- 
individuation which is unacceptable to anyone who believes that Davidson, 
Hornsby et al. are correct on this score, it is also incoherent with 
respect to individuation given what the relevant convention or rule is 
supposed to stipulate. For how can an action 'count as' a different 
action from that which it is? 'Counts as' like 'realises', 'constitutes', 
etc., requires identity of tokens it relates but is asymmetric with 
respect to the types of which they are tokens.
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will be conceived of as ensuring that any action is of a type or kind 
K, if it is also of some other kind, K^. But the details of such a 
definition need not be spelled out here because the idea of a conven­
tion carries with it the implication of ’psychological interaction' 
between members of a community. This suggests that it would be a 
mistake to look for a concept of level generation applicable to the 
conventional relations between types of which actions are tokens if 
such a concept is expected to be entirely autonomous from that of 
basicness^. Psychological interaction, while not reducible to 
physical interaction, plainly involves causation. Specifically, to 
say that actions of one kind are, due to the prevailing conventions, 
actions of another kind is to say something about what such actions 
are taken to be by members of the community in which the relevant 
conventions prevail.
Once this is admitted, the point can be expected to apply to 
non-conventional types of expressive behaviour such as those under 
consideration. As a step toward an account of how this might work, 
one might consider the following example intended by Hornsby to 
demonstrate an application of 'basic*' ((loc cit.) p. 74). If the 
sentence 'He greeted her by waving to her' is true of some action, then 
'his waving to her' is, according to Hornsby, a more basic* description 
of this action than 'his greeting her'. But the predicate, ' 
greets y ', could with some plausibility be construed as being appli­
cable only subject to the fulfilment of certain success conditions.
He could not be said to have greeted her unless she had been made 
aware of having been greeted. The appearance of circularity could be 
dispelled by an approximately Gricean expansion of the notion of 
greeting thus making explicit the fact that greeting is a form, 
perhaps rudimentary, of communication, x greets y only if x does 
something which causes y to recognise x's intention to draw y's 
attention to x's presence. In Hornsby's example this effect is 
achieved by waving. Causation is now conspicuously present in the 
account of greeting and the concept of basicness* consequently becomes 
superfluous. Her being waved to, which is the event introduced by the 
description of his action as a waving to her, causes her recognition 
of his intention as just described, which is the event introduced by 
the description of his action as a greeting of her. It might be 
maintained that strictly there are three descriptions of the same 
action being deployed here. There is one action described respectively
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as a 'waving to her', 'à greeting of her' and 'a causing her to 
recognise that she has been greeted'. But since applicability of the 
second entails applicability of the third description there is no 
point in insisting that only the third and not the second description, 
when paired with the action, introduces the relevant effect.
Still, fists can be shaken and anger thereby expressed in the 
absence of any witnesses. No effect (other than a fist-shaking^) is 
introduced by a description of an action described as an expression of 
anger; this is hardly surprising, since not all expression is communi­
cation. Nevertheless, there is intuitive support for the idea that 
physiognomic or interpretative redescriptions are comparable to causal 
redescriptions of actions. I will argue in the next chapter that an 
action is expressive only if it would produce a certain effect on an 
observer of a certain kind if one were present. Interpretative 
redescriptions are a species of conditional causal redescription. But 
before proceeding to a more detailed account of the conditions under 
which expressive behaviour is efficacious - to an account, that is, of 
the relation between the concepts of expression and communication - 
certain obstacles need to be overcome. Failure to do so would encourage 
the idea that expressive behaviour is distinguished not by its effects 
but by its inefficacy.
3. Causation and expression
3.1 Consider the following example. Henry II, in a rage, uttered
the words 'Will no-one rid me of this upstart priest?'. Hearing this,
four of Henry's knights rode to Canterbury and killed Thomas Becket. 
There seems to be an unbroken causal chain leading from Henry's 
utterance - which constitutes, inter alia, an expression of a desire 
that Becket should cease to exist - to the death of Becket via certain 
perceptions, beliefs and desires of the knights. The denial of this 
would be tantamount to a denial that the words of influential personages 
can alter the course of history. But admission of causal chains of 
this kind carries certain equally counter-intuitive implications if 
three general philosophical doctrines are also accepted; doctrines 
which otherwise have much to recommend them. They are the following :
(i) There are causal links between physical and mental events. 
(This assertion is intended to be neutral as between theories of 
psycho-physical causation and theories which depend on the claim that
for any mental event there is some neural event with which it is
identical.) In this case, Henry's behaviour caused some perceptual
60
- specifically auditory - event which caused a belief about Henry's 
desires and complementary desires in the knights which caused their 
actions which caused Becket's death. Clearly the sequence should be 
further expanded to include details of the links between audition and 
belief, but this plays no important role at his point (but is 
relevant later).
(ii) Transitivity of causation. Applied to the present 
instance this principle entails that Henry's utterance caused Becket's 
death.
(iii) Transitive verbs of the kind instantiated by 'to kill' 
are analysable in terms of causation and their intransitive counter­
parts. The suggestion is that 'x ^-s^ y ' is true iff 'x causes a 
(J)-ing^  by y'. To kill someone just is to cause someone to die. Given
(i), (ii) and (iii), Henry killed Becket and this is absurd.
One of the above theses must be dropped, or at least, modified 
if the repugnant conclusion just reached is to be avoided. The most 
obvious candidate seems to be (iii) since as it stands it is inde­
pendently capable of supporting inferences of the kind exemplified.
The difference between murder and incitement to murder, though perhaps 
negligible from a moral point of view, is intuitively and legally 
hard to relinquish. Hornsby has shown how the causal analysis can be 
modified in a way that will allow the general distinction between 
(f)-ing^  and getting someone else to to be preserved. The analysans 
is retained but conceded to be insufficient. An additional clause is 
required to ensure that an action is a killing only if the causal route 
from it to the victim's death does not pass through any other action 
performed either by the original agent or by someone else. Informally, 
her proposal is to define transitive verbs as follows ; x ^-s^ y iff 
X does something which causes y to (pj. and any other action which causes 
y to cj)^ also causes x to (j)^ y.  ^ This is sufficient to block the 
inference that Henry killed Becket since among the actions which caused 
Becket to die is included the knight's action of stabbing Becket which 
did not cause, though it was caused by, Henry's speech-act.
8. Hornsby ((op.cit.) pp. 124-128) Hornsby follows Davidson (1967) 
in treating verbs which report actions as two- or three-place pre­
dicates for intransitive and transitive verbs respectively. In the 
first case an event is related to an agent, eg. 'walks (x,e)'; in 
the second an event is related to an agent and a patient, eg. 'kills 
(x,y,e)'. Her formal definition of transitive verbs (p. 128) is 
formulated accordingly, but the details need not detain us here.
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There are minor grounds for dissatisfaction here. First, it 
might be objected that Hornsby’s refurbished analysis does nothing 
to explain why we do not say that Henry killed Becket. It merely 
repeats that this is so. But then an explanation is not what is 
aimed for here so much as a semantic description of a certain class of 
verbs. All that is required is that it should be a faithful record 
of the way in which the verbs to which it applies actually behave.
Secondly, however, the condition now imposed on the appli­
cation of transitive verbs may be too stringent. It is sometimes said 
that a smile launched a thousand ships. Hitler is accused of killing 
six million European Jews. Yet Helen of Troy never set foot on any 
of the ships of Argos until after the sacking of Troy and Hitler 
probably never laid a hand on a single non-Aryan. I suggest, however, 
that without diminishing the responsibility of Helen or Hitler the 
sentences 'Helen of Troy launched a thousand ships (by smiling)' and 
'Hitler killed six million Jews (by approving the institution of 
death-camps)' may safely be dismissed as hyperbole. Being less than 
literally true they do not amount to serious counter-examples to the 
modified causal analysis of transitive verbs under consideration.
3.2 The causal account of transitive verbs, suitably modified, 
does not entail that expressive actions, speech-acts and so on, which 
cause c|)-ingSj amount to #-ings^. So far, then, the theory of expression 
does not require the abandonment of any of the three doctrines 
mentioned above, but only the improvement of the third. This is a 
useful result if only because questioning the principle of transi­
tivity of causation would take us too far afield, probably unprofitably.
But consider, now, a more mundane example. I ask or enjoin someone to
close the door. The person to whom the injunction is addressed com­
plies with the desire expressed in it and closes the door. By 
expressing a desire for a state of affairs I have caused its realisa­
tion. In the light of the previous paragraph this does not, of course, 
entail that I myself have closed the door. But there remains a
certain reluctance to say even that I have caused the door to be
closed (by causing someone else to close it). There is, then, a 
different motive for denying the application of (i) or (ii) above to 
expressive behaviour. I still do not propose to question (ii), 
however, because of its general explanatory use.
That leaves the option of denying the efficacy of expressive 
behaviour altogether. The following passage due to Stuart Hampshire
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apparently supports this line.
A scowl, or an angry glance, are allowed to survive, when 
the rest of the behaviour is inhibited, partly because they 
are largely ineffective as action. Generally speaking, we 
effectively do things, and make changes in the world, in 
the primary sense of these words, that is, in the sense that 
is associated with physical change, with our hands and with 
other limbs rather than with our face. When a disposition 
to behave in a certain way is controlled, the last vestige 
of the behaviour is apt to survive in the facial expression, 
and particularly the eyes, as being the ineffective part of 
the behaviour, the most subtle and insubstantial, and there­
fore the most immediately expressive of the inner movement 
of the mind. ... If a movement is seen effectively to serve 
some evident and familiar human need or purpose, its signifi­
cance as gesture is lost. The behaviour generally needs to be 
taken as a sign. (Hampshire (1960) p. 153 in (1972))
When Hampshire says that facial expression is not a way of doing things 
'in the primary sense of these words', it may be that he is making, in 
a very general way, the point made in the previous paragraphs. We do 
not strike someone by expressing anger and the desire to do so. Henry 
did not kill Becket by expressing a desire for his demise. But while 
this much is acceptable, the further apparent implication that it is 
essential to the notion of a desire ('disposition' or 'inclination') 
being expressed that the movement by which this is achieved does not 
cause the desired effect goes rather further. I am not sure whether 
the implication is intended or is only the result of a misleading way 
of formulating the generalisation.
This further implication, however, is not obviously wrong. It 
sounds odd to say that my requesting the door to be shut actually 
caused the door to be shut. But the oddness pertains to the saying of 
it rather than to what is said to be the case. It may be true despite 
its peculiarity. The issue is related to the conditions which determine 
which of many causal antecedents we pick out as the cause of an event.
It has been said that the cause of an event is determined in part by 
the nature of our interest in explaining it. When several actions 
cause an event we are ordinarily interested in the action which is 
temporally last. The notion can be conveyed by noting that to say of 
an action that it is the cause of an event is usually, converscLt'ioYiatZy 
to imply (in the now familiar sense) that no other action caused the 
event and did not cause the first-mentioned action. In other words.
9. cf. Hornsby ((op. cit.) p. 129). The idea is due to Hart and 
Honoré (1959) Causation in the Law (Oxford : Clarendon).
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what is conversationally implied corresponds to the additional clause 
in Hornsby’s analysis of causative transitive verbs. What explain 
the implicature in such cases are the interests presumed to motivate 
the speaker. The same is true of Grice’s well-known example, where 
a professor conversationally implies that a student's work is inade­
quate by commenting on the beauty of his hand-writing (cf. Grice (1961) 
pp. 121-52). The implicature is noticed because professors are 
expected to be interested in the standard of the ideas expressed by 
their students, not in the calligraphy of their expression.
Hornsby ((loc cit.) p. 129) has noted the vagueness inherent in 
the notion of relativity to interest. I would add that it is this 
vagueness which makes it appropriate in the present connection. Explana­
tory interests vary, and so, accordingly, do our intuitions about what 
to count as the cause of an event. Thus, while it is odd to speak of 
a speech-act causing an event such as the shutting of a door, it is 
conspicuously less peculiar to say that Henry XT's utterance was the 
cause of Becket's death. Yet there is no relevant logical difference 
between the two cases.
3.3 The peculiarity of saying that an expressive action, a gesture 
or a speech-act is the cause of some event caused by an action incited 
by that speech-act or gesture is thus explained in terms of conversa­
tional implicature and interest-relativity. This is preferable to a 
truth-functional account - ie. an account that would disguise the 
peculiarity as falsehood - insofar as a proponent of such an account 
would have either to deny the transitivity of causation or to maintain 
that what appear in these instances to be straightforward causal 
sequences are not genuinely causal. The latter option would involve 
denying that one or more than one of the links in these apparent 
causal chains is causal. This could be justified only on the basis of 
some general theory which, for example, denied that desires and beliefs 
cause actions. In the initial example it would then be argued that 
the alleged causal route to the killing of Becket by the four knights 
traverses their beliefs and desires and is not, therefore, genuinely 
causal. Arguments have been put forward in favour of general theories 
of this kind, but they are considerably weakened by two kinds of 
counter-argument. First, if an analysis of causality in terms of 
nomologically independent counterfactuals is possible then it is 
futile to maintain in this connection that there are no laws linking 
desires and beliefs to action (cf. Lewis (1973) pp. 187-8). Secondly, 
even if this proposal is rejected, the fact that there are no law—like
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generalisations linking mental to physical events qua mental and 
physical events is, even if true hardly sufficient to establish 
that they are not causally related. For there may be some kind of 
which a mental event is an instance, instances of which generally cause 
physical events of some kind instantiated by the relevant physical
event. This contention has been argued for most persuasively in
. _ 11 recent literature.
This idea does not mean, however, that the passage quoted from 
Hampshire's paper contains no more truth than that given in my inter­
pretation of the distinction between expressing and doing things 'in 
the primary sense of those words'. If this is taken to imply that 
'ordinary event causality' is not the principle which determines the 
route from facial expression to some physical change in the world then 
it is misleading. Each event in the causal chains under consideration 
is an instance of some physical kind and is linked in the ordinary 
way to events which precede and follow it. But if descriptions of 
what goes on are restricted to this level it will be impossible to 
capture the way in which such sequences are intelligible as communica­
tion. For this an intensional, mentalistic idiom is required and to 
this extent the kind of causation operating is not 'ordinary'. But 
its dimension of extraordinariness is supplementary to or supervenient 
upon ordinary causation. It does not replace it. Expressive behaviour 
is not, as Sartre (1939) believed, essentially an attempt to alter 
the world by magical means. It is not ((ibid.) p. 65 in translation) 
essentially ineffectual.
Hampshire's point is really more subtle. One way of conveying 
its essence is by distinguishing not between expressing the inclination 
to (p and (j)-ing but by distinguishing between expressing a desire for 
some state of affairs which #-ing successfully would realise and 
trying, perhaps unsuccessfully, to cj). This distinction does not 
necessarily correspond to an observable difference between kinds of 
behaviour (cf. Gombrich (1972)). For in some cases the specific in­
efficacy of the behaviour - ie. the fact that it falls short of actually 
(f)-ing - is due to circumstances beyond the agent's control. In such
10. Which it may not be - vide Bennett's concept of teleological laws 
(Bennett (1976) Chapter 2) and their relation to mechanistic laws 
((ibid.) §21).
11. For example, by Davidson in (1963) and (1970).
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cases, as Gombrich (ibid.) puts it, the behaviour will be indeterminate 
with respect to the distinction between psychological and physical 
interaction. But while bo.th kinds of behaviour are identically re­
lated in one respect to some possible effect - both fall short of 
achieving it - there is a difference in another respect. The difference 
is between ineffectually trying to <p and ineffectually imitating the 
action of (p-ing. As such, it is plainly teleological rather than 
causal. More detailed discussion of it is to be.found in the Appendix.
4. Conclusion
It is a further corollary of the above and, I think, of Stuart 
Hampshire’s analysis, that the purely physical results to which an 
action might lead are not those in virtue of which the action is 
classifiable as expressive. Henry II’s utterance would have expressed 
his wanting Becket to cease to exist even if Becket had outlived Henry. 
I would have expressed my wanting the door shut even if the door had 
remained open. Consequently, if physiognomic redescriptions are to 
be successfully represented as being connected with causal redescrip­
tions, it will not be in terms of purely physical effects, but rather, 
in terms of cognitive effects. But the relevant kind of cognitive 
effect has not yet been mentioned. Its specification is the task for 
the next chapter.
66
IV. EXPRESSION AND COMMUNICATION
1. Expression as potential communication
1.1 The previous chapter culminated in an argument supporting the 
claim that expressive behaviour, including speech, could be said to 
produce concrete effects without logical impropriety and despite the 
conversational peculiarity of describing facial expressions or speech- 
acts as the causes of such effects. This was meant as a preliminary 
to a search for a kind of effect which is such that only behaviour 
which has the power to produce effects of that kind is expressive.
The relevant kind has not yet been specified, but the supposition is 
that somewhere in the causal chain from Henry II's utterances to Becket's 
death or from a request for the shutting of a door to its shutting, 
there is a link which instantiates it. It is reasonably clear that 
the physical consequences themselves are not what we are looking for. 
Henry could have expressed his desire for Becket's death in circum­
stances the same in every relevant respect without Becket dying as a 
result. (Of course, the circumstances would have to differ with 
respect to the knights' disposition to do Henry's bidding.) I could 
have expressed my desire for the closing of the door without the door 
consequently being shut by my audience. But among the events leading 
from these expressive actions to the realisation of the desires they 
express it is likely that there are events such that had they, ceteris 
paribus, not occurred then nothing would have been expressed. The 
relevant sort of effect will presumably turn out to be cognitive and 
it is this that underlies the conceptual connection between expression 
and communication. To exhibit this connection we need first to esta­
blish what kind of intuitive support is available. Secondly, an 
appropriate concept of communication is required, a concept such that :
(i) any action or behaviour which exemplifies it is expressive,
(ii) any action or behaviour which is expressive potentially 
exemplifies it (exemplifies it, that is, under conditions specifiable 
with sufficient facility to avoid trivialising the connection).
More precisely I will expect of an appropriate concept of communica­
tion that whenever 'x expressed F-ness' is true then, if a suitable 
audience or spectator is present, 'x communicated that Fx' is also 
true.
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1.2 It will be worthwhile to provide some examples which indicate 
in an approximate way the nature of the intuition expressed in the 
claim that expression is potential communication. Two introductory 
examples will suffice.
(i) In the course of an interview a dramatist alleges that his 
intention in writing a certain play was to express a feeling or vision 
he had but that he had no intention of communicating anything to 
anyone. He implies, moreover, that he takes himself to have succeeded 
in expressing the feeling - angst, let us say - which he set out to 
express. Before assessing the coherence of the dramatist's claim we 
need to know what question it was meant to answer. For example, he 
may have been asked why it is that the play under discussion has only 
just received its first public performance although it was written 
twenty years earlier. His answer would then seem to provide a reason­
able explanation; there are respectable and familiar ways in which one 
can imagine it being embroidered. Alternatively, the author may be 
attempting to meet a certain kind of not unusual, though less than 
seriously literary or aesthetic complaint. He is accused of having 
produced a piece which tends to induce disagreeable emotions in its 
spectators, of having imposed on them a pessimistic vision of life 
which they would prefer not to acknowledge or even to contemplate.
He replies that the work was written because he was afflicted by just 
such a vision which he felt could be rendered more bearable only 
through expression in his chosen literary form. He did not, however, 
intend to induce a similar pessimism in his audiences, though he 
recognised the probability of this occurring. As long as this apology 
is not intended as a means of disclaiming responsibility it contains 
no logical impropriety. One can do something which one believes will 
produce a certain result without intending to bring about that result 
but some other which one also believes will follow from one's action.
Finally, suppose that the dramatist is accused of having written 
a play so utterly obscure that no-one can understand it. It is to 
this criticism that he replies that he had no intention of communicating 
anything, only of expressing his own, highly personal anguish about 
things. He is indifferent to his failure to communicate this feeling, 
which, he alleges, does not diminish the expressiveness of his work.
This contention, it seems, approaches absurdity. If his play cannot 
elicit some sort of comprehension, then it is a failure not only as 
communication, but also as expression. In general a purportedly 
expressive object really is expressive only if there is some spectator
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or kind of spectator in whom the object would produce an appropriate 
cognitive response if it were made accessible to him. This, at any 
rate, expresses a powerful intuition. Of course, the dramatist is 
logically entitled to claim that all the actual audiences of the play 
are composed of individuals too dull to interpret it; that only he, 
the dramatist, has sufficient wit and erudition to understand his 
work. But as Wollheim has pointed out ((1964) p. 287) the author’s 
ability to understand his own work must depend on something other than 
his recollection of how he felt when he wrote it, or even of what he 
intended to express at that time. This is possible, perhaps, in 
principle, but a claim of this kind should be treated with suspicion 
for it is difficult to see how one could verify that the author's 
interpretation is based on understanding and not on memory.  ^ Either 
way the example suggests that it is a minimum condition of expression 
that there be some possible audience or spectator to whom it is 
recognisable as expression.
The example just given supports the supposition of a connection 
between expression and communication in a literary, ie. aesthetic con­
text. Its bearing on behavioural expression is, therefore, likely to 
be limited given the differences between artistic and behavioural 
expression discussed in Chapter 1. The point of the example is to 
indicate the nature of the conceptual relation between communication 
and expression at a high level of generality. Once we return to a more 
detailed discussion it will appear that wherever two concepts of 
expression differ, as do artistic and behavioural, or behavioural and 
linguistic expression, there will be two correspondingly different 
concepts of communication.
Behavioural expression resembles linguistic expression, in one 
respect at least, more than it resembles artistic expression. Both 
behavioural and linguistic expression relate what is expressed to the 
person who expresses it. Artistic expression does not (cf. Chapter 1, 
§5). The difference concerns the cognitive response produced in spec­
tators. In the aesthetic context that response is essentially contem­
plative. A work of art which expresses joy invites the spectator to 
contemplate the idea of joy, not necessarily the artist's joy - perhaps 
even the spectator's own. Behavioural expression, including speech,
1. The point is strikingly reminiscent of Wittgenstein's critique of 
the notion of a private language.
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is evidential in the sense that it is taken by those who notice it as 
evidence of some more or less reliable kind about the mental state of 
the person who exhibits it. Language, in its way, manifests as clearly 
as art the connection between expression and communication.
(ii) Imagine a love-sick adolescent who murmurs words of 
passion into his pillow and in the absence of the object of his 
affection. To say of this performance that it is an expression of 
love is surely to say that it is behaviour which would be taken by the 
person to whom it is secretly "addressed" as evidence that she is 
loved if she were present and if she spoke the same language. It is 
some such intuition that is expressed, vaguely but unobjectionably, 
by saying that to express a feeling or belief is to communicate that 
feeling or belief to a suitably qualified spectator if one is in the 
vicinity. That this is a genuine intuition rather than a prejudice 
motivated by a prior commitment to, say, a Gricean theory of meaning 
is obvious. There is a connection nevertheless. The strength of this 
intuition demonstrates the weakness of the sort of objections raised 
against communication-intention theories of meaning which are based on 
the performance of meaningful linguistic acts in the absence, recog­
nised by the speaker, of any audience (vide Chomsky (1976) pp. 60ff).
1.3 A further highly general point needs to be made about my use 
of the term 'communication*. I take 'communicate' to be a verb of 
achievement, two minimum conditions of whose application are the 
presence of an audience or spectator and the production in the latter 
of some prepositional attitude (cognitive response) vis-a-vis what is 
said to have been communicated. These requirements are met by any 
concept of communication essentially applicable to animate entities 
(as distinct from purely physical concepts such as that of the 
communication of motion). This is perfectly compatible with the 
analysis executed by Grice, Strawson, Schiffer et al., of whom it 
would be misleading to say that they attempt to define communication 
purely in terms of intentions. What is defined purely in terms of 
intention is a concept of trying to communicate applicable to a certain 
range of behaviour which includes speech. Successful communication 
occurs when the relevant intentions are realised. The concept of 
expression is the concept of communication with the requirement of an 
actual audience removed and as a consequence, but only as a consequence 
of its removal, with the uptake requirement removed.
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2. Gricean communication
2.1 Could an account of facial expression be based on a broadly 
Gricean concept of communication? This suggestion is not entirely 
unattractive for two initial reasons. First, communication of this 
kind is not necessarily linguistic, the aim of Grice and his followers 
being to define a concept of communication primarily and then to 
analyse linguistic meaning on that basis. Secondly, Grice's aim was 
to elucidate a concept of meaning - 'non-natural' meaning (Grice 
(1957)) - suitable for application to language but not only to language. 
If successful this would support the widely held assumption that non- 
linguistic behaviour is, or can be, meaningful. A smile means that 
the person smiling is happy. This idea has exerted an attraction on, 
among others, Wittgenstein, Wollheim, Charles Taylor and, in a different 
way, on many anthropologists. The suggestion to be contemplated here 
is that the meaning of naturally expressive behaviour is 'non-natural'.
The literature of communication-intention theory is replete with
2examples which seem to meet this desideratum. An approximate account 
based on Schiffer ((1972) p. 13) but substituting 'rely' and 'believe' 
for some of his uses of 'intend' (cf. Bennett (1976) p. 125), can be 
given for an incomplete analysis as follows :
A person, S, intends to communicate p to an audience. A, by 
exhibiting a piece of behaviour, a, iff :
(i) S believes that a has a certain feature, F ;
(ii) S relies on A to recognise that a is F ;
(iii) S intends A to infer at least in part from the fact that
Fa that (iv);
(iv) S intends a to produce in A the belief that p;
(v) S intends A to take A's recognition of S's intention (iv)
as a reason for believing that p.
Various explanatory and cautionary qualifications are required here. 
First I have modified Schiffer's first shot at an analysis of s-meaning 
to this extent. Schiffer begins by analysing 'S means something by ... 
whereas I have begun with an instance of this general analysandum;
'S means that p ... '. Thus where Schiffer's analysis proceeds in 
terms of some response, r, the utterer intends to produce via, to 
coin Bennett's phrase, the Gricean mechanism, mine proceeds in terms of
2. See eg. Schiffer ((1972) pp. 12, 119f) and Bennett ((1976) pp. 13, 
138f).
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the specific response, a belief that p, which is the proper replace­
ment for r at this stage when dealing with assertion. This is purely 
for ease of exposition. Secondly, as Strawson, Schiffer and Bennett 
are all aware, this is not yet sufficient as a definition of s-meaning. 
More importantly, as Strawson (1964) insists, it is not yet sufficient 
for the special but not artificial concept of communication that Grice 
(1957) had in mind. This insufficiency will be relevant, however, 
only if it transpires that the conditions formulated by Schiffer are 
necessary for physiognomic and gestural communication. Only then will 
it be worth attempting here to expand them into a set of conditions 
sufficient for our purposes. Finally, it is not, of course, communica­
tion as such which is determined by the above conditions, but only a 
certain way of trying to communicate. Communication as such occurs if 
the speaker's intentions are realised but it should be noted that, 
for reasons shortly to emerge, this could form the basis only of a 
sufficient, not of a necessary condition of successful communication.
At least the requirement that U's intention (iv) be realised must be 
dropped and this will have repercussions for the rest of the analysis.
2.2 I have cited Schiffer's modified version of Grice's (1957) 
proposal because it makes explicit the importance of a certain aspect 
of s-meaning not mentioned but implicit in Grice. Specifically it 
stresses that the communicative behaviour must have (or be thought to 
have) a feature or set of features calculated to fulfil a rationalis­
ing role in the production of the audience's belief. This addition is 
designed to exclude certain kinds of mechanical (eg. neuro-surgical) 
counter-example (cf. (ibid.) p. 12) which need not preoccupy us here. 
The relevance of Schiffer's proposal here is that it seems to allow 
us to sustain both the contrast and the similarity between linguistic 
and non-linguistic communication. They are similar in that both 
require complex sets of intentions on the part of the speaker. They 
differ in that they rely on the audience's recognition of different 
kinds of property. Thus if S intends to communicate that it is raining 
to A by uttering 'It is raining', he relies on A's capacity to 
'recognise that "it is raining" has the feature of being an English 
sentence which means "it is raining'" (ibid.). If, on the other hand,
S employs the common gesture of repeatedly raising his hand to his 
mouth in order to communicate to A that he, S, would like to be pro­
vided with food, then he relies on A's capacity to recognise that the 
gesture has the feature of resembling the activity of eating.
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Schiffer's suggestion is that :
  the first example the relevant feature of S's
utterance is a "non-natural" one, whereas in the second 
example it is a "natural" one. (ibid.)
This promises to supply a basis for distinguishing natural from non­
natural or conventional modes of communication, language being an 
example of the latter and gestures like the one just mentioned provid­
ing familiar examples of the former.
The promise, however, will turn out to be illusory. The kind 
of natural expression with which we are concerned is exemplified by 
smiling, scowling, fist-shaking, etc.. With respect to the first and 
second of these at least, there is no obvious 'natural' feature upon 
which the people who do them rely for the communication of their 
message. This is an important defect in theories of natural expression 
which depend upon the iconic or mimetic features of the behaviour thus 
designated (cf. Hampshire (1960) and also Darwin's 'principle of 
serviceable associated habits' p. 28 in (1965) edition). Such theories 
are not easily extended to accommodate the important class of behaviour 
which, for example, Wittgenstein has in mind when he spoke of natural 
expression ((1958) eg. §244). As well as the natural expression of 
pain this class includes smiling as a natural expression of happiness, 
scowling as a natural expression of anger and so on. The criteria for 
membership of this class are discussed in the final chapters; they 
are not relevant here.
Still, while Schiffer's distinction between 'natural' and 'non­
natural' features cannot supply a basis for a distinction between 
natural and conventional expression, his analysis may still be appli­
cable to facial expression. On the model of Schiffer's treatment of 
communicating something by uttering an appropriate sentence we might 
say that if S intends to communicate to A that he, S, is happy by 
smiling then S relies on A's capacity to recognise that smiles have 
the feature of being a (natural) expression of happiness and he 
intends thereby to produce in A the belief that S is happy, etc..
Like Schiffer we could assume that the circularity inherent in this 
proposal will be shown to be harmless by further analysis.
2.3 There is, however, a far more damaging (and not unrelated) 
objection to the general attempt to elucidate natural expression on 
the basis of Gricean communication. (Henceforward I will use the 
term 'natural expression' to denote behaviour like smiling or
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or inarticulately crying out in pain. To diminish the risk of confusion 
I will avoid Grice s and Schiffer's uses of the adjective 'natural' but 
an analysis of my own use will not be forthcoming until the seventh chap­
ter.) The attempt to formulate a Gricean analysis of facial expression 
is subject to the criticism that facial expression does not even satis­
fy the 'sub-Gricean' condition of meaning articulated by Bennett ((op 
cit.) p. 171f). According to Bennett's proposal S means that p by 
uttering a only if S intends to communicate p to A by offering him 
intention-dependent evidence that p. Bennett's aim is to exclude 
alleged examples of meaning already excluded by Grice and Strawson, 
which he does on the grounds that they constitute cases where the 
communicator offers intention-free evidence, while preserving the idea 
that a community of 'Plain-Talkers' ((ibid.) pp. 171f) have a language 
although they take each other's utterances of a as evidence that p 
without recognising speakers' intentions to communicate p. One may 
not be convinced of the sufficiency of this condition, but its necessity 
as a condition of s-meaning is beyond dispute. Smiling, however, 
constitutes evidence that the person who smiles is happy irrespective 
of whether or not he smiled intentionally. This is so because smiling, 
like laughter or crying, is often, indeed usually, spontaneous in the 
sense that the causal route from the emotion expressed (if actually 
felt) to the behaviour by-passes any formation of intention (communi­
cative or otherwise) by the communicator. Consequently facial expres­
sion cannot be elucidated in terms of a Gricean concept of communication.
One way of meeting this objection would be to argue that the 
contrast it sets up between spontaneous and intentional action is mis­
leading. This is true (and is developed in more detail in the Appendix), 
and something along these lines must be presupposed by Wollheim, for 
example, when he claims that to smile is essentially to produce 
intentionally a certain lie (movement) of the face insofar as it falls 
under a certain description (Wollheim (1966) p. 97 in (1973)). This 
is simply to deny that the point of the objection is true. Smiling, 
like the hand-to-mouth gesture and language, is evidence for the 
ascription of a state of mind to the person smiling or gesticulating 
only if it is intentional under the relevant description or, in 
Schiffer's idiom, only if the person intended to produce a movement 
which possessed the relevant feature. Bennett's concept of intention- 
dependence and Schiffer's explicit introduction of features or proper­
ties of behaviour into the analysis of meaning can be combined fairly 
neatly. For a spectator would not infer from the fact that the
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hand-to-mouth gesture resembles the activity of eating that the 
gesticulator is hungry unless he took the gesture to be intentional 
under the description 'imitation of eating'. This, incidentally, is 
more than is required by Bennett's sub-Gricean conditions which stipu­
late only that the evidence is in fact intention-dependent, not that 
it be taken by the spectator as intention-dependent evidence. This 
requirement may be too strong for communication which, like speech, 
depends in part on behavioural regularity. But it seems indispensible 
for communication which depends on imitation or iconicity. ^
The plausibility of Wollheim's position construed as it is here 
in terms of intention-dependence, is due to the need to exclude from 
the relevant concept of communication much the same kinds of intuitive­
ly non-communicative examples as those that intention-dependence 
excludes. To arrange convincing-looking evidence that p is not, even 
if accompanied by the appropriate Gricean intentions, to communicate 
that p (cf. Strawson (1964) p. 156 in (1971)) unless the evidence is 
of such a kind that it would not be evidence at all unless accompanied 
by the right intentions. To offer someone a photograph which confirms 
the statement that p (cf. Grice (1957) p. 44 in Strawson (ed.) (1967)) 
is not to communicate that p since the photograph would have retained 
its value as evidence even if discovered fortuitously. An object or 
event is intention-dependent evidence for p only if, had its existence 
been brought about by a purely mechanistic, ie. non-intentional, 
process, it would not be evidence that p. This requirement seems to 
be met by smiling as well as by linguistic or iconic communication.
A smile produced by galvanisation is not evidence that the person 
smiling is happy and, given the slightly stronger condition introduced 
in the last paragraph, if it is known to be thus produced it will not 
be taken as evidence of happiness.
But it would be wrong to conclude from this that smiling con­
stitutes intention-dependent evidence of happiness. The exclusion of 
galvanisation reflects only part of what we mean by saying that 
behaviour is intentional. It is a necessary but insufficient condition 
of intention that the movements of a person's body should not be 
caused by the intervention of any external agency. This condition 
must be met by a facial configuration if it is to constitute evidence
3. Bennett in effect notes the insufficiency of his revised conditions 
to account for any but regularity-dependent types of meaning ((ibid.) 
p. 174).
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for, and hence an expression of a feeling. In short, we require that 
the smile should be the result of behaV'iouTy ie. of a bodily movement^ 
of the person on whose face it appears. This is born out by the 
following consideration. There is a consensus among psychologists 
that infantile smiling is expressive from the age of about four months 
(see Chapter 7). Earlier apparent facial expressions are merely 
grimaces mechanistically caused by gastric wind which do not constitute 
behaviour at all. It would be implausible to suggest that the infant 
makes the transition from organic mechanism to intentional agency at 
so early a stage. But it is not obviously implausible to maintain 
that he begins to behave in certain ways which include a rudimentary 
form of communication. It is this rudimentary concept of communication 
which needs to be accommodated in the following analysis.
2.4 The conclusion of this section is negative. It is that physio­
gnomic expression, though it is a species of (potential) communication, 
is not usefully investigated in the light of s-meaning or intention- 
dependent evidence (Gricean and sub-Gricean communication). But before 
looking elsewhere for a suitable concept of communication, a somewhat 
paradoxical consequence of recent developments in the argument should 
be made explicit. Bennett's revised definition of s-meaning in terms 
of intention-dependent evidence, though intended as a weakening of the 
initial Gricean proposal required in order to accommodate the supposed­
ly linguistic behaviour of unsubtle plain-talkers, is in another way 
more stringent than the original account. Bennett's analysis runs as 
follows : S means that p by uttering a if he intends thereby to induce
in A the belief that p for which the utterance of a is intention- 
dependent evidence ((ibid.) p. 174 : this is not complete but is all 
that is required for the present point). This condition cannot be 
satisfied by smiling. True, it does not follow from this that people 
never mean anything by smiling given Bennett's strategy of supplying 
only sufficient conditions for s-meaning ((ibid.) p. 22f). But 
Bennett recognises a need to make his conditions as weak as possible - 
weak enough, that is, not only to accommodate actual languages, but 
also communication systems like Plain Talk and non-systematic, iconic 
modes of communication. It is prima-facie reasonable to expect the 
conditions to accommodate physiognomic and non-iconic, non-conventional 
gestural communication. But Bennett's proposal makes no sense of the 
claim that we sometimes mean something by smiling, frowning, raising 
eyebrows, etc.. For these sometimes constitute evidence for the feel­
ings and attitudes they express without being intentional.
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Schiffer s proposal, on the other hand, does admit the possi­
bility of s-meaning through physiognomic behaviour. This would be 
uninteresting if it amounted to no more than the claim that the 
elementary phase of Schiffer's theory quoted above could be applied 
to some cases of smiling. For at that stage none of the counter­
examples put forward by Strawson (op cit.), Searle (1965) and Schiffer 
himself have been eliminated. But Schiffer's strengthening of his 
conditions, particularly by importing the 'mutual knowledge*' require­
ment ((ibid.) pp. 30f) does not have the effect of excluding 
physiognomic expression altogether, though it does achieve its avowed 
objective. In general, it is reasonable to anticipate that overtly 
smiling at someone in order to communicate some message will satisfy 
all of Schiffer's requirements, all of them, that is, except the 
requirement introduced to distinguish linguistic from non-linguistic 
meaning (see pp. 120ff). ^ The criterion adopted for the execution of 
this task is the notion of convention derived from Lewis (1968) . 
Immediately preceding this there is an example of s-meaning minus 
convention in which members of a certain community utter the sound 
'grrr' when they intend to communicate that they are angry relying 
on the resemblance born by 'grrr' to the sound emitted by dogs when 
they are angry. The method is mimetic. But suppose that 'grrr' in 
fact corresponded to a sound spontaneously emitted by members of the 
same community when they are angry. In that case 'grrr' would con­
stitute intention-free evidence that the growler is angry. But this 
is no obstacle to their sometimes s-meaning by 'grrr' that they are 
angry. In the same way people sometimes s-mean something by smiling. 
Perhaps they often do so if they are civilised adult humans - perhaps, 
even, with certain kinds of smile they usually do so. This will help 
to explain the intuition that physiognomic behaviour is genuinely 
meaningful; meaningful, that is, in a literal, semantic sense. But 
although, as I have argued, people sometimes, or even standardly, s-mean 
things by smiling, the possibility of doing so depends on some more 
primitive connection between smiling and the type of feeling it 
communicates. A more elementary concept of communication is required.
4. Actually from p. 120 onwards Schiffer is no longer prepared to 
countenance non-linguistic meaning at all. I will continue to describe 
cases of Gricean communication which rely on iconic or mimetic features 
as cases of s-meaning, conforming thereby to Schiffer's usage at 
pp. 9-10 and Bennett's usage throughout.
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3. Communication and belief
3.1 How should we characterise the genus of which what people intend 
to do when they s-mean is a species? In other words, what is communi­
cation in general? Bennett suggests that this general concept of 
communication is such that *S communicates p to A' is equivalent to
'S gets A to believe that p' ((op cit.) pp. 127-8). Full Gricean 
communication is a version of communication in general with added 
constraints imposed on the method by which the communicative aim is to 
be achieved. The general concept is intended to be broad enough to 
cover what Bennett refers to collectively as the 'rejected cases' - 
notably those which consist in the offering of intention-free evidence 
that p. While agreeing with Bennett that a broad concept is required,
I do not think that he has provided a suitable definition. The 
condition 'S gets A to believe that p ' is supposed to be sufficient
and necessary for 'S communicates p to A' in some sense of 'communicate'
I maintain that it is neither.
3.2 First the weakness of Bennett's condition. This is brought out
be the following examples.
(i) A neuro-surgeon gets A to believe that p by altering the 
structure of A's brain. (This is a variant of an example of Schiffer's 
((op cit. ) p . 12) .
(ii) Suppose that p is the proposition that A's house is on fire. 
A malicious individual, S, gets A to helieve that his house is on fire 
by actually setting it on fire.
It is reasonably obvious that neither (i) nor (ii) are cases of 
communication in any normal sense. It is also fairly clear how the 
condition may appropriately be strengthened by means of Schiffer's 
suggestion introduced at the beginning of the previous section : S 
communicates p to A iff S gets A to believe that p by offering A evi­
dence for p. This straightforwardly eliminates the counter-examples 
above while preserving exactly the extension Bennett intended for his 
general concept. The 'rejected cases', ie. the cases where the prof­
fered evidence is intention-free, all fall within this extension.
A further strengthening of the condition has been suggested by 
McDowell (1980). McDowell argues that Strawson's (1970) characterisa­
tion of a speaker's primary intention (the only intention with which 
we are still concerned) as the intention to produce in an audience a 
certain belief is highly unnatural. Its peculiarity is well brought 
out by its consequences for the conception of interrogation. To ask
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a question about a subject is, on this view, to request someone to 
induce a certain belief about the matter at hand in the interrogator 
(McDowell (ibid.) p. 126). In order to eliminate this peculiarity 
McDowell argues that a conception of communication as transmission 
of information ought to be taken seriously ((ibid.) pp. 125f) . To 
communicate that p is to supply an audience with the information that p. 
In conformity with this intuitive constraint McDowell suggests that 
we treat 'communicate' as belonging to a certain class of verbs any 
member, (j), of which class is such that ’x cj)-s that p' entails the 
truth of its embedded sentence ((ibid.) p. 126). McDowell claims as 
as additional advantage of this concept that it reflects the continuity 
between primitive animal communication systems and human language.
If this claim is vindicated then it is just the sort of concept we are 
looking for since presumably facial expression lies somewhere along 
that scale. The general notion is as follows : an organism, S, 
communicates that p to some other organism. A, iff as a result of 
behaviour exhibited by S, A possesses the information that p. The 
sense of 'possess information' will depend on the degree of psycho­
logical complexity we are prepared to attribute to members of the 
species to which S and A belong. (In principle they may belong to 
different species, but I will ignore the possibility of inter-species 
communication.) For relatively primitive species the concept of 
information-possession will depend on something like Bennett's 
((op cit.) §14) concept of 'registration' along with the truth of 
the information (misinformation is not a sort of information) and the 
structure of a causal story relating the subject-matter, the communi­
cative behaviour and the registration. For primitive species again, 
this story might avoid mentioning evidence - which one would surely 
want to do for species to which one denies the capacity for belief - 
by treating their communicative behaviour as surrogate stimuli which 
elicit the same responses as their referents (cf. McDowell (op cit.) 
p. 129).
McDowell is aware, however, of the obvious implausibility of 
applying this concept directly to human, especially linguistic com­
munication. The appropriate concept of information-possession for 
humans is, of course, knowledge; knowledge that p being analysable in 
terms of p, belief that p and some sort of causal connection between 
p and the belief that p. So as far as human communication, at least 
between consenting adults, is concerned, McDowell's concept of communi­
cation is, so far, the same as Bennett's with the additional
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requirement that the belief produced in an audience, if one is present, 
be true. This requirement is obviously not satisfied by every case in 
which we want to say that S communicates p to A by uttering a sentence 
in a language of which S and A are competent speakers. McDowell is 
aware of this and I turn to his response shortly. More directly 
relevant is the following point; if expression is to be defined as 
potential communication, that is, as communication with any suitable 
spectator who may be present, then, given McDowell’s analysis so far,
'x expressed F-ness' entails 'Fx'. This was rejected in Chapter 1.
3.3 A weakness of Bennett's condition has been indicated. But it 
is also far too strong in another sense. The same applies to McDowell's 
concept insofar as it constitutes a further strengthening. Bennett 
explicitly represents the production of a belief that p as a necessary 
condition of communicative success when attempting to communicate that 
p. This is far too strong since there will be many cases of attempted 
communication that p, either linguistic or iconic or physiognomic, 
which do not achieve this goal but which one would normally regard as 
successful as communication. Bennett's definition obliterates the 
contrast between understanding and believing what is said, a distinction 
which seems to be applicable beyond the confines of language. This is, 
of course, none other than a version of the distinction between inter­
pretation and explanation sketched in Chapter 2. To believe what is 
said in an utterance is to believe that the utterance is explained in 
a certain way by the speaker's beliefs and that these in turn are 
explained in a certain way by facts about the world - facts which may, 
so to speak, be external or internal to the speaker. To understand 
what is said is not necessarily to have any such beliefs.
Failure to notice this (which is common to Grice, Strawson and 
Schiffer as well as Bennett) is explained in part by the emphasis on 
communication-intention rather than on successful communication. The 
assumption that utterances of indicative sentences are typically 
accompanied by an intention to induce beliefs in or convey information 
to an audience is not without plausibility. But it will not provide a 
basis for s-meaning as long as one allows that people sometimes mean 
what they say without caring much whether they are believed.
McDowell takes up a suggestion of Searle's (1970) to deal with 
this. The proposal is to drop Strawson's primary intention and replace 
it with the secondary intention. The primary intention in speech is 
to say something to an audience. Communicative success is secured if
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the audience is made aware of the speaker's intention 'so that securing 
mutual awareness is not, as in Strawson's picture, a fallible means to 
communicative success, but. rather constitutes it' (McDowell (op cit.) 
p. 130). This characterisation of communicative success could still 
incorporate Bennett's 'rejected cases' and so still meets the require­
ment he imposes on a general concept of communication. Success in 
communicating that p is achieved by arranging convincing evidence that 
p if the audience grasps what it is the communicator is trying to get 
across. He need not actually be convinced.
One is still entitled to claim the discovery of a concept of 
communication at once sufficiently integrated and sufficiently broad 
to make sense of the thought that there is an evolutionary route 
from primitive communication systems to language; this being one of 
McDowell's aims. (Whether or not evolution actually followed that 
route is not a matter for philosophical debate.) In both cases com­
municative success consists in the transmission of a piece of true 
(pleonasm) information. In primitive systems the information trans­
mitted refers to the world outside the speaker. In speech it refers 
to the speaker's intention. In both cases again there is a malfunction 
or breakdown of communication either if the message transmitted is not 
received or if it is false; if it is misinformation ((ibid.) p. 134).
It might be objected, however, that the comparison between primitive 
communication and language appears to be worthwhile only given a very 
vague description of each. True, each essentially involves the trans­
mission of some kind of information, but very different kinds of infor­
mation are involved in each case. McDowell admits the difference but 
takes pains to play it down. It is important, however. In a primitive 
system, if an organism attempts to communicate that p by behaving in 
a certain way but it is either the case that not p, of that no other 
organism comes to register that p, then communicative success has not 
been attained. Not so for language. Primitive communication meets 
Bennett's condition for communication in general (substituting regis­
tration for belief); linguistic communication does not.
I would like to suggest a partial defence of McDowell's claim 
that his concept is integrated (in a way in which Bennett's is not).
The objection rests firmly on the distinction between understanding and 
believing the content of communicative behaviour. It can be rephrased 
by saying that in human communication the securing of comprehension is 
a sufficient condition for communicative success but that in primitive
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communication, communication of p is not achieved unless it secures a 
registration that p in an audience probably of the same species. This 
is true but misleading. It is true that inducing the belief that p 
in an audience is not a necessary condition of communicating that p 
when the method of communication is human language. But it is not 
true that securing comprehension is not a sufficient condition of 
successful communication in a primitive system. The point turns on 
the vacuity of distinguishing belief from understanding in primitive 
species. For it is difficult to see what non-linguistic behavioural 
evidence there could be for the assertion that an animal understood 
the information that p transmitted to it that was not also evidence 
that the animal believed or registered that p. Consequently, pro­
ducing understanding of the means of signification is a sufficient 
condition for communicative success among primitive creatures since 
there is no empirically discernible difference with respect to such 
creatures between understanding what is signified and believing it to 
be true.
3.4 The kind of integrated concept of communication at which 
McDowell was aiming would be of value in the present context if it 
allowed physiognomic expression to occupy a transitional position on 
the scale from primitive to fully linguistic systems of communication. 
This is a desirable result because of the pretheoretical intuition 
we have about such behaviour as smiling, snarling, etc.. On the one 
hand they constitute a kind of natural expression, by which we mean not 
that their communicative function depends on their possession of 
"natural" features,but that they are comparable in certain ways to the 
communicative behaviour of more primitive creatures. On the other 
hand facial expression seems to be not entirely unlike speech; its 
expressive properties, and above all the understanding of them, 
resemble genuinely semantic properties (cf. Wollheim eg. (1964) p. 274), 
Unfortunately McDowell's concept is not very helpful here since, 
although it succeeds in representing speech and primitive communication 
as instances of a single concept of communication, it cannot describe 
an unbroken transition from one to the other. This is because the 
options available do not meet both the requirements made explicit in 
Chapter 1, Section 2 and the requirement specified in Section 2.3 of 
this chapter. Communicative success in physiognomic expression must 
not be identified as the successful transmission of first-order infor­
mation. If it is, then 'x expressed F-ness' will entail 'Fx'.
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Nor can we represent the recognition of physiognomic behaviour as 
expressive in terms of a spectator believing that Fx, perhaps mistaken­
ly; relinquishing, in other words, the condition that the spectator’s 
belief be true. We need the distinction between understanding and 
believing expressive behaviour. But we cannot either avail ourselves 
of the notion of the recognition of the communicative intention behind 
the physiognomy since there may be no such intention. The distinction 
between understanding and believing must be applicable to the attitudes 
of adult humans to facial expression, if it is to be applicable at all, 
to every instance of facial expression they encounter, including that 
of undeveloped infants. This lacuna in the range of McDowell’s concept 
can be filled, I think, only by incorporating a suitable concept of 
evidence to be used in the description of the attitude of understanding,
4. Communication and evidence
4.1 A need for the introduction of a concept of evidence into the 
account of communication in general was recognised at the beginning of 
the last section. It was found that Bennett's definition was in one 
way too weak. The notion of communicative behaviour as evidence for 
what is communicated was brought in to supplement that original sugges­
tion. However, it rapidly transpired that Bennett's condition was far 
too strong for any worthwhile concept of communication. The next step 
will be to drop that condition while retaining the proposal initially 
designed to strengthen it. This gives us : S communicates p to A only 
if S offers A evidence for p. But the mere availability of evidence 
is not sufficient for successful communication (though it may be for 
expression) unless an audience is present who is capable of availing 
himself of that evidence and does so. Consequently S communicates p 
to A by means of a piece of behaviour, a, only if A takes a to be 
evidence that p. This modified conception of communication in general 
will clearly have ramifications for more specific concepts such as 
Gricean communication. The suggested modification resembles McDowell's 
in requiring that we drop the intention taken to be primary by Grice 
et al. and treat as primary a genuinely communicative intention. 
Similarly, intention (iv) of Schiffer's definition must be abolished.
No doubt this will have repercussions for the rest of Schiffer's 
analysis but that need not concern us here.
Since the motive for emphasising the evidential nature of com­
munication is to avoid definitions of communicative success with
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respect to p which entail either the truth of p or that some audience 
believe that p, it is obvious that 'evidence* is being used in such a 
way that : 'p, and p is evidence that q' does not entail 'q'. In 
other words, we are talking about prima-facie evidence in precisely 
the sense elucidated by Peacocke ((1976) p. 172). Prima-facie evi­
dence is evidence which can be overruled without thereby losing its 
evidential status; in fact it corresponds at least to one ordinary 
way in which we use the expression 'evidence' tout court. On 
Peacocke's definition 'p.f. evidence' is primarily a sentence operator 
which, when applied to pairs of open sentences expresses a relation 
between 'type-situations'. So Fx may be prima-facie evidence that Gy 
even if there is some x which is F but no y which is G. But such 
evidence can be overruled and retain its status as p.f. evidence only 
if it is overruled by conclusive counter-evidence pertaining to the 
individual, x, itself. We withdraw the evidential claim altogether if 
it is found that there is no inferential link between F and G situations 
in general.
This gives us : S communicates p to A through his behaviour, a, 
only if A takes a to be prima-facie evidence that p. Before refining 
this proposal a possible misunderstanding needs to be forestalled. It 
might be thought that a definition of communication in terms of p.f. 
evidence could accommodate only regularity-dependent types of communi­
cation and not one-off iconic instances. It is easy to see why this 
is wrong. Any token of the hand-to-mouth type-gesture considered 
earlier is a way of communicating that the gesticulator wants to be 
provided with food even if only one token gesture of that type were 
ever performed. This isolated gesture, if it succeeded as communication, 
would still do so in virtue of being a token of an action-type which 
resembles but falls short of eating. In other words, any action that 
has the property of conspicuously resembling the activity of eating 
is p.f. evidence that the agent is hungry.
4.2 Let us return at this point to the specific concern of this 
thesis which is to define what it is for a certain type of behaviour, 
eg. smiling, to be an expression of a certain type of feeling. Using 
the concept of p.f. evidence it will be possible to construct a 
definition in such a way that in the definiendum the phrase ' 
expression of F-ness' will be interchangeable with the phrase ' ... 
way of communicating F-ness (Fx)' where the definiens consists of some 
kind of universally quantified conditional. Consider the following
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as a first attempt to do justice to the intuitions introduced at 
the opening of this chapter :
(f)-ing is an expression of F-ness. if and only if VxVy :
(x ({)-s & y notices x’s (f>-ing) ->■ y takes x ’s (f)-ing as 
prima facie evidence that Fx. ^
As it stands the obvious flaw in this definition is its failure to 
restrict the domain of quantification. Clearly for any type of 
expression there will be many individuals who (or, indeed, which) 
are not equipped to interpret it. It might be thought that a solution 
could be obtained by simply replacing the second universal quantifi­
cation with the milder requirement that some audience would, if he 
noticed a ^-ing, take it as prima facie evidence of F-ness. This is 
what seems to be suggested by the examples considered at the beginning 
of this chapter. However, such a modification of the above bi­
conditional has the absurd consequence that any unnotioed action will 
be expressive of F-ness and that some actions which some observer - 
eg. a visitor from another planet - takes as prima facie evidence of 
F-ness would count as expressive on that score alone. A more plausible 
suggestion would be to introduce a qualification to the effect that 
only properly equipped observers will, if present, correctly interpret 
the expressive behaviour. But, while this ought to be a consequence of 
an adequate definition it is difficult to see how a clause of this 
kind could be explicitly inserted in the definition without thereby 
rendering it tendentiously circular. A properly equipped observer 
just is one who is equipped to interpret #-ings correctly.
These difficulties can be solved by defining expression relative 
to a group or population. This requirement is obvious enough in the case 
of linguistic communication and should not meet much resistance when 
applied to other varieties. Accordingly the concept to be defined 
becomes : '^-ing is an expression of F-ness in P', suggesting the 
following definition :
(f)-ing is an expression of F-ness in P only if VxVy :(xeP & 
yeP & X (f)-s & y notices x's cJ)-ing)-> y usually takes x's ^-ing 
as p.f. evidence that Fx.
5. ÏThile I attempt to preserve some sort of analogy with Peacocke's 
use of the concept there is an important difference of aim. Peacocke 
is not attempting to define any semantic concept but to elucidate what 
it is for some already interpreted language to be the language of a 
certain population. I am attempting to define what it is for a piece 
of behaviour non-interprétâtively designated to be the expression of a 
feeling.
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Relativity to a group will be useful later insofar as it will allow 
the distinction between natural and conventional ways of communicat­
ing to be represented in part as based on different extensions of P.
Thus ^-ing would be a natural expression of F-ness if the condition 
just given were satisfied when the name of a species rather than a 
cultural group replaces P. As a limiting case one could allow the 
possibility of the group containing only one member; the possible 
identity of x and y. No doubt one should be suspicious of claims 
which depend too firmly on this possibility, but I am not sure that 
such suspicion should be manifested in a definition of expression (by 
stipulating, for example, that x f y). Such claims are dubious because 
it would be very difficult to tell of a painter, for example, that his 
'interpretation' of his own work was not based solely on his memory 
of what inspired it (cf. Wollheim (1964) op cit.).
4.3 The things that can be expressed include intentions and desires 
as well as beliefs and other prepositional attitudes. Indeed many 
emotions essentially involve some libidinal component.  ^ Because of 
this the condition given above, though necessary, is far from sufficient 
It is satisfied by many actions which are not expressive but do con­
stitute and are taken as p.f. evidence that their agents have a certain 
practical purpose. This could be true of every token of a single 
action type. For example, whenever a person is seen strangling someone 
else this will be taken as p.f. evidence that the agent wants his 
victim dead since strangling generally causes death. Can the suggested 
condition be strengthened in such a way that it will disqualify cj)-ing 
as an expression of the desire to (f>? In other words, can we find some 
way of excluding, in Anscombe's phrase, the 'manifestation' of desires 
and intentions in the behaviour which they motivate? (cf. Anscombe 
(1957) §2).
A first point to recall is that from the outset we were trying 
to formulate a condition on what it is for a kind of physical movement^
- smiling, fist-shaking, etc. - to be an expression of a feeling.
This, given the generality of the condition, will exclude the majority 
of counter-examples of this kind automatically. Most of the things we 
do are realised by different bodily movements on different occasions. 
Still, there will remain generalisations of the form '#-ing is p.f.
6. Some philosophers, including Stuart Hampshire, believe that all 
emotions involve an inclination to act in a certain way (cf. Hampshire 
(I960)).
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evidence that an agent wants x' which are true just because ing 
generally results in the availability of x. We could, therefore, try 
to impose an appropriate restriction on the reasons observers have 
for taking behaviour as p.f. evidence for some kind of mental state. 
Such a restriction could be derived from the earlier discussion of the 
inefficacy of expressive behaviour. Indeed we are now in a position 
to suggest a corollary of Stuart Hampshire's remarks about facial 
expression (as interpreted in the last chapter). The contrast be­
tween primarily effective and primarily expressive or communicative 
behaviour is that the former provides p.f. evidence about the agent's 
desires or intentions because of the effects it is seen to have, 
whereas the latter produces certain effects because it supplies 
mediating agents with p.f. evidence about the communicator's desires 
or intentions.
However, this restriction will not fully do justice to the 
distinction between manifestation and expression put forward by 
Anscombe. She argues against Wittgenstein ((1953) §647), for example, 
that stalking is not the natural expression of an intention to pounce 
among cats. I think she is right about this though not in her con­
clusion, shared by Stuart Hampshire ((1959) pp. 97-99), that there is 
no natural, non-linguistic means of expressing intention.  ^ Anscombe 
and Hampshire would need to support this conclusion by showing why 
primitive threat behaviour does not express an intention to attack if, 
for example, the animal's territory is violated or why primitive 
courtship 'rituals', which are not unlike the speech-act, promising, do 
not express an intention to mate. The denial that these are natural 
expressions of intention could be based, as far as I can tell, only 
on a general apriori reluctance to attribute intentions to language- 
less creatures.
There are two salient differences between threat and courtship 
behaviour on the one hand and stalking on the other. First, stalking 
is a preparatory manoeuvre rather than an expressive gesture. Secondly, 
stalking would be rendered useless as a predatory technique if it
7. It is odd that Hampshire allows only linguistic expression of 
intention (and, hence, the attribtuion of intentions only to language- 
speakers) given that the account he gives only a year later of non- 
linguistic expression in terms of the imitation of effective behaviour 
is most easily and directly applicable to the expression of desires and 
intentions. To express an intention would be to exhibit behaviour which 
resembles the kind of behaviour which would, if fully instantiated, 
realise that intention.
87
offered its prey an indication that it is being hunted. Stalking is 
essentially a method of closing with a victim without being noticed. 
Courtship and threat behaviour, on the other hand, essentially involve 
display. The difference is fundamentally a difference of function, 
and this ought to be incorporated into the definition of expression.
That is, expression is to be defined not merely as potential communi­
cation, but as behaviour whose function is communicative. This can 
be done without reintroducing communication-intentions given the 
existence of a non-teleological concept of ’function’ (cf. Bennett 
(op cit.) §23), or, as we might say, a quasi-teleological concept.
For, as Bennett points out, it is the similarity of functional to 
genuinely teleological explanations that partly explain the temptation 
to describe certain primitive communication systems as languages ((loc 
cit.) §62). A functional account of a type of behaviour will state 
that (i) tokens of that type of behaviour produce a certain kind of 
effect (if performed under suitable conditions) and that (ii) that is 
why tokens of it are performed.
We want to say that the function of expressive behaviour is to 
provide members of a group or species with prima-facie evidence for 
some proposition. The first element in the concept of a function is 
already present in the condition formulated on p. 84. I suggest that 
a sufficient condition can be attained by the addition of the following 
necessary condition :
(J)-ing is an expression of F-ness in P only if Vx : (xeP & x (|)-s )
(x <j)-s in part because Vy : (yeP & y notices x ’s (j)-ing)-> y takes
x ’s ^-ing as p.f. evidence that Fx. )
4.4 I doubt whether the counter-examples of the previous paragraphs 
could have been neutralised by the introduction of a clause about 
common-knowledge. Anyway, a common-knowledge requirement would be far 
too strong - indeed there is room for doubt about whether such a 
requirement must be met by behaviour if it is to count as linguistic 
(cf. Peacocke (op cit.) p. 174). Language aside, it is certain that 
#-ing could be a natural expression of F-ness in P even though members 
of P did not believe that other members of P took their cj)-ings as 
prima-facie evidence of F-ness. However it is reasonable to insist 
that if this were true, communicative success in one sense would never 
be achieved. Communication involves the achievement of mutual aware­
ness of something between the communicator and the audience (cf. McDowell
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(op cit.) p. 130). Given the concept favoured here, communicative 
success is a matter of mutual awareness not of the communicator’s 
intentions, but that the communicator’s behaviour constitutes p.f. 
evidence that the communicator is in a certain mental state. It 
should, therefore, be admitted that expression can fall short of 
successful communication in two ways without losing its title. First 
an expressive action may be performed in the absence of a suitable 
audience (member of P). Secondly, an expressive act may fail to 
secure mutual awareness of its occurrence or nature between communi­
cator and audience, for example because the communicator is unaware 
that he has expressed anything or unaware of the audience’s presence.
5. Some objections
5.1 The point might be raised that in general what gets expressed 
is not equivalent to what gets communicated. Typically philosophers 
talk of communicating some "proposition", p, - of communicating that 
p - whereas we talk of expressing the belief that p. Even if, as I 
suggested in Chapter 1, we treat 'expresses’ as a sentence operator, 
there will be a difference in most cases between the sentences embedded 
in ’S expressed p ’ and ’S communicated q ’. The first will always 
embed a sentence whose subject is S. The second will often embed a 
sentence which refers to the world external to the communicator. The 
objection based on this would not merely be that I have assumed the 
equivalence of p and q but that I have attempted to give a functional 
account of the relation between expression and communication which 
this assumption of equivalence renders highly implausible. A plausible 
functional conception of expressive behaviour in general would surely 
specify as its primary function the transmission of information about 
the world, not about the affective condition of communicators since 
the former makes a more obvious contribution to the survival both of 
the individual and of the species.
Before suggesting a way of coping with this objection, two 
clarifications are needed of the contrast between communication and 
expression on which it is based. First, the criticism clearly does 
not depend on anything like the old-fashioned distinction between 
expressive and assertoric uses of language where that is understood as
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a distinction between mutually exclusive classes of speech-acts. ^
The distinction is, on the contrary, between different ways of describ­
ing any speech-act. Any utterance of an indicative sentence, a, 
which means that p, will be a way of communicating that p and a way of 
expressing the belief that p.
Secondly, there is no need to insist on the non-equivalence of 
expressive and communicative content in every case. Avowals are speech- 
acts in which the utterer both asserts (communicates) and expresses 
something - the same thing - about his psychological state at the time 
of utterance. An utterance of the sentence ’I am delighted’ is at 
once an assertion that the speaker is delighted and an expression of 
delight. We are not forced to say that the speaker expresses his 
belief that he is delighted. Still, if a high value is placed on the 
preservation of an invariable relation between expression and communi­
cation in every case then one could say this. It is worth noting that 
Grice’s (1968) proposal to define ’S means that p ’ as ’S intends to 
get A to believe that he, S, believes that p ’ (along with higher-order 
intentions, of course) has the effect of equating expressive and com­
municative content and contrasting them to the assertoric content of 
all utterances of indicative sentences. Bennett ((op cit.) p 129f) 
has pointed out that this proposal can cope with avowals only by 
tolerating the construal of avowels as expressions (communications) 
of beliefs about the speaker’s feelings, but he adds that the repug­
nance of this consequence is superficial, the incompatibility between 
belief and incorrigibility being ’merely a matter of suggestion’. The 
concept of belief only conversationally implies the possibility of 
error. Bennett further points out that outside the context of fully 
interpreted languages it is difficult to make out the difference between 
communicating a feeling and communicating the belief that one has a 
feeling (ibid.)* For the present purpose, then, the two con­
ceptions of expressive content are not only compatible, they are 
indistinguishable.
The main thrust of this objection, then, is that is is implau­
sible to represent as the function of expressive behaviour the trans­
mission of information or evidence about matters internal to the
8. Alston (1965) and Wollheim (1966) have exposed the defects in an 
extensional conception of the contrast and the distorted comparisons 
between linguistic and natural expression to which it gave rise.
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communicator. There is some truth in this, which could be accommodated 
in a definition of the expression of feeling by reviving the well-known 
conception of feelings or emotions like fear, anger, joy, etc. as 
comprising a doxastic as well as a libidinal component. Fear, roughly, 
is a sort of belief that something is dangerous and a sort of desire 
or inclination to distance oneself from the feared object. The primary 
function of behaviour which expresses fear is to transmit the informa­
tion not that the communicator is suffering from a certain kind of 
affective condition but the information that there is something 
dangerous in its environment. This could be incorporated in the 
definitions on pp. 84 and 87 by specifying a function, f, relating 
emotions to types of situation. Thus f(fear) = dangerous (type) 
situation. In general, f(F-ness) = C. The definition could then be 
expanded as follows :
(p-ing is an expression of F-ness in P iff there is a type- 
situation, C, and a function, f, such that f(F-ness) = C &
(VxVy : (xcP & yeP & x (j)-s & y notices x ’s <j)-ing)-^  y takes 
x ’s (|)-ing as p.f. evidence that C is instantiated)&(Vx :
(xeP & X (J)-s)->(x (f)-s in part because Vy : (yeP & y notices x ’s 
4>-ing)-> y takes x's cj)-ing as p.f. evidence that C is 
instantiated. ))
In some cases C will in fact be the situation described by ’Fx’. This 
will be so when some interest (in a quasi-teleological sense) either 
of the individual or of the species is served by the transmission of 
just that information - for example the function of expressing hunger 
by young members of the species is to provide mature and hence more 
capable memebers with evidence that they are hungry.
Since in what follows I will be concerned mainly with human 
facial expression, and since humans, for whatever reason, are supposed 
to be interested in each other, I will continue to assume that the 
function of facial expression is to provide others with p.f. evidence 
about one’s feelings. I will treat this as fundamental, though 
obviously physiognomic behaviour may have other functions in addition 
to and dependent upon that mentioned.
5.2 A second objection takes issue with my claim that a unified 
general concept of communication, applicable to primitive and linguis­
tic communication systems, can be formulated in terms of prima-facie 
evidence. The initial aim was to specify the cognitive response in
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terms of the production of which expression can be defined. The 
relevant response has now been defined as the attitude towards p,
’ ... believes that there is p.f. evidence that p '. This is a sui- 
generis belief, irreducible to any other prepositional attitude. 
Communicative success is achieved only when the p.f. evidence belief 
is elicited. But the prepositional attitude specified in terms of 
p.f. evidence is surely too complex to be attributed to primitive, 
specifically to languageless creatures. Consequently, either I have 
defined communication in such a way that success can be achieved only 
with human audiences or I must recognise a different concept of com­
munication applicable to the behaviour of unsophisticated creatures. 
From the point of view of generality, my account is no better off than 
McDowell's.
But I offered a partial defence of McDowell which can be 
modified to meet this objection. True, the belief that certain p.f. 
evidence supports p is not reducible to the belief that p. It is 
not even reducible to a disposition to believe that p. Someone who 
knew in advance that it is not the case that p might still take cer­
tain appearances as p.f. evidence that p. But this does not entail 
that a difference between being disposed to believe and taking some­
thing as p.f. evidence that p can always be registered. For 
cognitively unsophisticated creatures the only behavioural evidence 
that could support the claim that they take something as p.f. evidence 
that p would also support the claim that they are disposed to believe 
(register) that p. And the only evidence in turn that would support 
the ascription to them of a disposition to register that p would also 
support (if they are sufficiently unsophisticated) the ascription of 
an actual registration that p. So, for a cognitively primitive indi­
vidual there is no difference between its taking p as p.f. evidence 
that q and its registering that q because it registers that p. The 
definition of communication in general on the basis of prima-facie 
evidence does not entail the attribution of complex attitudes to 
creatures incapable of forming them.
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V. PHYSIOGNOMIC PERCEPTION
1. Physiognomic perception and interpretation
1.1 In Chapter 2 I argued that expressive behaviour is behaviour 
which requires interpretation. Chapter 3 closed with the suggestion 
that despite first appearances to the contrary, interpreting descrip­
tions of behaviour are not entirely dissimilar from descriptions of 
actions "in terms of their effects". This suggestion was further 
elaborated in Chapter 4 where an attempt was made to specify a kind 
of cognitive response such that failure to produce it, by behaving in 
a certain way, in a suitably located and qualified observer dis­
qualifies that behaviour as expressive. It seemed that progress to­
wards a definition of the relevant cognitive response could be made by 
adapting Peacocke’s analysis of linguistic understanding in terms of 
prima-facie evidence. Putting Chapters 3 and 4 together we obtain the 
idea of communication as a causal sequence running from the communi­
cator’s behaviour through the audience/spectator’s perception of it 
to the letter’s taking the perceived behaviour as prima-facie evidence 
that its agent, the communicator, is in a certain affective state. 
However, there is a further important objection that may be levelled 
at such a conception of communication and expression. According to 
the objection I have in mind the foregoing account of expression 
represents physiognomic understanding as inferential (though not as a 
complete inference) but such understanding is typically perceptual in 
nature. Understanding behaviour is not a kind of judgement external 
to and imposed on the primitive perceptions we have of the behaviour, 
but is constituted by, or at least firmly based in a kind of perceptual 
experience peculiar to physiognomy. The claim that there is a special 
kind of perception involved in the habitual interpretation of expres­
sive behaviour - or, rather, that physiognomic perception is not 
sharply distinguishable from ordinary perception which is always to 
some extent interpretative - has a long and distinguished history.
1. Some notion of physiognomic perception is defended, stated or 
merely assumed by the following : Max Scheler (1913), Merleau-Ponty 
(eg. (l§45a) Part 2, Chapter 4; (1945b); (1947); (I960)), Sartre (1943) 
p. 410, Wittgenstein (1953), Stuart Hampshire (1960), Wollheim (1964; 
1966; 1968), Donegan (1966), Cooke (1969), Sircello (1972), Evans and
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This would be a sufficient reason by itself for attending to the 
notion of physiognomic perception, but there are more important 
reasons. First, it is simply true that, to put it negatively, we do 
not perceive people's expressive behaviour merely as movements and 
configurations of varying speeds and durations and then infer from 
such an impoverished basis a rich set of psychological conclusions. 
Secondly, a theory of physiognomic perception will have interesting 
epistemological consequences though, if properly formulated, it will 
not achieve what has sometimes been claimed for it - namely, an 
answer to scepticism about other minds. Finally, physiognomic per­
ception, far from being incompatible with the preceding characterisa­
tion of expression, fills a hiatus which is indeed present in the 
causal sequence which I have claimed constitutes communication.
1.2 So far nothing of a positive nature has been said about why we 
take what we see, when we see expressive behaviour, as prima-facie 
evidence that its agent feels what is expressed in his behaviour. On 
the contrary all that has been achieved is the imposition of certain 
restrictions on the possible routes from observable behaviour to evi­
dential judgements. Facial expression is, or is taken to be prima- 
facie evidence for what is expressed neither because it is seen to have 
results which anyone who felt that way would want to obtain nor because 
it ostensibly resembles behaviour of a kind which would bring about 
those results. A slightly different explanation which has not been 
mentioned so far also turns out to be inadequate. Scowling, it might
be suggested, is recognised as an expression of anger not because it
is or resembles aggressive behaviour - ie. behaviour which produces 
destructive effects of the kind angry people characteristically desire 
- but because it frequently accompanies such behaviour. This explana­
tion cannot plausibly be extended to smiling as the expression of, say, 
contentment or laughter as the expression of mirth. Physiognomic per­
ception, however, indicates that it may be superfluous to look for 
explanations outside the appearance of the expressive behaviour itself. 
When people smile they look happy and we take the way things look to
be evidence for the way the are.
1. continued ........
McDowell ((1976) Introduction), McDowell (1978), Aldrich (1978), 
Charles Taylor (1979). Undoubtedly the list could be considerably 
extended.
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It is clear from this way of putting the matter that a role 
for physiognomic perception in the understanding of facial expression 
can be acknowledged without relinquishing the preceding elucidation 
in terms of prima-facie evidence. (In every other respect the 
remarks made so far leave the concept of physiognomic perception 
entirely vague.) Physiognomic perception does not constitute under­
standing but describes the way in which understanding is based in 
observation. However, this falls short of the claims that sometimes 
seem to be made for perception. I have given a tentative preliminary 
account of the relation of understanding as grounded in the perception 
of the meaning of behaviour. But it often seems to be claimed not only 
that we see behaviour as meaningful but that we see the emotions 
themselves in the behaviour. The two kinds of assertion are rarely 
sharply distinguished but they plainly differ considerably; they do 
so along precisely the lines delineated in Chapter 2 where I distin­
guished interpretation from explanation. In terms of a more or less 
intuitive ontology, meaning does not exist, being 'primarily a 
property of behaviour', but mental events like beliefs and emotions 
do. How far is the positive existential claim threatened by the 
theory of physiognomic perception and the epistemological needs it is 
designed to meet? The question dominates much of the following dis­
cussion.
Distinctions have been made between different senses of 'looks' 
which may be of assistance here (cf. Jackson (1977) Chapter 2). When 
a person smiles he, or his face, looks happy in the phenomenal sense 
of 'looks'  ^ and the physiognomic sense of 'happy' (cf. Chapter 1,
§4.1). If I say that someone looks happy to me I do not go beyond a 
purely phenomenal description of my experience (cf. Chapter 2).
Indeed, as Wollheim repeatedly points out, I may be unable to provide
2. References will be forthcoming.
3. Dewey's remark quoted with approval by Quine ((1969) p. 27).
4. This involves extrapolating in a way which Jackson himself might 
not condone. It is hard to tell because of an apparent inconsistency 
in his treatment of immediate perception the objects of which (sense- 
data) may, he allows at p. 22,satisfy predicates other than those of 
colour, shape and size, eg. predicates which attribute aesthetic or 
expressive properties. However, though the notion of immediate per­
ception is to be defined partly on the basis of the phenomenal sense 
of 'looks', Jackson's initial definition of the latter explicitly 
restricts the descriptions it can contain to those of colour, shape and 
size (see p. 33).
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any other phenomenal description of how he looks which is relevant to 
the fact that he looks happy (eg. Wollheim (1966) p. 95 in (1973)).
But while this may be all that is required for artistic expression, it 
is crucial to behavioural expression that someone who smiles also looks 
happy in the epistemic sense; he looks as if he is happy (cf. Jackson 
(ibid.) p. 30).
Jackson equates 'It looks as if p ' with 'certain visually 
acquired evidence supports the proposition that p'. If this is right 
then the epistemic 'looks' construction serves to effect a tentative 
link between the perceptual claims to be scrutinised here and the 
conception of expression as prima-facie evidence for what is expressed 
that precedes.  ^ This suggests a very modest interpretation of the 
claim that we see people's emotions in their behaviour. I see anger 
in a scowl if and only if the person scowling (is angry and) looks as 
if he is angry. Whether a more interesting interpretation of the per­
ceptual claim is available remains to be seen. (Whether or not the 
sentence in parenthesis is required depends on 'grammatical' consider- 
tions to be advanced shortly.)
2. Inference versus perception
2.1 The theory of physiognomic perception is characteristically 
prefaced by a derogation of the role of inference in the ordinary 
person's unreflective interpretation of his neighbour's expressive 
behaviour (eg. Donagan (1966) p. 325, Wollheim (1968) p. 81, Evans and 
McDowell (1976) p. xxii). The basis of this denial is a contrast 
between perception and inference which contains three specific obscuri­
ties (as distinct from its general obscurity alluded to by Wollheim 
(loc cit.) p. 60), which will bear at least partial illumination at 
this juncture. First there is no interesting epistemological genus of 
which perception and inference are contrasting species. Instead a 
comparison should be made between beliefs which are based on inference 
and beliefs which are more intimately related to observation. It is 
not misleading to designate the latter 'perceptual beliefs' as long as 
the temptation to identify the perceptions themselves with the
5. 'Evidence', as Jackson uses it at this point, means 'prima-facie 
evidence', (p. 30)
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perceptual beliefs they sometimes deliver is resisted.  ^ A belief, 
say the belief that Fx, is based on an inference from a premiss, Gy, 
only if the subject also believes that Gy and that Gy implies Fx. To 
avoid infinite regress there must be some beliefs which are not formed 
as the result of an inference. These are the perceptual beliefs, 
which provide premisses for subsequent inferential beliefs but are 
not themselves conclusions. Admittedly this leaves the derivation of 
perceptual beliefs from perceptual experiences shrouded in obscurity, 
but it does so without detracting from the argument in progress. ^
The need for a theory of physiognomic perception arises because 
the habitual interpretation of expressive behaviour is non-inferentially 
based in the perception of it. Understanding is a kind of perceptual 
belief and must, therefore, be grounded in a suitable kind of percep­
tion. This claim can be supported by transposing certain arguments 
usually cast in terms of perception itself into the idiom of perceptual 
beliefs - beliefs about what we see. Wollheim writes as follows ;
Indeed it is only a piece of theory, an epistemological 
presupposition that leads us to think that there is available 
a neutral description drained of emotion that fits the original 
perception we have of such objects. ((1966) p. 75 in (1973))
The passage is primarily about the way in which what we see sometimes 
seems to us to ’match’ a certain emotion or mood; Wollheim's proposal 
is that the perception of expressive behaviour can profitably be com­
pared to the experience of 'correspondences' or 'aspects' in 
Wittgenstein's terminology. This is suggestive, but the
6. A temptation not resisted by, for example, Howell (1972), who 
analyses seeing and seeing-as on the basis of seeing-that which in 
turn he defines in terms of (a modal or possible worlds conception of) 
belief. Objections to doxastic concepts of perception are to be found 
in Jackson ((op cit.) Chapters 2 and 7). I have not noticed a tendency 
explicity to define physiognomic perception in terms of belief in any 
of the authors I have cited above. On the contrary, see Wollheim 
(1980) p. 219.
7. This is a problem for the philosophy of perception in general. I 
would add, however, that if one accepts my general premiss that for the 
belief that p to be inferentially based on q the subject must also 
believe that q and that q ^ p, then beliefs can be inferred from per­
ception only if a doxastic analysis of perception itself is true, which 
I deny in n.6 above. It is irrelevant at this point (though it becomes 
relevant later) to maintain that perceptual experiences are themselves 
the bearers of truth-values and thus a species of judgement (Vesey (1956)) 
or sui-generis propositional attitude (Hintikka (1969) pp. 152-3 and
181 n.5).
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epistemological presupposition in question is false only if it is
taken to assert that there is always a neutral description of his
experience available to the ^erceivev. To make a stronger claim
than this would merely be to substitute one unfounded piece of theory
for another. Of course, taken literally the rejected presupposition
as I have formulated it is rather too obviously false since it makes
all perception dependent upon possession of a language; a language,
moreover, equipped with an inconceivably rich store of colour, shape
8
and size predicates. This is born out by the fact that the science
of Kinesics, still more or less in its infancy, has had to devise an
entirely artificial notation for the description and classification
of bodily movements (see Birdwhistell (1971)). But part of Wollheim’s
point - not, as yet, the specifically phenomenological part but a
preliminary to it - can be conveyed in terms of belief. There is no
purely morphological perceptual belief which the perception of
expressive behaviour delivers and from which we infer that something
is being expressed. Consequently, the latter belief must itself be
founded in a kind of perception appropriate to it. I will argue later
that this does not involve subtracting from, but rather adding to what
8is traditionally conceived of as the purely "visual" component of - 
the knowledge or apprehension of behaviour.
Given these qualifications the following statement ought to be 
taken seriously :
Seeing cheerfulness in a face is not inferring that its owner 
is cheerful from the way his face looks, (Evans and McDowell 
(loc cit.))
Of course, interpreted perfectly literally this is uninterestingly 
true. Vision is not inference in much the same way as thoughts are 
not sandwich-fillings. That is why I have preferred initially to 
contrast perceptual beliefs to inferential beliefs. But, to preempt 
confusion, this is not intended as a denial that certain kinds of 
visual experience are available only to subjects already in a certain 
epistemic state derived from an antecedent inference or learning 
process (cf. Wittgenstein (op cit.) p. 200, Wollheim (1968) p. 77 and
8. Unfortunately the clumsiness of repeated individual references to 
colour, shape and size is unavoidable in the context of a discussion 
in which any more general term for these kinds of property will beg 
important questions. Hence, further down, the scare-quotes around 
'visual'.
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(1980) p. 221). If this were not the case then Evans' and McDowell's 
observation would lose its point, their primary interest being the 
nature of linguistic competence. Similarly, Wittgenstein's analogy 
between the seeing of aspects and understanding the meaning of a 
word ((op cit.) p.214) would fail; we learn what words mean and the 
process by which we do so is comparable in important ways to induction.
2.2 Of the three obscurities alluded to above in the contrast be­
tween seeing and inferring, two remain and will be dealt with briefly. 
First, when it is denied that, as a rule, we infer that emotions are 
being expressed from morphological premisses about the'way people look, 
this should be understood perfectly literally. In other words, the 
point is purely psychological and is subject to introspective veri­
fication. This might be put by distinguishing inferential processes 
from inferential procedures. A procedure is understood as a method, 
a set of rules or, as one might say, a virtual process. As such,a 
procedure could in principle be realised by a variety of actual pro­
cesses. For example, a procedure for inferring p from q might be 
realised non-inferentially in a being in whom the belief that p 
invariably caused the belief that q through a Humean association of 
ideas. The process of association is not the same as the process of 
inference but both might realise the same inferential procedure.
Bearing this distinction in mind, if it transpires that there is no 
reliable procedure for inferring from behavioural premisses to psy­
chological conclusions (deductively or inductively) then we must be 
content with solipsism. It is no answer to the latter, strictly 
philosophical position, that we seem to see emotions in behaviour. 
Phenomenology is irrelevant to scepticism. Nevertheless, it has an 
epistemological role if we assume that we do know about other minds 
and then ask how we acquire that knowledge, a question which, since 
Wittgenstein, has tended to be associated with questions about the 
acquisition of concepts and the learning of the meaning of psycho­
logical terms (see Chapter 6).
Secondly, while it is true that seeing cheerfulness in a face 
is not inferring that its owner is cheerful, it is also true that the 
former is no substitute for the latter. This is so not only for 
reasons advanced in §2.1, but also because inferring that the owner 
of the face is cheerful is tantamount to explaining the look on his 
face. But Evans and McDowell were interested primarily in the percep­
tion of meanings, ie. the perceptual basis of interpretation
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(cf. Chapter 2). We might see cheerfulness in someone’s face and 
believe on the basis of evidence acquired elsewhere that he is miser­
able. By the same token it would not be superfluous to infer from 
the cheerful look on his face that he is cheerful. To put the point 
another way, what is meant by claims that we see something in some­
thing else is determined in part by the conclusion of the inferences 
we are thereby alleged not to execute. Two different claims need to 
be assessed :
(i) Knowledge of other people's emotions is perceptual, ie. 
non-inferential,
(ii) Knowledge of the meaning of their behaviour is perceptual, 
ie. non-inferential.
3. 'Seeing-in'
3.1 The construction alluded to in the rubric contains a number of 
philosophical snares. Ultimately these are best circumvented by 
abandoning it as a potential analytical instrument applicable to the 
concept of expression. A useful suggestion of Wollheim's aligns seeing- 
in with representation and seeing-as with expression ((1970) p. 313 in 
(1973)). Before following that advice, however, I propose to explain 
certain unattractive features of theories which appeal to physiognomic 
perception as being a direct result of equivocations inherent in the 
'seeing-in' locution. Its use in the present context has the effect 
of blurring the distinctions I have urged previously and thus generat­
ing the puzzle noted by Donagan in a commentary on Wittgenstein: while
it is indeed perverse to describe the "observation" of other people's 
pain as inferential, the only alternative seems to be that the sentence 
'he is in pain' is about observable behaviour (Donagan (1966) p. 325). 
In short, the notion of physiognomic perception will appear to support 
a reductive account of the relation between behaviour and mental states 
if its proponents ignore differences between interpretation and explana­
tion or, again, if it suggests that scepticism can be answered by 
phenomenology. But the 'seeing-in' construction is too blunt an 
instrument to record these distinctions with any clarity.
The following is an appropriately illustrative excerpt :
An expression must at least offer what we might call a 
'physiognomic reading'. I want to speak of this in cases where 
we can see X in Y, where X is not identical to Y, and where 
there is not some other feature of Y, F, which permits us to
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infer to X .... In cases of genuine expression, what is 
expressed can only be manifest in the expression; whereas 
in mere physiognomic reading the X we read in Y can be 
observed on its own. (Charles Taylor (1979) p. 74)
Taylor’s schematic letters, particularly ’X ’, are noncommital in a 
number of intriguing ways. Actually ’Y ’ too is equivocal, but un­
importantly so. The Y-position is purely referential and Y can be 
replaced by individual referring expressions. It does not matter 
whether the position is occupied by expressions referring to events 
or to objects; whether, for example, we speak of seeing cheerfulness 
in a face or cheerfulness in a smile. There is no need to force a 
decision because to see a bodily movement^ just is to see a part of 
the body move. There is no perception of events which is not also 
perception of substances, there being no events without substances 
irrespective of what we perceive. This is perfectly compatible with 
the Davidsonian ontology of individual events assumed in Chapter 3.
For similar reasons there is no need to worry unduly about whether 
replacements of Y should refer to bodily movements^ or bodily move- 
mentSpj,, ie. behaviour (cf. Chapter 2 §3.2). Perception of bodily 
movements^, of parts of the body moving, constitutes perception of 
actions when there are actions to be perceived, in the sense that we 
see actions in virtue of seeing the bodily movements^ to which they 
give rise (cf. Hornsby (1980) pp. 102f, and for ’seeing in virtue of’, 
cf. Jackson (1977) pp. 15ff and more below).
What urgently requires investigating is ’X ’, both in relation 
to its possible replacements and in relation to the position they are 
to occupy. Taylor’s noncommital notation will be retained at this 
stage precisely because it allows the following question, among others, 
to be posed :
(i) What sorts of expression can legitimately replace X?
There are two readily distinguishable alternatives : We can replace X 
with sentences or with words. We can see ’in another person’s facial 
expression or his behaviour, that he is in pain’ (McDowell (1978) p. 136; 
see also Wollheim (1980) p. 210); we also sometimes say that we can 
see anger, or his anger, in a scowl. So we can replace X either with 
sentences attributing emotions like anger to the person whose behaviour 
we see, or with words like ’anger’. The latter, however, can be 
interpreted in different ways (cf. Chapter 1). Either ’anger’ is a 
term used to refer to emotions, or it is a nominalisation of an
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adjective. And if it is the latter, then it can be understood 
either physiognomically or in its primary, pyschological sense.
This gives us four possible interpretations of 'seeing X in Y', three 
of which correspond, reverting to my usage in Chapter 1, to senses of 
'seeing F-ness in Y'. Ignoring for the present the prepositional 
version of the seeing-in construction the difference between nominal 
and adjectival construals of 'anger' is plainly of the utmost impor­
tance, for only the latter supports a physiognomic construal. Thus 
the seeing-in construction is ambiguous as to whether it applies to 
the perception of the meaning or the perception of the cause of 
expressive behaviour: the same ambiguity as that noted in the
reservations about inference which motivate the search for a concept 
of physiognomic perception.
Now it is not part of my contention that one 'parsing' of the 
X-position is correct or even that at this point a decision as to 
which is most appropriate can be made; the decision cannot be made in 
isolation, but only in the context of a series of grammatical and 
semantic questions still to be posed. But though a decision is not 
called for, equivocation is still unacceptable and the passage quoted 
is equivocal almost to the point of incoherence. For since it is a 
fact about physiognomic reading that, according to Taylor, the X we 
see in Y can also be seen on its own in cases other than genuine 
expression, X must be an object of some kind - presumably an event.
This is strongly suggested also, but not entailed by the statement 
that X is not identical to Y. On the other hand the force of 'other' 
in 'there is not some other feature of Y, F ... ' is inevitably 
'other than X', indicating, contrary to the previous suggestion, that 
X is a feature, ie. a property of Y. The equivocation persists in 
Taylor's non-schematic illustration of physiognomic reading which is 
not expression(Taylor (loc cit.)) : we see instability in a building 
so the illustration has it, without being able to specify those features 
of the building which make us think it is unstable. But the building 
does not express its instability because if we continue to watch it we 
will eventually be in a position to witness its actual collapse.
What we see in the building, then, is both its instability, ie. a 
property of it and its imminent collapse, ie. a future event. It is, 
of course, all too obvious that there can be (apparent) instability 
without imminent collapse - witness the Leaning Tower of Pisa, and 
imminent collapse without instability, as suffered by many buildings
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in London during the Blitz. But it is apparently less obvious, at any 
rate to many philosophers, that there can be expressions of sadness 
without any sadness; that while meanings, including what is attributed 
by ’sad' physiognomically construed, are "mere" properties of behaviour, 
emotions are not. The latter are causes of behaviour.
3.2 Before pursuing this grammatical scrutiny of the claim that we 
see anger, joy, sadness, etc. in people's expressive behaviour, a short 
interlude is needed in order to anticipate a likely criticism accord­
ing to which my interpretation of Taylor's article is uncharitably
9
literal. Certain points can be made in defense of the admittedly 
somewhat laborious approach of the previous paragraph. First it would 
be equally uncharitable to dismiss as metaphor what is plainly intended 
as a piece of philosophical writing. This applies to all those menr 
tioned on p. 92 , and not only to Charles Taylor. Aldrich (1978) has 
forcibly asserted the literalness of the preposition in the construc­
tion in question : in doing so he speaks for most of those who use it. 
And it is crucial to McDowell's argument against anti-realism with 
respect to other-ascriptions of psychological states that 'one can 
literalty perceive, in another person's facial expression or his be­
haviour, that he is in pain' (McDowell (1978, op cit.) p. 136). True, 
some philosophers have attempted to elucidate expression in terms of 
metaphor (notably Goodman, cf. Chapter 1) and the concept of metaphor 
has sometimes been exploited for the purpose of understanding physio­
gnomic and other extensions of ordinary perception (eg. by Howell 
(1972) p. 412). Aldrich and McDowell are probably right ; the intro­
duction of a concept of metaphor at this point has the air of an 
arbitrary prohibition of further analysis. Such a prohibition could 
be justified only by a demonstration that analysis beyond the point 
reached must lead to an impasse, and this has not, as far as I know, 
been supplied.
However, the burden of the objection may have nothing to do 
with metaphor, there being other non-literal uses of language. Apart 
from obvious figures of speech - hyberbole, irony and so on, there may 
be imprecise idioms which are seriously misleading only when we try 
to analyse them through decomposition rather than paraphrase.
Imprecision of this kind, which has nothing to do with vagueness, is
9. Mark Sainsbury objected on this ground to an earlier draft of this 
section, much of which has now been suppressed or replaced with new 
material. I suspect, however, that the objection might still be con­
sidered apposite.
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acceptable where there is little risk of genuinely confusing items of 
different kinds such as instability and imminent collapse. But the 
concepts associated with expression are less immediately transparent 
and loose talk could cost us our mental lives.
There is a real difficulty here, however, which is not captured 
by contrasting metaphorical and literal uses of language, or precision 
and more or less tolerable imprecision, but concerns both the radical 
difference and the interplay between phenomenological discourse and 
ordinary objective language. Perhaps it is simply to miss the
point to insist on proper use of the apparatus of reference and quanti­
fication when what is aimed at is a purely phenomenological description. 
But pure phenomenology, where existence is put aside in a Husserlian 
parenthesis, is rarely done without an eye to some concrete philosophi­
cal goal. Clearly any hope of attaining such a goal will be dashed 
should it transpire that the results of phenomenological investigation 
in general are incapable of communication through the usual philosophi­
cal and objective idioms without seeming to generate esoteric entities 
on the one hand or eliminating respectable ones on the other. The 
basic concept of perception itself involves the phenomenal and the 
real, the way things seem and the way they are in various permutations 
which it is the task of the theory of perception to define. When deal­
ing with the more recondite perceptual idioms relevant to the present 
concern those permutations may be subject to alteration. For this 
reason we need to conduct a grammatical investigation, however 
pedestrian it may seem.
3.3 §3.1 indicated that there are four possible interpretations of
'A sees X in Y' with respect to possible replacements of 'X'. But 
nothing is settled by a decision in favour of one rather than another
until that decision is related to a number of other grammatical and
semantic cloices. In addition to the first question with respect to 
’A sees X in Y ’ :
(i) What kinds of expressions replace 'X'?
we have the following supplementary questions :
(ii) Does 'A sees X in Y' entail 'S sees X'?
(iii) Is 'sees' here used with its ordinary grammar?
10. A theme which deeply preoccupied Wittgenstein in The Thitosoph-ioat 
Remarks.
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(iv) How many objects of sight are there?
(v) How immediately are they seen?
(vi) What does 'in' mean here?
This gives us six questions in all which need to be approached to 
some extent holistically in the sense that only series of answers 
taken together will yield determinate truth conditions for the kind 
of sentence in question and in the sense that overall permutations 
with different atomistic components will sometimes yield practically 
equivalent interpretations of 'A sees X in Y'. It is of course 
unnecessary to mention every possibility; only those which yield 
interestingly false or promisingly true statements need be considered.
The most interesting initial hypothesis is that (ia) expressions 
whose ordinary function is to denote emotions can replace X. We can 
supplement this with the further hypotheses that (iia) 'A sees X in Y' 
entails 'A sees X' and (iiia) 'sees' is being used in the usual, 
extensional way. In other words 'A sees anger in somebody's scowl' 
entails that there is somebody's anger which A sees. This constitutes 
a partial interpretation which can be made to yield a complete 
definition in only one of two consistant ways. One complete inter­
pretation continues as follows : (iva) there is only one object of 
sight; (va) which is seen with whatever degree of immediacy characteri­
ses the seeing of objects in general which belong to the same onto­
logical category, ie. mainly events; (via) and 'in' serves to relate 
the seeing of X to the seeing of Y on the basis of the identity of X 
and Y. (ia) to (via) will provide a definition somewhat as follows :
Di : 'A sees X in Y' is true iff Y = X & A sees Y with 
a reasonable degree of immediacy.
This is, of course, incompatible with Taylor's requirement that we 
refrain from identifying X and Y. The only alternative that retains 
(ia) to (iiia) seems to be the following : (iva) there are two objects
of sight, X and Y; (va) which are such that X is seen less immediately
than Y; (via) and 'in' is equivalent to 'in virtue of seeing', relat­
ing the seeing of X to the seeing of Y on the basis of some relation 
between X and Y other than identity. The concepts of relative 
immediacy and seeing something in virtue of seeing something else are 
derived from Jackson (1977, loc cit.); more will be said about them
shortly. We now have a second definition :
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Dii ; 'A sees X in Y' is true iff r(X,Y), XfY &
A sees X in virtue of seeing Y.
Remaining at a level of abstraction at which the relation, r, is left 
unspecified, we already obtain an apparent dilemma which resembles in 
some respects that which perplexed Donagan (loc cit.). According to 
Dii we perceive other people's emotions, pain and the like only 
mediately which is apparently what Wittgenstein sought to deny. The 
only alternative involves identifying emotions with behaviour.
3.4 There are two reasons for not worrying excessively about this 
dilemma :
(a) Immediacy of perception is plainly a matter of degree when 
it is defined on the basis of the 'in virtue o f  relation. Our per­
ception of other people's emotions is mediated by perception of their 
behaviour, which in turn is mediated by perception of their bodily 
movementsj. The perception of objects and events in general is 
similarly mediated and, except in relation to a single series of 
objects corresponding to one perception, there is no reliable method 
for comparing degrees of immediacy with which different objects are 
perceived.
(b) To say that an object is perceived only mediately is not
to say that its perception is dependent upon an inference.
Paraphrasing Jackson's ((op cit.) pp. 15-20) explanation of mediated
perception, x is a mediate object of perception if and only if there
is some further object, y , in virtue of perceiving which we perceive
X. We perceive x in virtue of perceiving y only if there is a suit-
12
able relation between x and y; for example, y is a part of x.
11. Explicit assent to such an identification is rare for obvious 
intuitive reasons. An apparent exception is to be found in Merleau- 
Ponty ((1948) pp. 48-62).
12. A's seeing y and y's being a part of x obviously cannot be suf­
ficient for the truth of 'A sees x in virtue of seeing y '; if it were, 
then we would see the entire universe whenever we saw an individual 
object, a conclusion whose Neo-Hegelian extravagance will probably not 
recommend it to contemporary ways of thinking. What determines deci­
sions as to whether we see what we see a part of may well involve 
relativity to interest of the kind earlier tolerated in connection 
with decisions as to whether an action counts as the cause of a sub­
sequent event (cf. Chapter 3, pp. 62-3 ). The difficulty and probable 
vagueness here will not influence subsequent developments.
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Most physical objects are such that we perceive them in virtue of 
perceiving their surfaces and we perceive their surfaces in virtue 
of perceiving parts of their surfaces. Given that Jackson also 
holds that we perceive material objects in virtue of perceiving 
sense-data, and the presence of a perceived object causes the appear­
ance of a datum, causation is also a suitable relation between objects 
if one is to be seen in virtue of another. Less controversial 
examples might include seeing an object in virtue of seeing its re­
flection in a mirror. There is, therefore, nothing to be gained in 
explaining the perception of emotions by claiming that appropriately 
expressive behaviour is a part of the emotion expressed. (An analysis 
along these lines is suggested by Tormey ((1971) pp. 48f.)
In the light of this concept of mediated perception it seems 
plausible to assert that we do perceive other people's emotions. Dii, 
therefore, translates 'A sees X in Y' as a reasonable statement where
it concerns the seeing of emotions as such in relation to the perception
of behaviour. Moreover, if we see emotions at all, then we certainly 
see them only mediately in virtue of seeing behaviour. However, for 
reasons evidently related to what precedes, Dii is inappropriate as a 
definition of physiognomic perception. First, just because Jackson's 
concept of an immediate object of perception is not contrasted to some 
notion of an inferred object of perception, it is irrelevant to pro­
blems of physiognomic perception. The fact that emotions are at best 
mediate objects of perception does not entail that we infer their 
existence from the behaviour we perceive. On the other hand, no 
alternative explanation of how we recognise that we are perceiving 
emotions has been suggested. Secondly, physiognomic perception is 
supposed to correlate pretty closely with expression, even if the most 
that can be claimed is a purely de facto correlation true of human
beings (cf. Wittgenstein (1958) p. 218). But there is not an emotion
to be seen for every physiognomically perceived piece of expressive 
behaviour given the possibility of insincere expression. The latter 
possibility demands an explanation of the way in which sincere and 
insincere expression look the same which goes beyond purely morpho­
logical description (for reasons which will be clarified shortly). 
Jackson's definition of mediate perception is silent on the issue of 
how things seem insofar as there need be no match between my visual 
experience and an object which causes it for it to be true that I 
perceive the object. Conversely, the theory of mediate perception is
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insufficient by itself to accommodate the sense in which I am the 
victim of an illusion, not merely of erroneous belief, when it seems 
to me that there is before me a physical object of a certain kind, 
there being in fact only an imitation of the surface of objects of 
that kind. Similarly, if emotions themselves are to be represented 
as being more accessible to observers than the model of inference from 
premisses about behaviour suggests, then the primary effect of in­
sincere expressive behaviour is to generate the illusion of an emotion.
3.5 The argument of the previous paragraphs could have been based
on different initial hypotheses. With certain added complexities we 
could have examined the claim that we see that someone is angry in his 
scowl, assuming that ’sees that' occurs in this context with its usual 
success grammar as we assumed that 'sees' functioned extensionally.
The other questions (iv) - (vi) would have to be construed then as 
questions about whether we are dealing with a simple instance of 
epistemic seeing, or a case of secondary epistemic seeing in relation 
to emotions, based on primary epistemic seeing in relation to behaviour 
(cf. Jackson (op cit.) pp. 159-167). Again, questions about the per­
ception of properties are reducible either to questions about epis­
temic seeing or to 'seeing-as' which I propose to consider shortly.
4. Physiognomic versus representational seeing
4.1 The expression, 'representational seeing' is borrowed from
Wollheim (1968); it is a convenient phrase for designating en bloc the 
way in which we see not only people and things in representations of 
them, but also in flames, clouds and ink-blots which lack 'artifact- 
uality' and are not intentionally produced as representations. The 
details of representational seeing lie beyond the purview of the matters 
at hand but some comment, again negative, is called for in view of the 
powerful attraction exerted on many by analogies between expression 
and representation, physiognomic and representational seeing. A 
paradigm for this tendency finds expression in Wittgenstein's phrase : 
'The human body is the best picture of the human soul.' ((1958) p. 178). 
The analogy persists throughout Wittgenstein's discussion of the seman­
tics of 'pain' and psychological terms generally in terms of 'Bild' and 
'Vorstellung' (§300), and receives an interesting refinement at §297 
(see also Donagan (1966) for a worthwhile attempt to translate 
Wittgenstein's more cryptic pronouncements into a more literal idiom). 
There are, however, grounds for doubting that we see pain in pain-
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behaviour in the way in which we might see a person in his portrait. 
There are grounds, too, for suspecting that this analogy underlies 
much of the obfuscation in this area.
In terms of the scheme outlined in §3.3, representational 
seeing obviously requires a very different analysis from those con­
sidered hitherto. Still, the initial hypothesis can be retained, 
being if anything more plausible here than it was earlier : ’X ’ in 
'A sees X in Y' is replaceable by singular referring terms, for example, 
by proper names in the case of portraits. The only other alternative 
here is the prepositional version (cf. Wollheim (1980) p. 210), but 
for simplicity I will focus on the ’direct object' construction.
Moving on to phases (ii) and (iii) we can say either that (iib), 'A 
sees X in Y' does not entail 'A sees X' where (iiib), 'sees' is being 
used extensionally only in the second sentence ; or we can say that 
(iic) 'A sees X in Y' does entail 'A sees X' but (iiic) 'sees' is not 
being used in the ordinary extensional way (cf. Ishiguro (1967) p. 44f), 
Since (iib) and (iiib) either lead to a cul de sac or require sup­
plementation by means of (iic) and (iiic), speculation is safely 
confined to the latter. This does not mean, however, that we cannot 
eliminate the intensional 'sees' in favour of some construction employ­
ing its ordinary extensional counterpart; but such a construction will 
still need to contain replacements for 'X' non-referentially, eg. by 
introducing the verb after a reference-cancelling expression like 
'Its as if ... '. Proceeding, now, to (iv) a choice is available : 
either (ivc), there is only one object of sight, which is whatever is 
denoted by Y, or, as Quine puts it, extensionality can be nominally 
restored by (ivd) introducing an intensional object as the referent of 
X (cf. Ishiguro (loc cit.) and Wollheim (1980) pp. 213ff) . The ques­
tion of relative immediacy, construed as above, lacks application 
certainly if there is only one object and, as far as I can tell, also 
if we allow intensional objects of representation which, for reasons
which will become clearer if they are not already obvious, cannot be
13
identified with sense data. Since intensional objects are now
firmly established for better or worse the function of 'in' can be 
construed accordingly. Aldrich ( exploiting an idea of Tormey's) 
suggests that 'in' is disclosed by 'prepositional analysis' as
13. If they could, then we would see the X we see in Y more immediate­
ly than the Y in which we see it; if sense-data exist then there is 
nothing we see more immediately than sense-data.
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expressing the ontological dependence of the intensional object, X, 
upon Y : this dependence is captured by the Meinongian concept of 
'intensional inexistence'. 'X inexists in Y' (Aldrich (1978) p. 214).
4.2 This is, of course, the merest skeleton of an analysis of 
representational seeing. But it includes sufficient material to be 
unacceptable to those who, like Goodman, favour austerity at all costs, 
and to be recognisable as corresponding to elements of theories put 
forward by Ishiguro, Wollheim and Aldrich among others. Moreover, 
the type of analysis adumbrated just now needs very little filling 
out for it to be clear how misleading its application to expression 
would be. For whatever relation there is between Y, the painting, 
and X, a unicorn, griffin. Prince of Wales or Churchill, it cannot 
correspond to the relation either between behaviour and the felt 
emotions it expresses or to the relation between behaviour and its 
emotional 'meaning' or physiognomic character. First, there is a 
difference between, to put it crudely, what is in a painting and what 
a painting is of. Unicorns and griffins correspond only to the former. 
They do not exist outside paintings of them or stories about them. 
Churchill, on the other hand, was a real individual. As Goodman puts 
it, to say of a painting that it is a representation of Churchill is 
to say, first, that it 'denotes' the individual, Churchill (Goodman 
(1976) pp. 21f) . But there are no unicorns to be denoted by representa­
tions of unicorns. Goodman suggests that we construe statements about 
the representation of non-existent objects as specifying not the 
referent of the painting but a kind to which it belongs(loc cit.). We 
should reserve the expression 'representation of x' for genuine 
dénotâtional representation, rewriting sentences about non-denotational 
representation by means of the expression 'x-representing picture' or, 
more briefly 'x-picture' (loc cit.). Now most representations of 
Churchill will turn out to be Churchill-pictures providing ample scope 
for ambiguity particularly when unanalysed notions of representation 
occur as analogues in the elucidation of expression. Failure to dis­
tinguish between these two senses of 'representation' can lead to 
ontological disaster. If non-denotational is assimilated to denotation- 
al representation, one needs to postulate a referent for pictures of 
unicorns. If, on the other hand, denotational is assimilated to non- 
denotational representaiton, then the represented object disappears or 
retains only a somewhat diminished reality. If one applies the first 
assimilation to the relation between, for example, anger and scowls.
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one of two conclusions must follow. Either anger is the object 
which scowls invariably 'denote', in which case there could never be 
a scowl without anger; or scowls sometimes denote angry emotions and 
sometimes something more doubtful ontologically. If the second 
assimilation is adopted, then anger is reduced to a property attri­
butable to certain kinds of behaviour or facial configurations. In 
general, failure to keep Goodman's distinction in mind has the result 
that comparing expression to representation will make mental events 
seem as suspect ontologically as meanings.
4.3 Neither denotational nor non-denotational representation will 
support a concept of representational seeing applicable to physiognomic 
perception or the perception of emotion in virtue of the perception of 
behaviour. This is bound up with the extraordinary difficulty of 
eliminating the intensionality of representational perception at least 
by techniques which have some measure of success in application to 
physiognomic perception. This difficulty is undiminished, or only 
slightly diminished,by Goodman's extensional treatment of both varie­
ties of representation, treating the one as a matter of reference and 
the other in terms of membership of a class. The concept of expression 
is divided in an analogous way, though this is a rather superficial 
observation (cf. Chapter 1.). At all events, the analogy cannot be 
extended to the pertinent kinds of perception. There is a temptation 
here which must be resisted. The seeing of emotions in virtue of see­
ing appropriate expressive behaviour and the perception of the physio­
gnomic properties of the latter cannot be assimilated respectively to 
seeing the man, Churchill, in a portrait of him and (non- 
extensionally) seeing Churchill (or a unicorn) in a painting. For when 
we see Churchill in a painting we do not see the man, Churchill, at all. 
One cannot see x in virtue of seeing a representation of x; this 
statement ought to be supported by a sufficiently detailed analysis of 
causation in perception. I do not know whether the causal theory of 
perception has achieved this but it is clearly an intuitive desideratum. 
Little scrutiny is required to disclose the absurdity in a statement 
like the following : 'I saw my father in Hampstead yesterday. I saw 
him again today in that portrait in the hall'.
The other part of the analogy might seem to be better off. 
Representational seeing in relation to the non-denotational aspect of 
representation can be construed on the basis of the seeing of properties 
- seeing-as. This cannot be a simple matter of replacing seeing x in y
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with seeing y as x (cf. Wollheim (1980) p. 226); if it were, then 
whenever I saw a picture of a unicorn I would be subject to an 
illusion (as Combrich thought). The error is sometimes further 
compounded when it is thought that seeing y as x, or, more naturally, 
seeing x as an F involves believing that x is an F. Thus Howell 
(1972) maintains not only that seeing the duck-rabbit as a rabbit is 
to be deluded, but also that it is to be deceived into believing that 
the object before one is a rabbit. ('Duck-rabbit', of course, denotes 
a kind of drawing, not a mythical creature like a griffin.) These are 
oversimplifications, but there may be a systematic correlation between 
classes of seeing-as statement and classes of seeing-in statement. 
Ishiguro, for example, regards the claim that I see a painting as a 
picture of A as equivalent to the claim that I see A in the picture 
((op cit.) p. 46). Combining this with Goodman's concept of non- 
denotational representation we can equate claims to see unicorns in 
paintings with claims to see paintings as unicorn-pictures. Anala- 
gously the physiognomic perception of expressive behaviour is a 
matter of seeing behaviour as angry, which is equvalent to seeing it 
as an expression of anger (Chapter 1.).
However, this strategy works better for physiognomic perception 
than it does for representational seeing for reasons bound up with 
what Wollheim ((1980) p. 213) calls the 'two-foldness' of the latter. 
Representational seeing just is seeing things as representations, but 
seeing something as a representation requires further decomposition 
into two elements one of which seems irreducibly a matter of what we 
see in representations. The attempt to eliminate the intensionality 
of representational seeing may ultimately be futile. It is not, 
however, within the competence of this discussion to make a final 
decision; it is sufficient to indicate that the comparative difficulty 
of imposing extensionality on representational seeing is not matched 
in the case of physiognomic perception and that this is so because of 
a concrete discrepancy between the two concepts. Wollheim's concept 
of two-foldness is a response in part to the ineptitude of constru­
ing the perception even of highly "naturalistic" art in terms of 
illusion. The same scruple need not apply to expression - at least 
not to behavioural or facial expression. When I see a unicorn in a 
unicorn-picture, then not only do I not see the picture as a unicorn, 
but it does not seem to me as if I (extensionally) see a unicorn.
More briefly, it does not seem to me that there is a unicorn before 
me. But when I see anger in a scowl, then it does seem to me that I
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am witnessing someone's anger, that anger exists before my eyes in 
the only sense in which an emotion can exist; it seems that someone 
is angry. If the notion of physiognomic perception is to contribute 
epistemologically to our understanding of expression and communication, 
and ultimately to the processes of intersubjective cognition, then 
cases of seeing anger in a scowl where the scowler is not angry must 
be plausibly classifiable as illusion.
5. Seeing-as and physiognomic illusion
5.1 I turn now to Wollheim's suggestion, alluded to at the opening 
of §3.1 :
' ... what we see in a picture (partially) determines what it
represents and what we see it as (partially) determines what
it expresses.' (Wollheim (1970) p. 313 in 1973)
The nature of the contrast between seeing-in and seeing-as is 
discussed in more detail in Wollheim (1980), but, since to do a 
proper phenomenology of the distinction would take too long and any­
way would not conform to the overall tenor of this essay, I will 
confine myself to making a few, relatively abstract remarks. The 
main points about physiognomic properties, ie. what we see expressive 
behaviour as, are (a) that physiognomic properties are irreducible to 
any other kind of visually accessible properties; (b) that, nevertheless, 
they have the same ’phenomenotog'Ccat status as colour, shape, etc.; but
(c) they have a different ontolog-icdt status.
These observations deserve some clarification, though whatever 
justification is available must be allowed to remain implicit in the 
descriptive use to which they are put. The alleged irreducibility of 
physiognomic predicates is based on the prima-facie hopelessness of 
any attempt to state, in purely anatomical terms, necessary and
14. I agree with Wollheim's (1968, 1980) view that representational 
seeing is phenomenologically bifurcated in a way in which the seeing 
of aspects or physiognomy (usually) is not (contra, for example,
Aldrich ((1978) p. 214) who appears to think that the same kind of 
duplicity obtains in both kinds of perception). However, I disagree 
with statements to the effect that we do not perceive the 'sustaining 
features' involved in seeing-as at all. I am inclined to think that 
if such features are to fulfil the explanatory function indicated by 
the expression ^sustaining features', then we must perceive them at 
least in the weak sense that, for example, we are visually or audi­
torily affected by the morphological or phonemic properties of facial 
expression and speech. No doubt we see or hear the latter only as 
physiognomically or semantically qualified in the stronger sense that 
the physiognomic and semantic features are the only ones we notice.
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sufficient satisfaction conditions for physiognomic predicates. For 
the extension of any anatomical or morphological predicate suited to 
this purpose could not be determined without alluding to the physio­
gnomic concept to be defined. For example, one might attempt to 
define a predicate, ’ ... s-moves’, true of all and only people who 
smile happily. ' .., s-moves' would then specify the form or shape 
of a facial movement, but all we can say with precision about the 
type of movement in question is that it is the type of movement 
produced by those who smile happily. A suggestive analogy is to be 
found in the relation between sound and meaning. Take the predicate,
' ... is the word "fool"'. This is true of a token utterance if and 
only if it meets certain phonological conditions. The latter, 
however, cannot be stated phonetically. The second feature of
physiognomic perception can be roughly indicated by noting what either 
a representationalist or a direct realist might say who sympathised 
with the general notion of physiognomic perception. According to the 
former, physiognomic properties are properties which qualify visual 
sense-data in addition to properties of colour and shape (cf. Jackson 
(op cit.) p. 22). According to the latter physiognomic properties 
would be properties of the external surface of objects - specifically, 
of human faces. The contrast between ordinary and physiognomic pro­
perties, on the other hand, is an approximate isomorphism of the 
contrast between objectivist and phenomenalist conceptions of, say, 
colour. As such it is ontological. Thus, if we accept an objectivist 
account of the latter, we are committed to holding, approximately, 
that we see objects as coloured in various ways in part because of the 
colours they have. But the direction of explanation is reversed for 
physiognomic properties. Objects have the physiognomic properties 
they do because of the way in which we see them.
5.2 The outstanding question at this stage is ; what do we see 
expressive behaviour as? or, equivalently, what are physiognomic
15. In this respect only I would concede that the application by 
anthropologists, such as Birdwhistell, of a "linguistic model" to 
non-verbal expressive behaviour, represents a genuine advance from 
Darwinism. The contrast is between Birdwhistell at, say, ((1971) pp. 
80 & 99f), where he contrasts 'kinemes' to'kinemorphs,' etc., and 
Darwin at p. 202 of the 1965 edition of The Expression of the Emotions 
in Man and Animats, where he attempts to explain anatomically the 
observable difference between a genuine and an artificially induced 
smile. Of course, there is an anatomical difference, but we cannot 
assume that any "smile" produced by galvanisation will differ in the 
same ways from smiles produced spontaneously.
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properties? In Chapter 1, I argued that a physiognomic property, 
such as anger, just is a property of being expressive of anger. So 
it seems that when we see a scowl as angry, we see it as expressive 
of anger. But applying the same reasoning to the definition of 
expression proposed in Chapter 4 will yield the appalling conclusion 
that when we see a scowl as expressive of anger we see it as prima- 
facie evidence that the person scowling is angry; indeed, this is 
only a diluted version of the unintelligible conclusion which is 
forced upon us by this line of reasoning. The problem, intuitively, 
is that the predicate ' ... constitutes prima facie evidence that p ' 
cannot be seen to be satisfied except in a sense of 'sees' which is 
indeed far from literal. Sometimes, it is true, we say things like,
'You can see that p must be the case, given that q and r'. But such 
uses of the verb 'to see' are no longer tied to notions of perceptual 
ability; on the contrary, one could substitute verbs like 'to understand' 
or even 'to infer', thereby begging the question of the present chapter.
However, the principle which generated this puzzle is unsound.
In general the biconditional : 'Vx(Fx -<->■ Gx) ' does not entail the 
biconditional : '(A sees x as F) -<->■ (A sees x as G) ' . For example, 
one might recognize Napoleon on the basis of such indications as his 
stature, coiffure and the way his hand is held tucked into his coat.
One thus sees someone as Napoleon. It does not follow, however, that 
one sees him as the victorious general of the Battle of Jena, although 
the following biconditional is true : 'Vx (x is Napoleon x is the 
victorious general of the Battle of Jena)'. The same point applies 
even if the biconditional in question is true by definition. Thus one 
might see a certain shape as a circle. A circle is defined as a bound 
figure whose circumference is equal to its radius multiplied by it and 
then squared. But seeing something as a circle does not involve seeing 
it as having a circumference equal to irr^ .
An explanation of the failure of inferences of this kind is 
suggested by Jackson in the context of a discussion of epistemic seeing 
or seeing-that ((op.cit.) pp. 155-159). Jackson maintains that *A sees 
that X is F' is sometimes equivalent to 'A sees of x that it is F' or 
as I prefer, 'x is seen by A to be F', which is more idiomatic.
16. Jackson is, of course, applying Quine's analysis of statements 
about belief to seeing-that. For the analogue of the first transparent 
construction, see Quine (1956). For the second, Quine ((I960) p. 149).
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The latter formulations are valued for the referential transparency 
of the x-position, but Jackson points out that they are still 
'opaque modes of containment for general terms', ie. replacements 
of 'F' ((ibid.) p. 157). In other words, co-extensive predicates 
are not intersubstitutible salva veritate within the F-position.
This need hardly surprise us when we consider that the positions 
represented as dots in 'A sees x as ... ' and 'A sees of x that x is 
... ', can accommodate singular as well as general terms and, if the 
former, are certainly opaque (cf. Quine (1960) p. 151). If I see 
someone as Napoleon, it does not follow that I see him as the victor 
of the Battle of Jena. Admittedly, our problem is that ' ... is an 
expression of F-ness' is not merely co-extensive with a complex 
predicate involving the concept of prima-facie evidence, but is defined 
thereby. It might be suggested that the relevant locutions, though 
basically opaque as regards the second position, do sustain substitution 
of interdefinable terms. However, I see no justification for this claim. 
It ill accords with the intuitions of the previous paragraph and is 
plainly false if extended to familiar instances of opacity, such as 
that introduced by belief-statements.
The difficulty encountered by the claim that we see behaviour 
as expressive resulted in part from a failure to appreciate the role 
of physiognomic perception in the understanding or interpretation of 
physiognomic behaivour. Physiognomic perception and physiognomic 
interpretation are not to be identified; rather, the former is what 
we rely on when we try to achieve the latter. In general the way 
things look, or what we see them as, contributes to the explanation 
of why we take things as evidence supporting our beliefs about the 
world. But we cannot specify the way behaviour should look if we are 
to take it as p.f. evidence for attributing F-ness to its agent except 
in terms that are bound up with the concept of F-ness. The crucial 
point is that the evidence supplied by expressive behaviour is 
'imponderable' (cf. Wittgenstein (op.cit.) p. 228). Imponderability 
is not the same as incommunicability, but there is a connection 
between them. Evidence which cannot be measured ("weighed"), also 
cannot adequately be described by means of the idioms we use for 
describing what can be measured. For example, a friendly smile will 
appear to be insincere if it is cut off too rapidly or if it is 
rigidly sustained, fixed, for too long. But we cannot specify a 
duration of n seconds and a duration of n^ seconds such that a smile 
which endures for less than n or more than n"* seconds will look
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insincere. All we can say is that a smile that is too brief or 
too protracted looks insincere, and that a smile is too brief if 
and only if its duration is less than that required for an appear- 
anceof genuine friendliness. Physiognomic properties, ie. the pro­
perties in virtue of which we take behaviour as p.f. evidence for 
emotions, are perceptual but imponderable.
5.3 At the close of §2.2 I indicated the need to distinguish 
statements to the effect that knowledge about people's emotions is 
perceptual from statements to the effect that knowledge of the mean­
ing of behaviour is perceptual. I objected in Section 3 to the 
'seeing-in' construction on the ground that it failed to keep this 
distinction on display and consequently held out the false promise 
of facile, reductive solutions in the epistemology of intersubjectivity, 
It would seem that these pitfalls can be avoided at this stage by 
elucidating knowledge of psychological states on the basis of 
indirect perception and knowledge of physiognomic "meaning" on the 
basis of seeing-as :
(a) We perceive the emotions of others in virtue of perceiving 
their expressive behaviour.
(b) We perceive the expressive behaviour of others as 
expressive.
However, in thus separating two components which were confused in the 
idiom of 'seeing-in' we seem to have sacrificed the possibility of 
epistemological gain. The 'seeing-in' thesis was needed to support 
the claim that the emotions of others are in some sense open to 
observation. Of course, this will not meet the challenge of solipsism 
which could be based on the possibility of universal physiognomic 
illusion. But it might have suggested a middle way through a field 
currently divided among transcendent realists, reductionists and 
anti-realists with respect to other minds. A non-transcendent 
realism of the kind proposed by McDowell (1978) seemed plausible as 
an account of the acquisition of psychological concepts or the 
exhibition of competence with such concepts. I return to this theme 
in the final chapter. My concern here is to assess the following 
statement : 'If S expresses F-ness and is not F , then A, a witness 
of S's behaviour, is subject to the illusion that S is F'. The truth 
of this statement is a necessary condition of the truth of maintaining 
that we observe the mental states of others when they do feel the 
emotions they express. In order to establish the possibility of the 
right kind of physiognomic illusion we need to re-integrate seeing-as
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and indirect perception without, however, confusing them anew.
The claim that we see behaviour as expressive will not 
generate the right kind of illusion by itself. True, there is scope 
for illusion here. I might see a facial expression as expressive of 
joy when in fact it is expressive of melancholy. What determines 
the real expressive function of the facial configuration is in part 
the way other people tend to see facial configurations of that kind. 
But the fact that I see a face as expressive of joy when its owner 
is sad does not amount to an illusion given the material assembled 
so far. For in this case the face may in fact be expressive of joy.
A straightforward appeal to the indirect perception of emotions will 
not help either. For, irrespective of how the face appears to me, 
what I see in virtue of it is sadness just if sadness is what caused 
the face to take on that appearance.
The difficulty is two-fold. In order for an illusion to occur 
there must be a single object perceived (more or less directly) which 
must appear to have properties which it does not have. But so far we 
have been considering two objects, the emotion and the behaviour, one 
of which is perceived in virtue of the other. Furthermore, physio­
gnomic properties are not psychological properties. Accordingly, 
seeing behaviour as expressive of anger when its agent is not angry 
cannot constitute an illusion, there being no object here which is 
such that it is not what it appears to be. One reason for expecting 
a solution to this problem (rather than concluding that other people's 
mental states just are unobservable) is the possibility of generating 
precisely analogous puzzles in other areas of perception. Thus if 
the only properties of immediately perceived objects are properties 
of colour, shape, etc., then the only illusions we can explain are 
those in which objects appear to have different colours, etc. from 
the colours they have. It is impossible to explain, for example, 
illusions of physical objects generated by holograms. For holograms 
are relatively insubstantial bearers of the phenomenal (including, 
perhaps, physiognomic) properties which they appear to have and they 
are the objects we see, albeit with a somewhat indeterminate degree 
of immediacy. Ordinarily holograms are counted as illusions generated 
by artifice, but we have been unable so far to locate a discrepancy 
between what is and what appears. In order to do so we need to admit 
within the phenomenal sphere properties not traditionally regarded as 
phenomenal (cf. Chapter 2, §4.2). For example, a holographically
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generated image of a human being is a thing which looks human. This 
appearance of humanity is, I suggest, irreducible to a conjunction 
of classical phenomenal properties. Any attempt so to reduce it, 
eg, by means of a comparative use of 'looks’ (Jackson (op cit.)
PP* 31-33) will again undermine the illusion. The object in question 
does not merely look 'i'Vke a human being; it looks human.
5.4 The solution to the problem introduced in the previous para­
graph, the problem, that is, of how there can be a discrepancy between 
behaviour and emotion which is aptly described in terms of illusion, 
involves two fairly easy stages. First we need to reconsider the 
question of the object perceived. There is an obvious candidate for 
the role of perceptual object common to the perception of emotion and 
of behaviour. What we perceive are the human beings, the relation 
between whose behaviour and emotions is in question. Then the first 
step towards a theory of the perception of behaviour is to state that 
we primitively perceive human beings as human beings (cf. Cooke (1969)) 
We do not perceive them as "senseless bodies", nor do we perceive them 
as indeterminate with respect to the distinctions between the animate 
and the inanimate. The claim made by Cooke and others is that even as 
infants we perceive adults as human. Indeed Max Scheler suggested 
that infantile perception of the world retains the traces of a primi­
tive animism (Scheler (1913) Part III, Chapter II); one might appeal 
to some such notion in explaining the continuity observed by Wollheim 
between the perception of expressive behaviour and the emotionally 
coloured experiences we sometimes have of inanimate things (cf. 
Wollheim (1966) p. 95). Of course, in attributing these perceptual 
capacities to the infant we do not attribute to him the capacity to 
distinguish conoeptually between the animate and the inanimate, the 
human and the non-human. Rather such attributions constitute an 
attempt to describe the perceptual basis (in a phenomenological rather 
than an empirical sense) of the acqu'is'it'ion of those conceptual 
abilities.
Human beings are not, of course, things we perceive directly 
any more than are purely physical objects. We perceive them in virtue 
of perceiving the surfaces of their bodies. But if we perceive human
17. To be really persuasive the point would need to be expanded 
considerably beyond what is compatible with the balance of this 
chapter. Still, in line with Chapter 2, it could be rephrased by 
saying that the comparative use of 'looks' is not a way out of the 
confines of phenomenal space; it describes a form of interpretative 
perception.
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beings indirectly (in Jackson's sense), nevertheless, we perceive 
them as human beings. And if we perceive the surfaces of their 
bodies more directly, we perceive them as parts of human beings 
and not as parts of automata. The elements of physiognomic per­
ception and the observation of psychological states can now be based 
in the perception of human beings in such a way that their dependence 
upon each other can be disclosed without reducing one to the other.
When behaviour is perceived as expressive of F-ness then a human 
being is seen to be expressing F-ness. When the agent is also F, 
then he is seen to be F . But, precisely because of the additional 
condition just mentioned, the following bi-conditional is false :
(a) S is seen by A to be expressing F-ness S is seen by 
A to be F.
If A is not F, then he cannot be seen to be F but he can be seen to
be expressing F-ness. This is so because the form ' ... sees x to
be F' carries a success grammar. It differs from seeing-that only
18in containing x referentially. However, the following conditionals
are true :
(b) S is seen by A to be expressing F-ness S seenis to A 
to be expressing F-ness.
(c) S is seen by A to be F S seems to A to be F.
Finally, the following bi-conditional is true (but for minor reser­
vations to be ignored here) :
(d) S seems to A to be expressing F-ness S seems to A to 
be F.
The main possible source of resistance to (d) would be a confusion of 
how things seem and how we believe they are. But the truth of (d) 
does not depend on truths about A's beliefs. It concerns those of his 
visual experiences which may or may not give rise to beliefs about 
their objects.
(d) is all that is required to justify the claim that to 
express emotions which are not felt is to produce the illusion that 
they are felt (without necessarily encouraging false beliefs). But 
the falsity of (a) is sufficient guarantee against any reductive 
consequences that might be thought to follow. Reductionism, then, is
18. I should add that I do not take the 'sees-that' construction or 
its referentially transparent counterparts to entail belief- 
ascriptions. In this I follow Hintikka, but not Howell (references 
given on p.96n) and not Jackson, although there is a curious concession 
on p. 159 of the work cited.
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not justified by the allegation that we can sometimes observe the 
emotions of others by (and only by) observing their behaviour. On 
the other hand, solipsism is not by any means refuted by such a claim,
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VI. CORRELATION AND APPROPRIATENESS
1. Performance and Correlation
1.1 When we say of a type of behaviour that it is an expression of 
a type of mental event we are committed to saying that within the 
community or species in question every token of that type of behaviour 
is an expression of that type of mental event. But if we say that a 
behaviour-type, (p, is an expression of an affect-type, F-ness, then 
are we committed to the statement that for every token of cp there is 
a token of F-ness? It seems obvious that we are not. If (p corresponds 
to the description : ’expression of F-ness’, the correlation is imper­
fect, given the non-relational concept of expression defended in 
Chapter 1, since people sometimes express emotions they do not feel.
If (f) corresponds to a physiognomic or a morphological description, the 
correlation fails because people feign anger by scowling and pleasure 
by smiling. Might we nevertheless be committed, when we say that (p is 
an expression of F-ness, to saying that for every token of F-ness 
there is a token of cj)? Again it is obvious that we are not, but this 
time it will be for different reasons depending on the level of descrip­
tion to which (|) corresponds. The universal correlation in the direc­
tion now under consideration fails if () corresponds to the description : 
’expression of F-ness’, because people sometimes inhibit the expression 
of emotions they feel. It fails if p corresponds to a physiognomic or 
morphological description for the same reason and because there may be 
different means available for the expression of a given type of emotion. 
Anger, for example, is expressed by fist-shaking, offensive manual 
gestures, verbal abuse and inarticulate shouting. Both the diversity 
of behaviour patterns expressive of anger and the physical impossibility 
of certain combinations of them - such as the first and the third with 
the second and the fourth of the examples given - rule out the possi­
bility of anger invariably giving rise to instances of any one 
morphological or physiognomic kind of behaviour. The obvious conclu­
sion justified by these observations is that expression cannot literally 
depend upon ’constant conjunction’ - a phrase which usually connotes 
a perfect symmetric correlation between items of different kinds. For 
while some types of behaviour are expressive there are no perfect (even 
asymétrie) correlations between tokens of them and tokens of what they 
express.
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1.2 Nevertheless we take it for granted that there are positive 
albeit less than perfect correlations between expressive behaviour and 
what it expresses. This raises a hypothetical question as to whether 
a type of behaviour could be an expression of a type of emotion if
there were no correlation or even if there were a negative correlation
between their tokens. In other words, could cj)-ing be an expression of
F-ness if for every token of p there is no token of F-ness or for every
token of F-ness there is no token of cj) or both? A negative answer to 
this question would establish that some degree of positive correlation 
is necessary for expression. An affirmative answer would settle the 
question left open in Chapter 2 : correct interpretation of expressive 
behaviour is not determined by its standardly true explanation.
Wollheim has suggested the following hypothesis :
We could imagine laughter becoming universally the behaviour 
of those who were sad, without our thinking that laughter 
expressed their sadness ; for there is surely no absurdity in
supposing there to be pathognomic disturbance on a massive
scale. (Wollheim (1964) p. 284)
This does not in fact entail either of the correlation failures under 
consideration, Wollheim’s primary target here being the view that 
constant conjunction is a sufficient condition for expression. It will 
be clear from the preceding chapters that I share Wollheim’s view on 
this point. It is possible, in principle, that the members of a group 
might all behave in a certain way when and only when they are in a 
certain affective state and yet consistently fail to interpret each 
others’ behaviour accordingly. Furthermore, on the natural reading of 
’laughter is universally the behaviour of those who are sad’, it is 
compatible with the claim that laughter is also universally the behaviour 
of those who are amused or delighted. Formally : ’Vx : (Fx ^ px) &
(Gx px)' is not only internally consistent, but is consistent with
’Vx : (Fx & Gx)’, the last proposition being designed to capture
the intuition that people are not usually sad and delighted simul­
taneously . Nevertheless, there are persuasive objections to Wollheim’s 
claim which, if decisive, also indicate grounds for insisting on the 
necessity of some degree of correlation between expressive behaviour 
and what it expresses.
1.3 First, it is arguable that the passage quoted misrepresents or 
underestimates the bearing of phylogenetic change on what we are pre­
pared to say about expression. The phrases ’becoming universally the 
behaviour ... ’ and ’pathognomic disturbance on a massive scale’ can
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be read as implying a widespread evolutionary upheaval. The claim 
thus seems to be that while laughter is widely associated with mirth 
or delight as things are, it could come to be associated with sadness 
without its expressive significance being altered as a result.
Strictly this is probably true but it contains an implicit and slight­
ly misleading emphasis. A minimally less speculative analogy is 
available. Konrad Lorenz has maintained that the phylogenetic origin 
of laughter is to be located in behaviour indirectly associated with 
aggression or hostility; behaviour, that is, the function of which is 
appeasement or neutralisation of hostile tension (Lorenz (1963) 
pp. 152f in translation). It is, of course, an unjustifiable simpli­
fication of Lorenz’s view to allege that laughter evolved from an 
expression of hostility but the crucial point here is that there is an 
evolutionary story relating laughter as an expression of amusement to 
some earlier, pre-humorous phase. The same story, whatever its details, 
presumably also explains how laughter came to be correlated with amuse­
ment, for it is difficult to make sense of the claim that laughter 
might have become the expression of amusement without the development 
of a correlation between them. True, the latter development could 
occur without the former and so Wollheim’s conjecture is basically 
sound. But the establishment of a correlation has a positive explana­
tory relevance to expression.
This is further confirmed by the consequences of expanding the 
hypothesis in question. Suppose that the result of the pathognomic 
disturbance is not only that people laugh whenever they are sad but 
that they laugh when and only when they are sad. In other words, they 
cease to laugh when amused or intensely pleased. In this situation 
laughter would no longer be an expression of amusement even if it con­
tinued to be (incorrectly) interpreted as such. For while people might 
continue to take laughter as prima-facie evidence of amusement it 
would no longer "be prima-facie evidence of amusement and would no 
longer be behaviour the exhibition of which is partly explained by the 
fact that it is taken to be prima-facie evidence of amusement.
However, the notion of a pathognomic disturbance is more 
naturally understood as involving a deviation from a norm rather than 
mere change. But the concept of universal or almost universal devia­
tion from a norm is surely incoherent. In its defence an appeal might 
be made to the inadequacy of purely statistical criteria of normality. 
Normality cannot be determined by the calculation of averages; if it
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were, it would be normal for human beings to have slightly less than 
two legs. Nor is normality determined by what is true of the majority 
of members of the class in question; if it were, then the normal 
human life-span would be diminished during periods of excessive vio­
lence. The second point, however, contains an obvious fallacy bound 
up with its failure to specify the relevant class. Normality of life­
span may be determined by the majority of human lives. This will not 
be modified by the abbreviation of most lives in one or two generations.
Analogously the notion of a massive pathognomic disturbance is 
to be construed in relation not to a single class of individuals, but 
to two classes one of which is a sub-class of the other. The norm is 
defined relative to the inclusive class which, in this case, is to be 
identified as the human race. The deviation may be universal within 
a sub-class of the human race ; a particular generation or society.
There is, therefore, no incoherence, but there remains a serious 
risk of vacuousness. If the deviation occurs throughout a given 
generation and is such that members of that generation do not laugh 
when they experience the emotions which currently give rise to laughter 
but do laugh when they experience entirely different emotions, 
then, while laughter would not have become the expression of the latter, 
it would surely be pointless to insist that it remained the expression 
of the former. An appropriate phylogeny is not sufficient, for the 
reasons given earlier, to justify a physiognomic interpretation in 
the absence of a sustained correlation. The distinction between change 
and deviation, difference and deviance is drained of content.
The point cannot be met by adding that members of the deviant 
generation continue to interpret or to see laughter as expressive of 
joy. Where laughter is no longer correlated with joy but continues to 
be interpreted as expressive of it by members of the generation in 
question intuition supports the conclusion that laughter is universally 
misinterpreted and not that it is correctly interpreted and, as such, 
tends to mislead. Similarly, if all the members of a given society 
laugh when and only when sad and never when happy or amused, and if 
the relevance of correlation to expression is denied altogether, then 
it is not clear on the basis of the material assembled so far what 
would determine whether they express sadness by laughing or express 
happiness by laughing and laugh in order to simulate joy and disguise 
sadness.
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2. Performance and appropriateness
2.1 Phylogenetic norms are, therefore, irrelevant to the determina­
tion of expression in generations or communities which deviate from 
them wholesale. But if correlations or norms within those communities 
are equally irrelevant then it must seem that expressiveness is per­
fectly autonomous with respect to behavioural regularities of any kind. 
At this point an appeal might be made to a concept of appropriateness. 
The relevant concept is not, of course, captured by saying that cj)-ing 
is an appropriate thing for x to do if x is F . For this would be true 
of any rational action in relation to its motive. The point is rather 
that 4»-ing is an appropriate thing for x to do if x is to offer prima- 
facie evidence that he is F, or, more briefly, is to communicate that 
he is F.
If appropriateness is to furnish a concept of expression which 
is genuinely independent of behavioural regularity there are two availa­
ble models : the linguistic and the iconic. The linguistic model will 
allow us to say that cj)-ing is an expression of F-ness although no-one 
ever tf)-s. <p would thus be compared to the unuttered sentences of a 
language, one of which, a, may mean that p and thus be appropriate for 
expressing the belief that p. The intuition that unuttered sentences 
have determinate meanings is part of what underlies the investigation 
of semantic structure. The formal theory of meaning for a language 
assigns meanings to all its infinite sentences on the basis of the 
fewest possible rules of derivation and a finite set of axioms. It 
may seem, therefore, that not only is it possible to specify meanings 
for unuttered sentences (or unused sentences), but also that sentences 
which are commonly used metaphorically (eg. ’You have hit the nail on 
the head’) retain their structurally determined literal meanings. But 
none of this would make sense without the notion of semantic structure.
In the hypothetical communities in question laughter could not be a 
’’literal" expression of delight and a "metaphorical" or, more intelli­
gibly, an ironic expression of sadness unless laughter could be decom­
posed into repeatable components with specifiable ’semantic’ functions. 
Some social anthropologists do indeed believe that non-linguistic 
communicative behaviour is structured in such a way as to be comparable 
to language (eg. Leach (1972) p. 317f, Birdwhistle (1971)). But these 
analogies depend for their plausibility on a blurring of distinctions 
between different levels of structural investigation pertinent to 
language - phonological, lexical, semantic and syntactical. Furthermore,
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although it is reasonable to insist that sentences retain their 
structurally determined meanings even when they are used only meta­
phorically, nevertheless they also acquire a "metaphorical meaning" 
which determines what they are expressions of. ’You have hit the nail 
on the head’ is not an expression of a belief about the impact of your 
behaviour on the top of a nail, but of admiration at a particularly 
apt or acute observation.
2.2 Iconicity is not much better off in this connection. First, 
if there is no token of the type, (p, then (p is not an iconic expression 
of anything. For there is no limit on the subjects (J) could iconically 
be "about" in advance of the performance of ^-tokens in actual contexts. 
This is so even if iconicity is straightforwardly definable on the 
basis of resemblance; it is exaggerated if iconicity is construed in 
terms of some looser concept applicable to representation or ideograms. 
Still, the hand-to-mouth gesture discussed in Chapter 4 might be an 
expression of the desire to eat without ever being associated with it.
The gesture might always and only be used in feigning hunger. So while 
iconicity could not assign expressive properties to unperformed types 
of behaviour, it could explain the expressivity of behaviour sometimes 
exhibited but never in conjunction with what it expresses. Iconicity 
does offer a genuine escape from correlation but it is inapplicable to 
facial expression for a more fundamental reason : facial expressions 
simply do not resemble the emotions they express. Laughter has no visual 
or auditory properties in common with delight or amusement since the 
latter lack visual and auditory properties altogether. Nor does 
laughter resemble some other behaviour pattern which delight involves 
a disposition to exhibit; if delight involves any disposition it just 
involves the disposition to laugh or smile. Stuart Hampshire’s theory 
is therefore inapplicable at this point (cf. Chapter 3, Section 3 and 
Chapter 4, Section 2). Finally, some iconic communication succeeds by 
producing a configuration which resembles in a salient respect the 
object or state of affairs to which it refers (cf. Bennett (1976) 
p. 139). For example information about the approximate length of an 
object can be transmitted by means of a gesture producing a corres­
ponding distance between the hands. But it is far from clear what 
could be meant by saying that laughter matches the type of situation 
which standardly elicits it. Indeed, the relevant type of situation 
can only be specified as amusing or delightful, thus begging the 
question.
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2,3 The claim under consideration, namely, that (p-ing is an expres­
sion of F-ness just if ^-ing is appropriate for the expression of F-ness, 
could be protected from the criticisms of §1.4 only by manoeuvres which 
either trivialise it, or render it dependent on exactly what it has 
been introduced to replace. Thus an appeal might be made to the 
reflexivity of resemblance but this would result in a vacuous parody 
of Hampshire’s account of imitative iconicity and would, in addition, 
depend on the holding of a correlation between behaviour and what it 
expresses. Indeed the holding of such a correlation between behaviour 
and emotion might be thought to render the former appropriate for the 
expression of the latter. This is obviously irrelevant to the attempt 
to replace correlation as the (partial) basis of expression with 
appropriateness though it may bear on the more plausible claim that 
expression is characterised by a kind of appropriateness in addition 
to correlation. However, the holding of a correlation does not 
generate expressive appropriateness unless it is observed to hold by 
those who interpret instances of the behavioural correlate and this 
explains their ability to interpret correctly.  ^ This suggests a more 
plausible and definitely non-vacuous claim : what makes #-ing appropriate 
for the expression of F-ness is the fact that <p~ing is nearly always 
interpreted as an expression of F-ness. This, suitably relativised to 
communities, generations or species, is true and constitutes a genuinely 
autonomous concept of appropriateness as opposed to correlation. But 
for the reasons given in §1.3, it is not true that #-ing is an expres­
sion of F-ness just if it is in this sense appropriate for the 
expression of F-ness. The way a type of behaviour is standardly 
interpreted by those who observe tokens of it is insufficient to deter­
mine what it actually expresses even if it does make the behaviour in 
question appropriate for the expression of what it is interpreted as 
expressing. For the same reason it may be that a kind of subjective 
iconicity or correspondence (cf Wollheim (1966)) characterises the 
habitual and unreflective interpretation of other people’s physiognomic 
behaviour, in which case the relevant concept of physiognomic appropriate­
ness is needed to supplement but cannot replace the concept of corre­
lation in the analysis of expression.
1. I return to this theme in Section 4.
128
3. Correlation as a necessary condition
3.1 Even if one accepts that for certain kinds of expression - 
linguistic, iconic - the appropriateness of (j> for the expression of 
F-ness is a sufficient ground for asserting that (j) is an expression 
of F-ness even in the absence of any correlation between them, this 
will not help with facial expression. The linguistic and iconic models 
of appropriateness are inapplicable,with the consequence that the 
dilemma of §1.4 remains unsolved. The dilemma was produced by the 
allegation that in a given society laughter could be the expression of 
amusement while coming to be correlated with some entirely different and 
incompatible emotion. There is no adequate phylogenetic, structural
or iconic explanation of the expressivity of laughter in such a com­
munity. The elimination of these alternatives compels the admission 
of some degree of correlation as necessary within even deviant communi­
ties if it is true of t/iem that laughter is an expression of amusement, 
delight, etc.. In fact this conclusion is not entirely faute de mieux 
but is indicative of important differences between facial expression 
and linguistic or iconic methods of communication which constitute the 
significance of the claim that the former is a kind of natural expres­
sion. The extension of the latter concept is determined primarily by 
ontogenetic considerations. The explanatory relevance of phylogeny is 
established only when certain ontogenetic conditions have been observed 
to hold. A crucial component in the concept of the natural expression 
of an emotion is that of a disposition or tendency to behave in a 
certain way whenever that kind of emotion is experienced. The impu­
tation of an expressive tendency or disposition to a class of individuals 
does not, of course, entail the re-admission of a constant conjunction 
as such but it does require some degree of correlation between 
behaviour and what it expresses. For while a disposition may be in­
hibited or suppressed on some or even most occasions of its activation, 
it is arguable that were such a disposition invariably inhibited, there 
would be no ground for its attribution. However, reasons for doubting 
this claim will be mentioned in § 3.3.
3.2 The concept of a tendency among members of a community to laugh 
when amused takes the form of a generalisation about the members of 
the community in question. Each member is inclined or disposed to 
laugh when amused even if he sometimes inhibits that inclination. Is 
it possible that every memeber of the community always inhibits the 
inclination to laugh whenever he is amused? Intuition seems to support
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an affirmative reply, but at the same time it is difficult to see 
how to verify such an affirmation (except in a peculiar case to be 
discussed shortly). One response to this puzzle is to focus on the 
notion of a suppressed tendency. This notion, it might be contended, 
is tantamount to the concept of a tendency which was manifested even 
if now it is suppressed. In terms of inclinations, this amounts to 
the claim that members of the community laugh when and only when they
are amused at least until they have learnt to inhibit (or feign) the
inclination to laugh. In fact this is all that is required for the 
purposes of natural expression; it does not entail the generalisation 
that people inhibit an inclination to laugh on every occasion of feeling 
amused. Habitual inhibition often leads to total suppression of the 
original inclination; many adult males are never disposed to weep when 
miserable, but they have usually passed through a phase during which 
tears had to be suppressed by a deliberate exercise of self-control 
whenever sufficiently accute distress was experienced.
This line of thought suggests that (j)-ing is a natural expression 
of F-ness among humans only if tf)-ing is actually correlated with F-ness 
at a phase in the development of each individual in every human community. 
More precisely, ^-ing is a natural expression of F-ness only if everybody 
(f)-s when and only when he is F at least until he has learnt to control
the activity of (f>-ing, to <() or refrain from (f>-ing at will. The difference
between natural and other forms of expression is in part the difference 
between behaviour which we learn how to inhibit under certain conditions 
which dispose us to behave in that way and behaviour which we must first 
learn how to exhibit and then become disposed to exhibit under suitable 
conditions (cf. Danto (1973) pp. 163f.). Evidence that a given type of 
behaviour is naturally expressive of a type of emotion, expression of 
which is suppressed, will consist in evidence which supports a bilateral 
correlation between behaviour and emotion among infants up to a certain 
age if not among adults.
It is worth contrasting this ontogenetic requirement to the 
inadequate phylogenetic proposal considered earlier. According to the 
latter, (j)-ing could be an expression of F-ness in a deviant community or 
population, P, even though c{) and F-ness are not correlated in P, because 
(p is correlated with F-ness in a larger class, humanity, of which P is 
a sub-class. According to the new ontogenetic requirement, (p-ing could 
be an expression of F-ness in P, despite the absence of a correlation in 
P as a whole, so long as there is a correlation between F-ness and (p 
in a sub-class of P, ie. in its infantile population. If, however, in
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the allegedly deviant community, not even infants conform to the 
required regularity, then there is no justification for the assertion 
that ^-ing is an expression of F-ness within it. This in turn would 
threaten the claim that cj)-ing is a natural expression of F-ness in the 
species of which P is a sub-class. If P corresponds to a generation, 
then we would be strongly inclined to say that laughter was but is no 
longer an expression of delight among human beings. If P corresponds 
to a society, then it constitutes prima facie evidence against the 
claim that laughter is a natural expression of delight among humans and 
for the claim that laughter is a conventional or culturally determined 
expression of delight among some humans who are not members of P.
These reflections encourage us to try for a modified version of 
the thesis that correlation is a necessary condition of natural expression. 
In fact such a condition might be expected to have a wider relevance, 
being applicable not only to natural expression, but also to conventional 
but unstructured methods of communication typically involving gestures.
For example, the manual ’V-sign' which is the reverse of the sign for 
victory, is taken by most English speakers as prima facie evidence of 
hostility on the part of its perpetrator, but many of those who grasp 
its significance would nevertheless refrain from using it because of a 
sense of the gesture’s vulgarity. Thus the condition we are looking for 
might best be introduced as a condition on non-iconic, non-linguistic 
forms of expression somewhat as follows :
^-ing is a non-iconic, non-linguistic expression of F-ness in a 
population, P, only if there is a non-empty sub-class of P, C, 
such that anyone who is a member of C c{)-s if and only if he is F 
& most members of C sometimes (j).
If (p is replaced by a verb of facial expression then C will probably
include all and possibly include only infants in P. If  ^ is replaced 
by a verb which attributes a conventional - eg. manual - gesture to an 
agent then C will only include members of P who have had time to learn 
and do not object to the use of the gesture.
3.3 There are obviously several problems with the proposed condition 
as formulated above. First, as it stands it does not exclude very much 
at all. Suppose that just one member of P, Fred, sneezes when and only
when he is afraid. C could be designated as the class of members of P
who sneeze when and only when afraid and would thus contain just one
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member, Fred. Admittedly the condition introduced in the preceding 
paragraph is meant only to be necessary, but its capacity to accommodate 
this example suggests that it is rather trivial (though not completely 
trivial since it still discounts cases where sneezing and fear coincide 
on only one occasion although each occurs independantly with a reasonable 
degree of frequency). Furthermore, if the scenario is filled out by adding 
that most members of ? take sneezing as p.f. evidence of fear then, 
although Fred is the only member of P who instantiates a correlation 
between sneezing and fear, sneezing is an expression of fear in P.
While it is not obvious that the concept of expression should exclude 
such a situation, it is so intrinsically odd, and so unlike any situation 
we are actually likely to confront, that on balance I see no harm in 
making the concept exclude it.
A first step would be to stipulate that C should not merely be 
non-empty, but should contain a substantial proportion of P. The 
vagueness thus introduced is no objection to this proposal. This would 
seem to allow for those cases with which we started out, but it is worth 
building into the condition a further intuitively sanctioned requirement 
that members of P who do not (p when F have, some motive for refraining 
from doing so. The point of this requirement is that where #-ing is a 
natural expression of F-ness, members of P who are not members of C have 
had to inhibit the inclination to (|). Admittedly, where #-ing is a 
conventional manual gesture it would be wrong to insist that all members 
of P are inclined to cj) when F, or have at some time been so inclined. But 
the additional requirement holds so long as the following, weaker, 
counterfactual claim is true : members of P who are not members of C would 
(J) when F if they had no reason for not doing so. Of course their dislike 
of the gesture may be so strong that they do not even feel any inclination 
to (p.
The proposed condition is also open to the objection that it is 
too strong. The excessive strength of the condition is due to the 
universal quantification over times implicit in it which requires #-ing only 
when they are F and on all occasions on which they are F. This seems 
implausible and the quantification ought to be made explicity but toned 
down in such a way as to specify the behaviour of members of C most of 
the time. Accordingly, the condition should at least be rewritten as 
follows :
2. This, and another counter-example introduced on p. 133 were suggested 
to me by Mark Sainsbury in the course of discussing an earlier draught of 
this section.
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(f)-ing is a non-iconic, non-linguistic expression of F-ness in P 
only if there is a substantial sub-class of P, C, such that for 
any person, x, who is a member of C, and for almost any time, t,
X (f)-s at t iff X is F at t, members of C sometimes <j), and all 
other members of P have a reason for refraining from 4>-ing.
However, while this loosening represents an improvement, this 
formulation of the correlation requirement still fails to accommodate 
the phenomena of what may be termed ’physiognomic synonymy’ (cf. §1.1) 
and ’physiognomic ambiguity’. Physiognomic synonymy arises where there
are two alternative ways of expressing the same kind of emotion. Anger,
for example, may be expressed, even by members of C, in a variety of
ways none of which, consequently, will be associated with anger even on
most occasions of its provocation. Conversely the possibility of 
physiognomic ambiguity needs to be recognized. To some extent it has 
been recognized implicity in the foregoing discussion of laughter as 
expressive of delight or mirth. Delight and mirth may either be regarded 
as entirely dissimilar affects, or they may be regarded as variants of 
the same kind of affect neutrally specifiable as, say, ’euphoria’. I 
doubt whether consensus can be achieved over issues of this kind given 
the inevitable vagueness of the intuitive affective classifications 
available. To mention one example of a thriving controversy of this kind; 
among social scientists there are those who believe that smiling is 
equivalent to partially suppressed laughter and carries a diminished 
significance of the same sort (eg. Lorenz (1963) p. 152),and those who 
believe that smiling is on some occasions mild laughter, suggesting 
partially inhibited mirth or open mild amusement, and on other occasions 
an altogether different kind of expression, with a distinct phylogenetic 
and ontogenetic background and indicative of an altogether different range 
of affective states including friendliness, contentment and so on 
(eg. van Hooff (1972) pp. 212 f). It is difficult to determine what 
would settle the debate in a genuinely definitive way; still, some 
support for the view that smiling is inherently equivocal might be 
derived from the confusion and misapprehension to which it is known to 
give rise cross-culturally and even within cultural boundaries (where 
these can be delineated with any clarity). Either way, the possibility 
of physiognomic ambiguity ought to be admitted, at least in principle, 
if only to avoid prejudging the debate among ethologists.
Unfortunately, it turns out to be surprisingly difficult to 
provide a formulation of the sought for necessary condition which is not 
either completely vacuous or fails to accommodate physiognomic ambiguity
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and synonymy. In itself I do not believe this constitutes a decisive 
objection to the view that some degree of correlation is a necessary 
condition for the kinds of expression recently discussed, but the 
difficulty does not seem to be sufficiently important to justify the 
complexity that would have to be countenanced in dealing with it at all 
formally. The task will seem even more futile in the light of the 
following, seemingly devastating objection to the claim that correlation 
in either direction is, in the strict sense, a logically necessary 
condition of natural expression.
Consider the following scenario. A species which is not unlike 
humanity, is such that its members begin to experience a certain emotion,
F, only at puberty. Whey they experience F, they are (naturally) disposed 
to express it by <f)-ing. Within this species there is a community, P, 
whose members never (p because, before they reach puberty, they are taught 
by other members of P that #-ing is totally unacceptable. But the following 
counterf actual is true : if any member of P were seen to by another 
member of P, the latter would take the former's (f)-ing as p.f. evidence 
that he is F (cf. n.2 above). Should we not say that ^-ing is an 
expression of F-ness in P and a natural expression of F-ness in the 
species of which P is a part? It seems obvious that we should and that 
consequently (j)-ing could be a non-iconic, non-linguistic expression of 
F-ness in P without there being any correlation between them.
There are three points to be made about this example. First, it 
is difficult to see how to construct a similar counter-example to bear 
on the claim that correlation is necessary for conventional unstructured 
signs. I suspect that it is impossible to do so, suggesting that cor­
relation is necessary for conventional but not for natural expression 
(a suggestion which contrasts interestingly with the view put forward, 
for example, by Alston. See section 4 below.). Where #-ing is a natural 
expression of F-ness it seems that all that is strictly necessary is 
that members of the species of which this is true should be disposed to 
(p when and only when F (subject to possible refinements dealing with 
physiognomic ambiguity and synonymy).
Secondly, the hypothetical example described above presupposes 
that the deviant population possesses a language. Without a language 
it would be impossible (a) for the situation to arise and (b) to verify 
that it had arisen. (a) is true because without a language members of 
P could presumably only learn to refrain from (|)-ing by first <{)-ing and 
experiencing some disagreeable result on several occasions. (b) is 
true because the only evidence that members of P were disposed to <j)
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when F would consist in their avowals to that effect. This, in fact, 
presents problems for the outsider, for whom it would be difficult to 
discover the meaning of native expressions meaning ' to cj)’. Such problems 
are awkward, but probably not insuperable.
Finally, a situation of this kind is most unlikely to be realised 
and most cases of non-iconic, non-linguistic expression actually 
encountered will satisfy the correlation requirement as stated on p. 132 
(but for ambiguity and synonymy). Thus, while the condition is not 
strictly necessary, it does seem to capture what is distinctive of 
genuine examples of the types of expressive behaviour in which we are 
interested.
3.4 How distinctive an aspect of expression is the degree of 
correlation? It is, I suggest, distinctive in two respects. First, it 
is sufficient to contrast expression to most other, non-expressive types 
of action. If we retain # as a variable ranging over types of bodily 
movement^, F-ness as ranging over types of mental events or states 
including beliefs and desires as well as emotions, and introduce a new 
variable, jp, to range over types of action determined by the types of 
events to which they give rise beyond the surface of an agent's body, 
then there will be very little correlation between tokens of ......
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F-ness and tokens of # or ^ for most F, (p and ip. Certainly there 
will be no two-way correlation between F and ip even if for many ip 
(but certainly not most ip because of branching causal sequences of 
indefinite protraction emanating from any i|;-token) , tokens of \p will 
usually be accompanied by tokens of F-ness, eg. by wanting to \p. 
Correlation in the opposite direction is precluded by Davidsonian 
’holism of the mental realm’ even for wantings to \p and ip-ings. ^
Any attempt to establish such a correlation would be vitiated not 
merely because of the possibility of suppression for its own sake, 
but because of the endless possible variation in the beliefs and com­
peting desires of a human agent. ■
Even if Davidsonian holism is thought to be exaggerated, 
it is sufficient for the contrast drawn here that there is no corre­
lation in either direction between F-tokens and ^-tokens for most F 
and (p. This does not depend on an extreme holistic picture but on the 
obvious fact that most bodily movement types will have different con­
sequences on each occasion of their instantiation because of the 
variation from token to token of the standing causal conditions under 
which they are performed. Such variations will be registered more or 
less accurately as beliefs in most agents, thus contributing to the 
determination of different bodily movements in different circumstances 
where the same type of end is sought. Similar vicissitudes do not 
affect the relation between bodily movements and those of their results 
which justify calling them expressive to nearly the same extent. They 
do not, therefore, threaten the correlation between bodily movements 
such as smiles and affects such as contentment. We do not have to
arrange our faces differently every time we express the same kind of
4emotion physiognomically.
Secondly, the imposed condition applies only to natural expres­
sion and unstructured conventional signalling systems insofar as the 
latter may be conceived of as techniques for the expression of a limited 
range of beliefs. It does not apply to iconic modes of expression or 
to an infinite portion of any natural language comprising all its un­
uttered sentences or belief-, desire-, etc.- expressing utterance types. 
The condition, which is satisfied by facial expression, entails that 
c|)-ing is not a natural (or at least, non-iconic, non-linguistic)
3. cf. Davidson ((1970) p. 217 in 1980) and also (1980) pp. 263-4.
4. The fact that the physical descriptions of facial expressions are 
irreducibly vague does nothing to diminish the clarity of the con­
trast indicated.
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expression of F-ness in P if no member of P ever cf)-s when he is F 
and each member of P cj)-s only when he is not F. The total absence 
of correlation conjectured at the opening of §1.2 is incompatible with 
the kind of expression under discussion. But it is worth noting that 
the possibility in P of universal physiognomic dissimulation or uni­
versal physiognomic simulation is not denied, whether it is pathological 
and involuntary or hypocritical and voluntary. What is denied is that 
the physiognomic means of simulation and dissimulation would, under 
these circumstances, be an expression of what it simulates.
There is at this point both a contrast and a similarity between 
physiognomic expression and language which will help to clarify the 
last point. First the similarity. If there is a sentence in the 
language of P, a, which members of P utter when and only when it is 
dark, then it would be ludicrous to distinguish two languages, L and 
L"*, which are identical in every respect except that in L, a means that 
it is dark and in L^, a means that the sun is shining and then to ask 
whether L' is the actual language of P and their 'actual language 
relation’ is deviant, or L is the actual language of P, the actual 
language relation being perfectly standard.  ^ This matches my earlier 
point about laughter and delight at §1.3.
The contrast arises because it is virtually inconceivable, for 
reasons to be spelled out in Chapter 7, that members of P could per­
sistently utter o when it is not dark and continue to understand a as 
meaning that it is dark. But an analogous situation for laughter is 
conceivable, or at any rate inconceivable for different reasons.
Members of P might always laugh when sad and always be misled by each 
other’s laughter or, if not actually misled, prone to misinterpret or 
misperceive each other’s laughter as expressive of delight. In this 
case laughter would neither be an expression of delight nor an expres­
sion of sadness. The concept of expression as it applies to the human 
face is defined by the convergence of two conceptually independent 
notions; correlation and interpretation. ^ The relative independence
5. The point is a familiar one. My way of putting it is influenced 
by Lewis ((1968) pp. 176f$ and Peacocke (1975).
6. It is interesting to compare Wollheim’s view of artistic expression 
as lying ’at the intersection of two constituent notions of expression’ 
(Wollheim (1968) p. 46). One of those notions is that of natural 
expression of which I maintain that it too is complex and that (in 
contrast to Wollheim), the criteria which determine its application 
could, in principle, diverge.
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of the constituent notions is a mark of the naturalness of facial 
expression; I will justify this claim in more detail in Chapter 7.
4. Interpretation and correlation
4.1 The establishment of a correlation between a kind of behaviour 
and a kind of mental or affective condition does not provide a suffi­
cient ground for claiming that the former is an expression of the latter. 
First, though there is no correlation between most types of behaviour 
and most types of mental event - eg. types of desire, nevertheless, 
some action-types are highly correlated with associated desire-types. 
Indeed in some cases the correlation will be better than it need be 
for expression. For example, eating is generally accompanied by a 
desire to eat (if not by hunger or a need for nourishment), and 
gastronomic desires, at least in priviledged communities, generally 
give rise to gastronomic activities. Secondly, the claim that corre­
lation is sufficient for expression is plainly contrary to the basic 
tenor of the preceding chapters. However extensive, however exception­
less the correlation, the correlated behaviour will not be an expression 
of its emotional correlate unless tokens of it are standardly interpre­
ted as such by members of the class in which the correlation holds.
However, theories which aim to elucidate expression on the 
basis of constant conjunction are unfairly characterised as attempting 
to define expression in this way irrespective of interpretation.
Rather the aim is to represent the constant conjunctions which hold 
between behaviour and emotion as explanatory of the letter's interpreta- 
bility and even of its physiognomic perception.  ^ A proponent of just 
such a theory is Alston who, in (1965), maintains that while linguistic 
and facial expression have in common the fact that they are taken by 
suitable witnesses to be a 'reliable indication’ of what they express, 
facial expression is so construed because of a de facto correlation 
uniting it to what it expresses, but linguistic expression is so con­
strued because of 'a general practice of using the sentence in a 
certain way’ (Alston (1965) p. 21). Alston uses the term ’practice’ 
to mean something like ’convention’ or ’rule’, but this leaves the 
contrast he has in mind somewhat obscure. In a footnote on the same 
page, however, he suggests that the contrast is a matter of the
7. It is the second view which constitutes the main target for 
Wollheim’s criticisms in (1966).
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direction of dependence between expression and reliable indication 
in each case : facial expression is expressive because it is a 
reliable indication; an utterance of, for example, ’I’m disgusted’, 
is a reliable indication of disgust because it is expressive. In 
other words Alston’s point can be made without presuppositions about 
the dependence of linguistic meaning upon convention thus avoiding, 
or at least postponing a problem in his exposition; how is the concept 
of a convention to be understood independently of the concept of a 
behavioural regularity?
The definition of expression arrived at in Chapter 4, because 
it is intended to be general, ie. indeterminate with respect to 
distinctions between linguistic and non-linguistic, conventional and 
natural forms of expression, left open the question of why members of 
P take each other’s behaviour as prima-facie evidence for (or a reliable 
indication of) what it expresses. The difference between linguistic 
and facial expression now seems to be partially determined by different 
possible answers to that question ;
(i) Members of P take ^-ings by other members of P as p.f.
evidence that the (J)-er is F heoause members of P usually 
are F when they cj>.
(ii) L-speakers take utterances of a by other L-speakers as p.f. 
evidence that the o-utterer believes that p because o means 
that p in L.
(ii) corresponds in an approximate way to Peacocke’s use of the notion 
of prima-facie evidence in describing the relation between a population 
and an inter'preted language (cf. Peacocke (1975) p. 164). Of course, 
much more is required to complete the definition, notably, the correct 
insertion of a common-knowledge condition, if not of a concept of con­
vention (cf. (ibid.) p. 169). The confusion in Alston’s article arises 
in part from a failure to distinguish the very dubious application 
of the concept of convention to the definition of the concept of an interpre- 
ted language, and the questionable but not obviously incorrect
8. Thus Peacocke, in the quoted article, accepts the widespread view
that L is an interpreted language if there is a theory of truth and
theory of force for L where, roughly, the former relates sentences to
the world by means of truth-theorems, and the latter potentially relates them to
the minds of speakers by means of a function, f, between sentences and
prepositional attitudes. Thus L is a fully interpreted language if for
every sentence, a, in L we have a theorem : T(o) = p and a function :
f(o) = ip, (Peacocke (ibid.) p. 171)
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application of the concept of convention to the elucidation of the 
actual language relation.
4.2 However, the import of 'because' varies in relation to the 
nature of the explanatory project in progress. Bearing this in mind, 
there may be a sense of ’because’ in which (i) is true and a sense in 
which (ii) is true, but there is no sense of ’because’ in which (i) 
and (ii) are both true. Correlation cannot contribute to the expla­
nation of the ability of members of P to interpret tokens of cp what 
a theory of meaning for L contributes to the explanation of L-speakers’ 
ability to interpret token-utterances of a. It turns out, on the 
contrary, that given any explanatory project we might initiate with 
respect to both facial and linguistic expression, either there is no 
contrast between them which can be described in terms of correlation 
and meaning or the contrast is the reverse of that suggested by Alston.
It is possible to distinguish four explanatory projects :
(a) Radical interpretation;
(b) Ordinary interpretation by adult L-speakers or members of P;
(c) The phylogeny of interpretation;
(d) The ontogeny of interpretation
A more detailed discussion of the role of correlation and meaning in 
each explanatory project will be postponed to Chapter 7. At this point 
I will confine myself to some brief remarks which suggest that Alston’s 
distinction is ineptly applied to any one explanatory level. The 
distinction is introduced as an account of the different ways in which 
inferences from facial expression and inferences from linguistic expres­
sion are supported. As such it is plainly irrelevant to the phylogeny 
of interpretation (c) where the sense in which members of P interpret 
each other’s behaviour the way they do because of the emotional state
with which it is associated would have to be captured by a notion of
9function applicable to evolution in general.
9. cf. Chapter 4 §4.3. Construed phylogenetically (i) is true, but 
presumably it is true also of the evolution of natural languages. Note 
that this is not incompatible with the statement in the definition pro­
posed at 4 §4.3 to the effect that members of P behave the way they do 
because such behaviour is taken by members of P as p.f. evidence for 
what it expresses. The function of expressive behaviour in general is 
the promotion of common knowledge among members of P (or common 
registering), about the environment, which includes the mental states 
of communicators. This function is realised only if :
(a) What members of P take as p.f. evidence for psychological 
facts about members of P is in fact correlated with those facts.
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Also, if Alston’s aim is to distinguish grounds of inference then it is 
inapplicable to ordinary adult interpretation either of linguistic or 
non-linguistic behaviour (b), if the view that everyday unreflective 
interpretation is perceptual rather than inferential in character is 
taken seriously. Still, it might be insisted that interpretation in­
volves a perceptual or unreflective analogue of inference to which 
Alston’s distinction is applicable. This might be elucidated through 
the possibility of coming to see things in certain ways as a result of 
having become familiar with the way things are. It depends, therefore, 
on the application of Alston’s contrast to the way in which we learn 
to interpret behaviour (d).
But the crucial failure of the meaning/correlation opposition 
is in its application to ontogeny and, for the same reasons, to radical 
interpretation (a). First, what distinguishes radical from ordinary 
interpretation is precisely the refusal whilst engaged in the former 
to rely upon any antecedent knowledge of the subject-matter. The 
radical interpreter of language, therefore, has nothing to fall back 
on if not the correlations which can be observed to hold between 
utterances of a sentence and the conditions under which they are elici­
ted by appropriate interrogation and under which they elicit assent or 
dissent from native speakers. The infant learner is in exactly the 
same predicament vis-a-vis his first language. It is, therefore, in 
connection with language that the inferential procedure available to 
the radical interpreter and the learning processes of the infant are 
supported by correlation. Alston’s contrast is thus undermined.
More importantly, it appears to be reversed because there is no 
observable correlation between instances of expressive behaviour and 
instances of what it expresses. True it might be pointed out that the 
same difficulty afflicts the radical linguist and infant learner with 
respect to the expressive part of language, specifically, the part 
which comprises sentences used for attributing emotions to the utterer. 
But here radical interpretation reflects the ontogeny of interpretative 
competence with self-ascriptions of psychological predicates to the 
extent that in each case the self-ascriptions are interpreted by 
correlating them with non-linguistic expressive behaviour. We learn
9. continued ........
(b) The behaviour which members of P exhibit when in certain 
states is taken by members of P as p.f. evidence for those states 
and not different ones.
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to understand a sentence, o, as an expression of distress by corre­
lating it with antecedently understood facial expressions of distress. 
Some reflecticnsuch as this underlies Wittgenstein's concept of 
expressive behaviour as the criter-ion of, or reference-fixing device 
for the semantic determination of avowals (Wittgenstein (1955) §244). 
The same approach is obviously impotent to determine the meaning of 
the facial expressions on which we rely in determining that of linguis­
tic expressions.
An alternative method could be based on correlations between 
behaviour and situations which can be expected to give rise to certain 
kinds of emotions. I examine the prospects for this approach in the 
next chapter; they are not promising for radical interpretation and 
are, within the bounds of psychological plausibility, even worse for 
ontogeny. But even without anticipating these conclusions it is clear 
that the understanding of expressive behaviour is not explained by 
the correlation between it and what it expresses. Such correlations, 
therefore, do not provide the material for a sufficient condition of 
expression. Furthermore, the argument of this section has issued in a 
premiss for a negative argument for the innateness of the capacity to 
recognise facial expression; the negative argument will be completed 
if it turns out that the infant is not in a position to learn what 
adult behaviour expresses from the conditions under which it is 
exhibited. I will close this chapter with an incidental positive 
argument for the same conclusion, relying on premisses about physio­
gnomic appropriateness.
5. Interpretation and appropriateness
5.1 The relevant concept of appropriateness here will not be based 
on iconicity or structure, and its role will not be to replace corre­
lation altogether in the analysis of expression, particularly natural 
expression, but to replace it in the analysis of interpretation. The 
concept of natural expression requires both elements : we come to 
interpret people’s behaviour as expressive because it seems to ’match’ 
or ’correspond’ to the moods or emotions it expresses; the presence or 
absence of a correlation between behaviour perceived in this way and 
the emotions we consequently interpret it as expressing is what deter­
mines the correctness of our interpretations. I have alluded in pass­
ing and more than once to Wollheim’s elucidation of physiognomic 
perception on the basis of ’correspondences’ (Wollheim (1966)). The
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kind of appropriateness or matching to which Wollheim refers is 
not iconicity, but it is not entirely dissimilar from it. It might 
be described as 'subjective iconicity’. Unfortunately, it is 
difficult to differentiate in a perspicuous fashion between subjective 
and objective iconicity; surely iconicity in general depends upon 
subjective standards of similarity and ultimately, no doubt, upon an 
at least partly innate capacity to classify experience according to 
certain natural kinds. Thus Wollheim writes :
The difference between iconic and noniconic signs, which is 
generally treated as though it were a difference in the re­
lation in which the sign stands to the referent, is really 
a difference in the relations in which we stand to the sign.
((1968) p. 157)
In certain cases iconicity accrues to the relation between sign and 
audience simply as a consequence of the latter’s familiarity with 
instances of the former (ibid.). But if this is so then we would 
have to describe the perceptual element in linguistic understanding as 
iconic (a problem noted by Wollheim at (loc cit.)). Still, this difficulty 
need not disturb us so long as we take it that the operative concept 
is subjective and can be distinguished from the standard examples of 
iconicity which, though also subjective, are partly explained by 
features objectively possessed by the material sign.
The question of whether or not a clear distinction can be drawn 
between subjective and "objective" iconicity need not preoccupy us at 
length. For there is a second difficulty attached to the application 
of the former to the perceptual basis either of linguistic or of 
physiognomic recognition. There is scope here for a phenomenotogioat 
controversy. I am not persuaded that sentences in our own language or 
familiar facial expressions do seem to match what they express in the 
way in which a rural scene or even a chromatic configuration might seem 
to match a mood. On the contrary, such correspondences seem to depend 
on a degree of unfamiliarity; to many English-speakers, for example, 
expressions of passion uttered in French simply sound more amorous than 
their English translations. I have no idea how to settle this contro­
versy.
5.2 These scruples do not require the withdrawal of the concept of 
appropriateness altogether, for the differences between the perception 
of correspondences and the perception of physiognomy are so phenomeno- 
logically subtle that, for all I know, there may be nothing correspond­
ing to them in many people’s experience. Whether or not this is so.
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the similarities far outweigh the contrasts. Physiognomic perception 
and the experience of correspondences are both forms of aspect-seeing 
or the kind of extended seeing-as which intrigued Wittgenstein 
((1953) Part II, Section XI). What we see things as sometimes depends 
on familiarity with what things which look that way actually are. It 
can be produced by an antecedently formed belief as well as contribut­
ing to the formation of new beliefs (cf. Wollheim (1980) pp. 220-1).
What initially appears to me as no more than a dull, red patch with a 
squarish shape will take on the appearance of a decrepit double-decker 
bus partly as I remember that such a vehicle has always been in that 
place. On other occasions, it is the operation of the imagination 
rather than memory or intellect that determines how things look.
Finally, Wittgenstein himself was struck by the way in which the seeing 
of aspects, like imagination, is to some extent subject to voluntary 
control ((loc cit.) p. 213). We can choose to see the duck-rabbit 
either as a representation of a duck or as of a rabbit.
Both physiognomic perception and the perception of correspond­
ences differ from the foregoing cases of aspect-seeing in two salient 
respects. First, Ishiguro has pointed out that not all seeing-as is 
subject to the influence of the will (Ishiguro (1969) p. 53). 
Physiognomic perception is plainly involuntary; we cannot help seeing 
a scowl as angry, a happy smile as happy (cf. Wollheim (1968) p. 61).
To some extent the same is true of linguistic understanding (cf. ibid.), 
and probably of correspondences. Those who merely affect a delicately 
tuned sensibility are, one suspects, incapable of seeing things in 
pleasingly affecting ways however hard they try to. Secondly, physio­
gnomic perception is, in addition to being involuntary, non-rational; 
it cannot be influenced by beliefs previously formed as a result of a 
process of induction, since the required generalisation cannot in the 
ordinary way be established. In this respect physiognomic perception 
is unlike unreflective linguistic competence. It is also unlike the 
experience of correspondences because the latter, while comparably 
non-rational, is so because it is irrational. There is no criterion 
of correctness applicable to the emotional light in which we perceive 
inanimate things.
10. Some philosophers are attracted by the possibility of elucidating 
seeing-as solely on the basis of imagination (eg. Warnock (1976) pp. 187f) 
But analyses of this kind cannot plausibly be extended to physiognomic 
perception.
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5.3 The combined effect of the involuntary and non-rational 
nature of physiognomic perception is to suggest that we look beyond 
the conscious operations of the mind for its explanation (cf. Ishiguro 
(1969) p. 53). When behaviour or cognitive states appear to be in­
voluntary or non-rational we tend to locate their causes outside the 
areas in which reasons are formed, or at least to hypothesise that 
there is some causal process of a more mechanistic than rational 
nature engaged. When, furthermore, the phenomenon under investigation 
is repeated in connection with several individuals, and when all those 
individuals are members of an antecedently identified class such as 
the human race, then there is a strong suggestion that the same 
mechanism is operative in each case. It is a part of human nature to 
perceive each other’s physiognomy in appropriate physiognomic ways.
Since the physiognomic perception of expressive behaviour is not 
explained either by ratiocination or learning, or by voluntary decision, 
or by the straightforward operation of the machinery of perception, 
the case for its innate determination, for ’innately acquired receptor 
mechanisms’ (Eible Eibesfeldt (1972) p. 306) merits serious attention.
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VII. NATURAL EXPRESSION
1. Justification of the subject-matter
1.1 The aim of this chapter is to develop some of the themes 
introduced in Chapter 6. In the last chapter discussion remained at 
a fairly conceptual level in the sense that while certain suggestions 
were put forward concerning the nature of the evidence required for 
the claim that a type of behaviour is innate, and in that sense, 
natural to humans, the justification for these, as yet rather tentative 
claims, depended on questions about what we would be inclined to say 
undçr certain hypothetical conditions. In this chapter I proceed to 
examine the way in which the issue of innateness might be settled in 
the light of data widely agreed to have been gathered by anthropologists, 
psychologists and ethologists.
Conceptually the contrast between conventional and natural forms 
of expressive behaviour is a legitimate one (cf. Alston (op cit.)).
One way of establishing the naturalness of much physiognomic expression, 
therefore, would be to demonstrate that it is not conventional. But 
this distinction needs to be decomposed. There are two necessary 
conditions of conventionality, both of which can be shown to be 
corollaries of Lewis’s (1968) definition of convention, and neither of 
which are met by physiognomic expression. It is not necessary to 
demonstrate the connection between these conditions and convention 
insofar as failure to meet them constitutes a sufficient ground for 
innateness. The conditions to which I allude are the following :
(a) Conventional regularities are culture-specific;
(b) Conventional regularities are regularities to which those 
who conform have learnt to conform.
The first point is more or less explicit in an analysis of the kind 
put forward by Lewis. It is a convention in a group, P, to behave in 
a certain way in certain circumstances, if members of P do behave in 
that way in those circumstances, and they do so because other members 
of P do so and because they are expected to do so by other members of 
P. This requires that members of P should be related to other members « 
of P in such a way as to explain the transmission of the disposition 
to conform to the convention. The nature of the relation which must 
therefore bind some members of P to some other members of P is captured
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in condition (b). Members of P learn to conform to conventional 
regularities from other members of P. The concept of a convention, 
therefore, is defined in part, by what I will call 'pedagogic 
transmission’. Pedagogic transmission cannot occur across cultural 
barriers where a barrier between a group P and a group P" is defined 
as cultural if it is a barrier to pedagogic transmission. In other 
words, such contacts as there are between members of P and members of 
F' are not such as to generate conformity in P to conventions which 
prevail in F'. The notions of a cultural barrier and pedagogic 
transmission are cognate.
Of course, both concepts are relative to a specific regularity 
under discussion. There may be certain conventions to which members 
of P, or of a sub-class of P, and members of P'', or a sub-class of F', 
are parties. For example, P and F' may have different languages but 
certain polite gestures in common. There can be international con­
ventions. But this will not, on the whole, seriously interfere with 
the bearing of species-wide regularities on the naturalness of 
expressive behaviour; in general the hypothesis of species-wide 
pedagogic transmission will be contrary to plausible historical 
generalisations about the degree of contact between cultures with 
shared behaviour patterns. International conventions are a compara­
tively recent phenomenon.
These remarks are sufficient to indicate why cross-cultural 
comparisons are thought to have a role in determining whether physio­
gnomic expression is natural or conventional. But the question is 
more fundamentally dependant upon ontogenetic considerations and the 
evidence of developmental psychology. At what age do physiognomic 
behaviour patterns begin to be exhibited? Ideally, as Birdwhistell 
((1971) p. 32) has suggested, comparisons should be carried out 
between rates of physiognomic development in different cultures. This 
ideal is also suggested by the conceptual requirements disclosed in 
the last chapter, but it appears that little has been achieved in the 
way of systematic research in this area. Still, some progress can be 
made by considering the relations of theoretical priority between 
the currently separate areas of developmental psychology and anthro­
pological research.
The aim of this chapter is to show that developmental 
psychology provides the fundamental determinants of ontogentic issues, 
especially the issue of whether there is any such thing as natural
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expression. I will then argue that in the light of evidence which 
is not actually disputed - though it is frequently neglected by those 
who, like structural anthropologists and psychological behaviourists, 
would promote relativist, learning theories of aVi behaviour - the 
case for natural expression is very strong. In one sense this order 
of priorities is obvious, but the links between developmental 
psychology and cross-cultural research are more intricate than a simple 
statement of priorities suggests. Cross-cultural comparisons are 
insufficient to determine the point at issue in certain obvious ways. 
First, where members of all cultures do behave in similar ways, there 
are possible explanations of this which avoid the attribution of innate 
capacities. There is the remote possibility of cross-cultural peda­
gogic transmission and also the possibility, recognised by modern 
universalists such as Ekman but ignored by Darwin of universal 
environmental conditions sufficient to justify the generalisation that 
members of all cultural groups team or are conditioned to behave in 
similar ways. Secondly, and this is crucial, the question of whether 
there are universal patterns of expressive behaviour should be under­
stood as follows : Is #-ing an expression of F-ness in every cultural 
group? I will argue that this question is hopelessly underdetermined 
by the data available to anthropologists if they proceed according to 
empiricist assumptions and refuse to take the data delivered by 
developmental psychology into account.
1.2 Before initiating the argument in detail, certain objections of 
a general nature must be answered. It may be doubted whether it is 
legitimate for philosophers to participate in a debate among social 
scientists. In doing so one renders oneself vulnerable to charges of 
"armchair psychology" or "armchair anthropology". There are various 
points to note here. First, it is curious that contemporary philoso­
phers tend to evince a certain reluctance to risk the first but not 
the second of these pitfalls. Philosophical discussion of language 
acquisition is often hedged about with apologies (eg. McDowell (1978) 
p. 128n), but not discussions of radical interpretation. The 
explanation of this lies, I think, in an instinctive assumption that 
philosophy is concerned with the order of justification while science, 
including the social sciences, and scientific methodology are concerned 
with the order of discovery (to adopt a distinction due to Santayana).
1. Darwin ((1965) p. 14f) and Ekman ((1973) p. 171).
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Thus philosophers of radical interpretation do not expect the pro­
cedures actually adopted by field lexicographers to reflect the form 
of their philosophical reflections. The latter are intended to 
exhibit the justification available for the interpretation of an alien 
language. But it is difficult to find a counterpart to this distinc­
tion applicable to language-acquisition. There is only the order in 
which the infant discovers his language and this, it is felt, must be 
a matter for empirical psychology.
However, the importance of scruples about armchair psychologis- 
ing can easily be exaggerated. Wittgenstein, Quine and Dummett, among 
others, cannot be criticised for their preoccupation with the 
acquisition of language for it is a serious requirement of philosophical 
theories about meaning that they should exhibit the conditions under 
which it is possible for a language to be learnt (cf. Wittgenstein 
(op cit.) §224). Indeed, questions about radical interpretation and 
questions about language-acquisition are widely supposed to have the 
same philosophical relevance. The verifiability of a theory of meaning 
and the discoverability (by the infant or the lexicographer) of the 
language for which it is true are taken to impose the same condition 
on the philosophy of language, namely that it should relate semantics 
to empirical observation. In fact, for reasons to emerge shortly, I 
believe this assimilation to be highly misleading. It is well worth 
distinguishing the empirical determination of meanings from the empiri­
cal determination of theories of meaning (cf. Fdllesdal (1975)); the 
former, but not the latter, may well admit imponderable evidence. 
Finally, whether or not such a distinction is accepted, too strict a 
prohibition of armchair psychology is likely to be taken as a license 
for social scientists to indulge in equally illicit, casual philoso­
phising in the field or laboratory. In practice, it may be impossible 
to fix with any precision the boundaries separating philosophy from 
one or other of the scientific disciplines, particularly where the 
social sciences are concerned. There are certain areas of overlap, 
including methodology and the interpretation of data. The arguments 
to follow touch on both of these areas which constitute the arena of 
the controversy which concerns us here. That controversy is not really 
empirical and, as intimated earlier, the stand taken here relies on 
empirical data only insofar as they are the subject of widespread 
consensus among social scientists interested in the topic. Thus 
Edmund Leach, a confirmed relativist, admits some universels and some
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innate contribution to the determination of facial expression 
(Leach (1972) p. 339). Ekman, on the other hand, committed as he is 
to the significance of innate determining factors, nevertheless 
acknowledges considerable cross-cultural variation (Ekman, eg. (1973, 
1980)).
1.3 Where §1.2 was concerned with the question of the philosopher’s 
right to participate in the debate over the innateness of facial 
expression, I turn now to the question of the philosopher’s duty to 
do so. To put the matter less moralistically; why should philosophers 
be interested in these topics? Again, apart from the obvious answer 
that any subject-matter offers some potential for philosophical debate, 
the question can be approached via reflections on the philosophy of 
radical interpretation. In Chapter 6 I assumed an analogy between 
radical interpretation and the ethnology of expressive behaviour. The 
latter simply is the radical interpretation of the expressive behaviour 
of culturally alien communities. This analogy underlies the possibility 
of making a detailed comparison of the procedures involved in each 
case. There are important contrasts. It also suggests that whatever 
philosophical benefits are to be obtained from radical interpretation 
of language are also to be found in a discussion of the radical inter­
pretation of non-verbal behaviour.
The second expectation is further encouraged by the connection,
alluded to in Chapter 1 §1.1, between the two kinds of interpretation.
This can plausibly be represented as a dependence of linguistic upon
pre-linguistic radical interpretation, acknowledgement of which is
implicit in philosophical theories of the former. This dependence is
two-fold. First, the interpretation of native utterances whose function
it is to ascribe psychological states either to the speaker or to
others will rely on the natural expressions of those psychological
states (cf. Chapter 6, §4.2). This matches Wittgenstein’s explicit
preoccupation with the natural expression of pain, though it is perhaps
inept to allow the expression of sensations as such; rather it is the
attitudes or emotions to which those sensations give rise which are
expressed. When we are in pain we express the suffering or distress
2
physical pain usually causes. Whatever view is taken on this point.
2. It is not entirely certain that pain is just a sensation rather 
than a complex syndrome which includes sensational and affective 
elements. Is the description of a masochist as one who engoys pain 
contradictory? (See Hare and Gardiner (1964)), Either way the
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it is a corollary of Wittgenstein's conception of natural expression 
as the criterion which determines the reference of psychological 
terms that the former is what we rely on in the radical interpre­
tation of the latter. . But this accounts only for a small portion 
of any language and it seems that the same straightforward link 
does not hold between non-verbal expressive behaviour and the central, 
assertoric part of language. There is no natural expression of 
belief.
However, Davidson relies on the possibility of discerning 
which sentences of his language the native speaker holds-true; Quine 
relies similarly on the interpreter's ability to recognise native 
signs of assent and dissent. Literally construed in terms of natural 
expression these assumptions appear somewhat suspect. It is by no 
means certain that there are universal (albeit imponderable) indi­
cations that speakers hold-true the sentences they utter. Certainly 
the tone of an utterance is no guide to the honesty or otherwise of 
utterances in a foreign language, though there may be subtle 
physiognomic clues discernible by a highly trained, sensitive observer. 
Even so, their reliability is surely doubtful. Furthermore, it is now
agreed among anthropologists that the non-verbal signs of assent and
3
dissent are culture-specific. The dependence of radical interpre­
tation upon natural expression with respect to the main body of an 
alien language will be less direct, more diffuse. The interpreter may 
be expected to rely upon native displays of congratulatory enthusiasm 
at his successes and exasperated frustration at his failure to grasp 
the meaning even of the simplest sentences. Highly relevant in this 
connection would be the 'eyebrow-flash' which, according to
2. continued
concept of the expression of pain should be understood in terms of the 
expression of a kind of distress if it is granted that emotions, but 
not sensations, can be expressed. This seems right intuitively, but 
the only defence of the claim with which I am familiar strikes me as 
unsatisfactory (Tormey (1971) Chapter 1). The argument makes 
intensionality of the expressandum a necessary condition of its 
expressibility (see, also, Danto ((1976) Chapter 6). This appears to 
be ad hoc at best, and does not obviously succeed in excluding sensa­
tion. Underlying this restriction is the thesis, due to Brentano, that 
intensionality is the universal characteristic of the mental. But what 
are sensations if not mental?
3. From Darwin until the middle of this century the opposite seems to 
have been assumed. But the culture-specificity of assent and dissent 
is one of the few uncontroversial claims for relativity made in the 
notorious article by Weston LaBarre (1947).
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Eible Eibesfeldt ((1972) p. 300), may well be a natural and universal 
physiognomic sign if sufficient latitude is granted in its interpre­
tation. As Eible-Eibesfeldt puts it, the eye-brow flash expresses a 
'Yes to social contact', which ranges over approval, consent, assent, 
greeting, etc..
Whether or not it is accepted that radical interpretation 
cannot get under way without some support from the natural expressive 
behaviour of native speakers, it is surely indisputable that certain 
broader philosophical interests may be served by a theory of the latter 
We rely on physiognomic evidence in seeking access to the affective 
facts about other people. This is so particularly when we are not in 
a position to assess or to trust their linguistic behaviour. The 
ethnologist, as he initiates his investigations, seems forced to trust 
his own physiognomic perceptions of native behaviour. The infantile 
language learner is in a comparable predicament. He will be in no 
position to appraise the success or failure of his first, tentative 
attempts at speech unless he can recognise his parents' smiles as 
expressive of approval, their sighs of dismay as he persists in mis­
applying his rudimentary vocabulary. Even as adults we are prone to 
give credence to the physiognomy of an interlocutor in preference to 
the words he utters partly on the assumption that the former is less 
subordinate to voluntary control than the latter, an assumption which, 
as we become more sophisticated, we learn to qualify. It seems un­
likely, furthermore, that a theory of action will render natural 
expression superfluous in this connection. Actions do not speak 
louder than words; they do not speak at all. Ordinary functional 
behaviour does not deliver up the secrets of its motivation, actual or 
feigned, to a casual glance as physiognomic behaviour does. On the 
contrary, it is quite probable that in starting out to explain the 
actions of unfamiliar agents in unfamiliar contexts we will be bound 
to scrutinise any associated physiognomic appearances. Certainly, 
human-beings are intelligible to each other only through their 
behaviour. My suggestion is that even if one denies that all pyscho- 
logical revelation ultimately depends upon natural expression, the 
latter is fundamental at least in the sense that it is more readily 
intelligible than any other kind of behaviour.
These reflections were introduced primarily to weaken the 
resistance which might be met by the following philosophical contri­
bution to a debate which at first sight appears to be conspicuously
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unphilosophical. But they serve also as a partial justification of 
the entire essay.
2. Is any expressive behaviour universal?
2.1 It is important to stress that our concern is with the question 
in the rubric and not ultimately with questions such as the following : 
are there any types of situations which are such that members of all 
cultural groups exhibit the same type of behaviour in them? Undoubted­
ly the two questions are related, but the first is not reducible to 
the second. Nevertheless, the second question has been thought to 
capture the whole empirical content of the first. There are, moreover, 
strong methodological grounds favouring a reduction. Since emotions 
cannot be observed independently of the behaviour in which they are 
expressed, we can observe only the expressive behaviour itself and 
correlate it with situations classified according to observational 
criteria. This is the procedure adopted by Birdwhistell ((1971) p. 31). 
I will argue that the classical empiricist who enters the field with­
out presuppositions must remain impotent to form a theory of the 
expressive behaviour of the subjects of his investigation.
The problem is that there are three elements to be correlated 
and they possess a disconcerting potential for independent variation. 
Reductive programmes aside, we need a theory capable of correlating 
expressive behaviour, emotions and eliciting situations. Let us 
suppose that the prospective ethnologist knows of some observable type 
of behaviour, ie. of some bodily movement, (j), that he and his neigh­
bours at home cf) only when they are F, and they are F only in eliciting 
situations of some observable kind, E. We will waive for the time 
being the extraordinary implausibility of the assumption that the 
expressive type of behaviour can be described purely in terms of bodily 
movements and that the relevant situations can be specified without 
allusion to the kind of emotion to which they give rise. Let us now 
suppose that the ethnologist discovers that members of an alien popu­
lation, P, (f) only in an altogether different kind of situation, E',
In E-situations they do not noticeably do anything at all, or they 
exhibit some other type of behaviour, ip, which is such that the 
ethnologist and his neighbours ip not when they are F but only when 
they are F'. There are three theories available to the ethnologist 
to account for <|)-ing in P. All the theories are perfectly compatible 
with all the observable evidence :
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0i : Members of P express F-ness by cf)-ing, but tend not to
feel F in E-situations; on the contrary, they are F^ in 
E-situations and they express their F^-ness, like the 
ethnologist, by ip-ing.
0ii : Members of P express F-ness by cf)-ing and they are F in 
E-situations but they refrain from expressing F-ness 
especially in E-situations (and esneciallyby (f>-ing) , 
where they often feign F^-ness by i|;-ing.
0iii : Members of P do not express F-ness by ^-ing, and when they 
are F, as indeed they are in E-situations, they express 
their F-ness by jp-ing.
The cultural relativist with respect to facial expression who insists, 
like Birdwhistell, that his theory is based on empirical evidence in 
a way that Darwinism (universalism) is not, commits one or both of 
two fallacies. Following the psychologist, Paul Ekman's usage, we can 
designate them as the 'display rule pitfall' and the 'elicitor pitfall' 
(Ekman (1980) pp. 90-91). The relativist who infers 0iii from the 
absence of correlation between <f)-ing and F-ness and the presence of 
correlation between ip-ing and F-ness ignores 0i and 0ii which, so far, 
have equal empirical justification (or lack of it). He thus falls 
into the elicitor pitfall and the display rule pitfall respectively.
2.2 These points will benefit from being spelled out in more con­
crete detail. First the elicitor pitfall. The fallacy involved might 
be summarised as follows : the cultural relativist with respect to 
the expressive "meaning" of behaviour is a universalist with respect 
to the emotions elicited by various kinds of situation (cf. Ekman 
(1980) p. 90). He assumes that a certain class of E-situations elicits 
the same kind of emotion in people the world over. Given this assump­
tion, it follows that if members of different cultural groups behave 
differently in similar E-situations then (but for the conventional 
interference of display rules etc.), they express similar emotions in 
different ways. However, the initial assumption of the behavioural 
relativist - psychological universalism - has no more empirical justi­
fication than the assumption that these are universal expressive 
behaviour patterns. Indeed, the former assumption is highly implausible 
in certain cases; humour, for example, is probably subject to a high 
degree of cultural variation; we can be more or less certain that 
members of different classes within just one community will not always
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be amused by the same material, ^ ' The problem for the psychological 
universalist/behavioural relativist is compounded by the enormous 
difficulty of specifying the relevant kinds of E-situations without 
alluding to their capacity to elicit some emotion. This, too, is 
clearly exhibited in the example of humour. Whether or not humour is 
subject to cultural determination, the situations which stimulate it 
plainly do not share any "observable" properties even within the confines 
of our own community. Indeed, it is far from obvious that amusing 
situations share any properties at all other than that of being funny; 
witness the disastrously limited scope of the purportedly general analyses 
put forward by Bergson (1911) and Freud (1905).
The display rule problem is equally clear intuitively, although 
considerable philosophical ingenuity may be required to render it 
thoroughly lucid. We need something like the distinction, by now 
familiar, between rules or conventions which are merely regulative and 
those which are constitutive (cf. Rawls (1955), Schwayder (1965) p. 287, 
Searle (1964)). At this point I can offer only a brief and in some ways 
unsatisfactory account of the distinction insofar as it bears on the 
issues at hand. To begin with, the distinction rests upon a general 
distinction between classes and kinds or types of action and is, therefore, 
unacceptable to those who refuse to countenance unreduced intensionality 
in philosophical analyses. Initially, the concept of a convention is 
defined on the basis of a contrast between the conditions responsible for 
the origin and the preservation of different behavioural regularities.
The notion of a regularity in behaviour is worked out in terms of a 
correlation between ways of behaving and repeatable objective situations 
originally construed by Lewis (1968) as games of pure conflict or, more 
importantly, of coordination.  ^ So far, then, the concept of a convention 
requires only the perfectly extensional notion of a correlation between 
members of a class of behaviour and members of a class of situation. No 
mention is made of the possibility that ....
4. In this case the larger community, eg. the British, would be 
identifiable by means of various criteria such as the existence of a 
shared language, geographical and historical continuity, ètc., but 
not, of course, by reference to a shared propensity for laughter.
5. I am not sure whether the game-theoretical model can plausibly be 
applied in any detail to all conventional regularities. It is often 
not clear what specific 'intevest is served by coordination beyond some 
shared, inexplicable interest in conformity.
155
semantically non-equivalent descriptions may be true of all and only 
members of the relevant behavioural class. But at least two 
descriptions will be true of all members of a class of expressive 
behaviour; each member of it will be a ^-ing and an expression of 
F-ness. Recognition of this will allow us to distinguish con­
ventional behaviour from behaviour which is natural but subject to 
conventional modification. It is worth noting in this connection 
that Schwayder scorns the epithet 'natural’ as a means of character­
ising non-conventional types of behaviour on the ground that language
is conventional but at the same time linguistic behaviour is natural
for human beings ((op cit.) p. 284). Again, this confuses levels of 
description. It is natural to say that p when p is the case and 
certain other conditions are met, but it is the linguistic conventions 
which prevail in a particular community which enable one to say that 
p by uttering a sentence in the language of the community. For 
similar reasons the conventionality of an expressive action type is 
determined by what the conventions which regulate it "stipulate".
More precisely, it is determined by the concepts under which the 
relevant correlation is subsumed. There is a difference between the 
following claims :
(i) Members of P cf) in E-situations
(ii) Members of P express F-ness in E-situations.
Accordingly, there is a difference between claiming that a convention 
is in force to which one conforms if and only if one expresses F-ness 
by (f)-ing (in E-situations) , and claiming that a convention is in force 
to which one conforms if and only if one expresses (or refrains from 
expressing) F-ness in E-situations. A constitutive rule or convention 
is one knowledge of which is necessary for knowing how to express a 
certain kind of emotion (cp. Schwayder (op cit.) p. 187). A 
regulative convention or display rule is one knowledge of which is 
necessary for knowing when to express a certain kind of emotion.
If the foregoing distinction, or something like it, is sound, 
then the following passage is, but for certain obvious equivocations.
6. Of course this need not strictly be true if there are cases like 
those admitted in Chapter 6 where tf)-ing may be an expression of 
different kinds of emotion and F-ness may be expressible in different 
ways. However, it is safe to ignore physiognomic ambiguity and 
synonymy at this point because certain display-rules are applicable 
only to specific ways of expressing the kind of emotion in question 




There is clinical and anecdotal evidence that, at least in 
Western cultures, children must learn to smile in appropriate 
situations. That is, they must learn how and when to smile 
... ' (Birdwhistell (1971) p. 32)
In fact the first statement is almost certainly false for many
situations in which it is appropriate to smile (references are supplied 
later); but even if it were true, it would not justify the statement 
that children must learn hcno to smile. The distinction between 
behavioural regularities the explanation of which involves mentioning 
conventions or rules only regulatively and not constitutively is best 
illustrated by example. There is ample evidence of variations in the 
behaviour of different communities at funerals (see, eg. Leach (1972) 
p. 331-2). But now, if we find that members of a group, P, tend to 
smile and laugh at the funerals of those to whom they have been 
attached, while it would be absurdly naive to infer that members of P 
are shockingly callous in the face of death, it would be little better 
to infer that their way of expressing the misery of bereavement is 
by laughing. Ignoring the fact that in the light of many religious 
beliefs the death of a loved one should be taken as an occasion for 
rejoicing, we would be inclined to explain the discrepency between 
the behaviour with which we are familiar and that of members of P on
the basis of a display rule prohibiting the overt display of sadness
and enjoining its dissimulation by means of apparent jubilation.
This interpretation receives added confirmation where, as in Leach's 
(loc cit.) example, the conventions appear to operate selectively ;
the requirement to refrain from crying is, in our 
home culture, more rigorously imposed on men than on women.
2.3 The thoroughly emp'tr'icdl observer apparently faces an impasse. 
The evidence will not permit him to choose between the theories out­
lined above. There is, furthermore, no reason to suppose that he 
could improve matters by considering the entire expressive repertoire 
of the people whose behaviour he is investigating. It is conceivable 
that a display rule might be in force which prohibited any revelation 
of a certain kind of emotion under any circumstances which actually 
elicit it. In practice, however, even fairly radical empiricists 
will permit the ethnological observer to enter the field with a hand­
ful of presuppositions about human nature, a certain amount of 
irrepressible 'animal faith' which will enable him to pick out certain
157
situations as elicitors of certain basic emotions. In the spirit 
of animal faith, then, the investigator might be permitted to assume 
that all human subjects experience intense fear when faced with the 
plain prospect of imminent violent death. Reduced to its consti­
tutive elements the assumption includes seemingly legitimate 
presuppositions about the proper functioning of the subject's 
sensory equipment, a modicum of intelligence sufficient for the 
anticipation of events in the short-term future and a totally 
earnest and urgent desire for self-preservation. Preconceptions of 
this kind will enable the investigator to sidestep the elicitor 
pitfall, although it must be recognised that plausible preconceptions 
will not always be ready to hand and that so far we have no way of 
distinguishing genuine animal faith from theoretical prejudice, the 
propositionswe are bound to believe because we are human from the
propositions we are bound to believe because we are, say, structuralists.
Even if this manoeuvre is allowed, the investigator has still 
found no way of circumventing the potentially deceptive influence of 
display-rules which may or may not prevail. He may attempt to 
rectify this by arguing that certain emotions, fear of death for example, 
are too powerful to be inhibited for the sake of some convention. It 
is these emotions through which he can effect an initial, tentative 
foray into the affectivity of his alien subjects. However, this is 
not obviously true. In Th,e Gattia Vavs Julius Caesar expressed
admiration for those of his legionaries who continued to wear an
expression of stern ferocity even in death. Our investigator, however, 
confronted by the same phenomenon, would be obliged to suppose that 
what looked to him like ferocity was for the Romans an expression of 
fear. It seems that he, had he been a contemporary but not a com­
patriot of Caesar's, would have been unable to translate certain 
passages in The Gallic Tars^
Still, at this point the ethnologist may adopt a strategy 
currently available to uncompromising empiricists. Rather than attempt 
to cope with the display-rule problem or the elicitor problem singly, 
he will note the possibility of alternative interpretations of Caesar's 
respect for the appearance of his late subordinates. Does Caesar 
admire the corpses' physiognomy on the ground that it conceals the 
terror felt at, or immediately prior to the moment of death, or does 
he admire it on the ground that it indicates that the corpses' late 
owners suppressed even the feeling of fear under naturally frightening
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circumstances? There is an indeterminacy here which matches an 
indeterminacy arguably inherent in the concept of courage which can 
be understood indifferently as the ability to inhibit the manifesta­
tion of fear or the ability to suppress the fear itself. Accordingly 
the cultural relativist might counter the accusation that he ignores 
6i and 0ii by repeating the anti-realist slogan : there is no fact of 
the matter. There is no way of determining which of the two fallacies 
he has relevantly committed or which of the two theories he ignores 
might be true.
By the same reasoning 0iii, the relativist position, is in­
distinguishable empirically from 0i and 0ii. This appears to undermine 
the very terms of the controversy between relativism and universalism, 
thereby supporting neither theory. But this appearance is misleading. 
The relativist who appeals to anti-realism with respect to the emotions 
felt by members of alien cultures and indeterminacy with respect to 
the expressive meaning of their behaviour is not committed to 0iii.
He is committed only to verifiable (and often verified) propositions of 
the form : members of P do not cj) in E-situations. This proposition is 
an element in each of 0i-iii, but the relativist goes on to say that 
the further elements in each theory are undecidable in principle, and 
should, therefore, be relinquished. There is no further question 
about whether members of P feel F in E-situations and whether #-ing is 
an expression of F-ness. F-ness just is what people feel and what is 
expressed in their expressive behaviour in E-situations. Empiricsm 
leads, via anti-realism, to a 'form of behaviourism’  ^which will 
justify relativism if it is found that the correlation between expres­
sive behaviour and stimuli varies between cultures.
2.4 This line of argument is vulnerable to several objections which 
I will review briefly. First, it is far from certain that the anti­
realist approach outlined above really succeeds in eliminating all 
non-empirical material. There remains the outstanding and seemingly 
intractable question of how to classify the token-actions and individual 
E-situations to be correlated. How can we determine when a native is
7. See McDowell ((1978) p. 130). McDowell imputes a 'form of be­
haviourism' which is distinct from 'crude reductionism' to Dummett.
I cannot consider the possible difference between reductive and anti­
realist behaviourism here, but perhaps it is possible to distinguish 
methodological from conceptual behaviourism, in which case our relati­
vist can be represented as committed to the former like Birdwhistell.
I suspect, however, that the theoretical import of such distinctions is 
negligible.
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^-ing, when, that is, he is performing what other natives would regard 
as a token of (p? The problem arises in part because of the inelimin- 
able vagueness of any non-physiognomic description true of every 
token of a physiognomic kind of behaviour (cf. Chapter 5, §5.1). The 
interpreter cannot be sure that any vagueness in his own classification 
will be matched by the vagueness of the native classifications. As 
regards the relevant E-situations, we have already noted the absence 
of any guarantee that their classification will be determined by 
features accessible to the interpreter. This difficulty is compounded 
by the probability of internal sub-classifications of E-situations. 
Pleasure, for example, may be induced by the spectacle of misfortune 
or the sight of a friend. In each case it may be physiognomically 
exhibited in similar ways; would it follow from this that smiling or 
laughter sometimes express hostility and sometimes friendliness?
Surely one would be more inclined to say that smiling is generally 
caused by pleasure while pleasure can be stimulated by very different 
kinds of situations. In general, behaviourism of any kind will never 
be fully vindicated until it can register highly subtle psychological 
distinctions on the one hand, and the classifications delivered by our 
intuitive affective taxonomies on the other, as differences in 
behaviour. It is unlikely ever to meet this requirement.
Finally, the relativist who rests his case on the indeterminacy 
of meaning is faced with a problem which also faces Quine : under what 
conditions does underdetermination constitute indeterminacy? For the 
theory of nature is admitted by many, including Quine, to be evidenti­
ally underdetermined. Indeterminacy, however, allegedly applies only 
to the theory of meaning (cf. Hookway (1978) pp. 17-43). I do not 
propose to tackle this question, but one point is obvious. Under­
determination, though not sufficient, is a necessary condition of 
indeterminacy. Accordingly, any proponent of indeterminacy in whatever 
area must supply an assurance that he has considered all the relevant 
evidence. The relativist in the present debate certainly has not done 
so.
3. Inter- and intra-cultural interpretation
3.1 In earlier chapters I stressed the conceptual importance of 
the relation between interpretation and expression. This suggests that 
the crucial determinant of the issue of universality will be evidence 
which tends to establish not correlations between behaviour and emotions
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in different cultures but whether or not a particular type of 
behaviour is interpreted in the same way within all cultures and 
between them. Both Ekman ((1973) pp. 191f) and Birdwhistell ((1971) 
p. 31, quoted below) agree on the importance of this aspect of the 
problem. There are two ways in which a consideration of interpre­
tation across cultures may support or fail to support the statement 
that ^-ing is universally an expression of F-ness.
(a) If it can be established that for some human population,
P, members of P interpret each others’ ^-ings as expressions of F-ness, 
then this will provide substantial (though strictly incomplete) support 
for the claim that #-ing is an expression of F-ness in P. If the same 
premiss can be established for all or most other human populations, 
then the claim that cj)-ing is universally an expression of F-ness is 
more or less justified. If, on the other hand, the way <j)-ings are 
interpreted in P does not correspond to the way they are interpreted 
in any other population, then relativism is conclusively justified 
insofar as it is reducible to the denial of universalism.
(b) If it can be established that for any two human popu­
lations, P and P'f between which pedagogic transmission of sufficient 
intensity has not taken place, members of P and P' interpret (j)-ings as 
expressions of F-ness then this entails universalism with
respect to cj)-ing as an expression of F-ness.
However, it is difficult to see how either sort of information 
could be accessible to an investigator who did not already possess 
considerable knowledge of the beliefs, values and language of the 
cultural groups being studied. If, therefore, we treat evidence 
relating to interpretation as fundamental to the question of universa­
lity with respect to expressive behaviour we will be forced to abandon 
the earlier proposal to accord absolute priority to physiognomic 
expression in the order of ethnological discovery. It is obvious why 
this should be so. Lacking any other information about the cultural 
group in question, the only clue to their interpretation of expressive 
behaviour will be the behaviour it elicits from them in response.
The simplest case will be that of reciprocation. But suppose it is 
found that members of P  ^ in response to ^-ings by other members of P 
and the same holds for P'. This would be compatible with statements 
like the following : members of P express hostility by ^-ing and they 
tend to reciprocate with equal hostility while members of P^ express 
friendliness by #-ing and they tend to reciprocate each others’
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friendliness in kind.
Inter-cultural interpretation is no better off in this respect 
than intra-cultural interpretation. - Consider the following anecdotalg
example. Visitors to the South-West of France find that if they 
greet the inhabitants of small villages in the area by smiling, their 
smiles will be interpreted as expressive of aggression or contempt. 
Paradoxically, if we assume no linguistic evidence or acquaintance 
with prevailing attitudes in French rural communities, then the 
possibility of making this relativistic discovery presupposes the 
universality of other kinds of physiognomic behaviour. We can rely 
only on the way in which natives reciprocate when smiled at by visitors 
Presumably what indicates to the visitor that the local inhabitants 
construe his smiling under an offensive light will be that they 
respond with an air of surly hostility. Consequently, the relativistic 
hypothesis about smiling is supported, if at all, by evidence which 
presupposes the universality, ie. the universal or inter-cultural 
interpretability, of physiognomic expressions of hostility.
3.2 It is unnecessary, however, to insist on the exclusion of
linguistic evidence at this point in the argument. Verbal testimonies
supplied by subjects in response to photographs or sketches presented
to them, or their commentary on the behaviour of their neighbours may
count for or against cultural relativity and thus retrospectively bear
upon the way in which the behaviour of the same subjects initially
came to be understood and prescriptively upon the methods to be adopted
9in future investigations of totally alien cultures. Thus the 
relevance of Birdwhistell’s observations of variation within the United 
States, a homogenous lingui-stia community, may be conceded.
In one part of the country, an unsmiling individual might be 
queried as to whether he was "angry about something", while in 
another, the smiling individual might be asked, "What’s funny?". 
(Birdwhistell (op cit.) p. 31)
Observations of this kind, however, offer only inconclusive support to
relativism. There are several psychological variables to be taken into
account which complicate matters considerably. The compexities thus
8. Suggested to me by Mark Sainsbury.
9. Birdwhistell finds the evidence supplied by such methods indeter­
minate (except where it seems to support the relativism to which he is 
committed). See Birdwhistell ((op cit.) p. 32). For a different view, 
see eg. Ekman ((1973) pp. 191f), Ekman, Friesen and Ellsworth ((1972) 
chapters XIII-XIX), Eible Eibesfeldt (op cit.).
162
introduced may be appealed to by the universalist at least in 
defending the enduring -possibitity of his theory against the more 
facile arguments of the relativists (exemplified in an extreme form 
by LaBarre (op cit.)). In some cases the attempt to make sense of 
these complexities will sometimes seem to give positive support to 
the universalist case.
In this connection it will be convenient to revert to the 
notion of emotional taxonomy mentioned earlier. The classification 
of emotions is to some extent apriori and certain disagreements among 
anthropologists can be traced to diverging intuitions about these 
classifications. Thus Birdwhistell (loc cit.) criticises a universa­
list strategy which may be adopted to cope with observations of the 
kind quoted, on the ground that it appeals to an implausibly ’elastic’ 
conception of pleasure (cp. Eible Eibesfeldt’s general ’Yes to social 
contact’ quoted earlier) capable of being associated with such 
divergent attitudes as humour, ridicule, friendliness, hostility, etc. 
To some extent, as noted in Chapter 6, controversies of this order 
cannot be settled with any confidence. However, the issue is not 
simply a matter of how far particular emotional concepts can be 
stretched before they are deprived of meaning altogether. Clearly 
there can be no satisfactory answer to questions about which emotions 
are species of which. But there are apriori links between different 
emotional concepts which cannot be ignored. These connections are 
not merely taxonomic, but explanatory. Let us take a rudimentary 
example. The concept of pleasure is essentially bound up with the 
notion of gratification and there plainly are indefinitely many kinds 
of gratification. Two plausible apriori schemata involving pleasure, 
some other attitude and a kind of eliciting situation are the 
following. Hostility involves a tendency to feel pleasure at the 
spectacle of misfortune befalling the object of hostility. Friendli­
ness involves a tendency to feel pleasure at the advantages accruing 
to the friend. Accordingly, observations to the effect that smiling 
is sometimes associated with hostility, sometimes with friendliness, 
that smiles sometimes accompany apologies and sometimes insults, have 
no bearing on the question of whether or not smiling is a universal 
expression of pleasure. The same applies to variations in interpre­
tations of smiling by members of different cultural groups which may 
well be determined by which of the possible apriori schemes is stressed 
in the group and the hypotheses members of the group tend to form in 
advance about the attitudes of strangers.
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3.3 The failure to acknowledge the conceptual relations between 
different emotions, or emotions and attitudes, is connected with a 
tendency to neglect differences between interpretation (or under­
standing) and the formation of explanatory hypotheses, between first 
and second order interpretation, and even between interpretation and 
moral evaluation. The first and second mentioned differences are not 
themselves sharply distinguishable in practice. This is not important, 
however, since it is often clear that the apparent plausibility of a 
conclusion is based on neglect of one of them, even when it is not 
clear which. The distinction between first and second order inter­
pretation is most easily grasped in relation to language. Let us 
assume that the first order interpretation of a language, L, is 
successful when we have a theory of truth for the sentences of L.
The truth theory includes a standard theorem of the form : T(o) p. 
But it turns out that L-speakers sometimes utter tokens of a in order 
to communicate that q. Furthermore, we have reason to believe the 
following counterfactual ; If it were not the case that T(a) p in L,
then L-speakers would be unable to communicate that q by uttering
tokens of a. If these conditions hold, and if they capture our 
reasons for interpreting some token utterances of a as acts of
communicating that q, then this interpretation is second order in the
sense that it presupposes the first order interpretation which yielded 
the truth theorem for the type, a. Of course this is a highly abstract 
characterisation of second order interpretation; it is intended to 
accommodate the interpretation of various non-literal speech-acts 
involving metaphor, irony, various kinds of conversational implicature 
and so on.
There is every reason to suppose that an analogous distinction 
can be made out for non-linguistic expressive behaviour. The only 
constraint on the analogy is that noted in Chapter 6, §2.1 where the 
possibility was admitted that T(a) p could be true for L on 
structural grounds even though L-speakers always used a to communi­
cate that q, never to communicate that p. The universalist, then,', 
could appeal to the distinction in order to justify the following 
possibility, ignored by relativists. Members of all human communi­
ties recognise a first order interpretation of <j)-ing as expressive of 
F-ness, but members of one group, P, recognise a second order inter­
pretation of #-ing as expressive of F '-ness while members of another 
group,?', recognise a second order interpretation of #-ing as
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expressive of F*-ness. 'Fx' does not entail ’F'x’ or ’F*x’ (or 
'F'x or F*x'). Furthermore, ’F'x’ and ’F*x’ cannot both be true.
But, (j)-tokens are interpretable as expressive either of F'-ness or 
of F*-ness only in virtue of a shared antecedent interpretation of 
^-ing as expressive of F-ness.
For example, a certain facial configuration may be taken by us
as an expression of easy-going bonhomie. When we try out the same
physiognomic expression on members of an alien community, they take
it as expressive of disrespect. Birdwhistell, Leach (1972) and 
others will often argue for relativistic conclusions on the basis of 
just this kind of discrepancy. But prima facie it is just as plausible 
to maintain that members of the alien community recognise the facial 
configuration as expressive of relaxed bonhomie and regard such 
behaviour in a stranger as a slur on their dignity.
Further indeterminacies are introduced by the distinctions 
between interpretation and explanation and moral evaluation. Thus, 
should an ethnologist laugh in the presence of a native spectator, 
the latter may believe the ethnologist to be friendly or he may 
believe him to be hostile. Both explanations are compatible with a 
native interpretation of laughter as expressive of amusement, but 
laughing at someone may be a result of a basically hostile attitude, 
while laughing with someone suggests solidarity. Whichever explana­
tion the native thinks is true, it will be based in a first order 
interpretation which he shares with the ethnologist.
Exactly the same argument can be used to block inferences 
from discrepancies in evaluation to discrepancies in interpretation. 
Again, evaluative discrepancies often presuppose constancy of inter­
pretation. Where two audiences recognise the "message" conveyed, one 
may disapprove either of the "message" itself or of the particular 
medium adopted while the other accepts the behaviour in question 
without moral judgement. The discrepancy in evaluation would be a 
result of discrepancies in the display rules acknowledged by the
10. A striking example of this kind of confusion is exhibited by 
Leach ((op cit.) p. 324). Leach contrasts the different views of 
Catholicism held by a Catholic priest and a psychoanalyst, among 
others. But the psychoanalyst is interested in explaining belief in 
Roman Catholicism in terms, perhaps, of mass neurosis. To do this 
he must first establish what those beliefs are which he can only do 





3.4 Finally, before proceeding to the last, positive phase of the 
argument, a particularly disingenuous manoeuvre, common among cultural 
relativists, should be noted. The basic argument of the relativist 
runs as follows :
(i) (f)-ing is an expression of F-ness in P
(ii) (p-ing is an expression of F'-ness in P'
(j)-ing is not universally an expression either of F-ness 
or of F '-ness.
But in many cases this form of argument represents as inter—outturat 
variationswhich are in fact intra-cultural, ^-ing may be an expression 
of F-ness and F '-ness in all of the cultural groups compared. This 
fallacy is implicit in the passage quoted from Birdwhistell at the 
beginning of this section. If his observation is to have any weight,
he must also show that in some groups smiling is never an expression
of amusement. The same objection applies to LaBarre's (op cit.) 
observation that in some cultures tongue-protrusions are regarded as 
erotic gestures while in Western European cultures they are considered 
to be slightly offensive ('mischievous’ might be a better description). 
As an argument for relativism with respect to the expressive properties 
of tongue-protrusions this fails for two reasons. First, it is 
vitiated by an intolerable vagueness of description : erotic tongue- 
protrusions are morphologically distinct from mischievous ones. 
Secondly, within Western Europe, tongue-protrusion is sometimes erotic 
and sometimes mischievous.
Anticipating this kind of criticism, Birdwhistell ((op cit.) 
p. 33) finds himself forced to concede that there is no evidence of 
cultural communities whose members never smile in situations which we 
would regard as appropriate elicitors (cp. Leach (op cit.) p. 339).
But if there is no such evidence, then there is no evidence for 
relativism as opposed to universalism. The latter theory asserts just 
that some forms of expressive behaviour are universal.
11. Leach again supplies an illustration of this kind of confusion. 
At op cit. p. 319 he offers as an example of the ’context-dependency’ 
of conventional symbols the case of a woman dressed and adorned in 
such a way as to look smart to some and ridiculous to others.
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4. The innateness of physiognomy
4.1 Ethnology cannot provide evidence for or against theories of 
the ontogeny of behaviour. This is so partly for reasons adverted 
to in passing at the beginning of this chapter. #-ing may be 
universally an expression of F-ness and yet be learnt because of the 
possibility of pedagogic transmission between cultures or common 
environmental features relevant to learning (though it is unclear 
what the latter could be in the case of expressive behaviour).
Again, in principle (j)-ing might be expressive of F-ness only in one 
or two cultures and yet be transmitted through inheritance if those 
cultures were in some sense "racially" distinct. Admittedly, neither 
of these suggestions is very plausible. Universality would strongly 
suggest that the behaviour pattern in question is innate given the 
difficulty of specifying environmental factors which do not themselves 
include the expressive behaviour of adults and the improbability of 
sufficiently widespread pedagogic transmission. Much more damaging to 
the attempt to argue from ethnological premisses to ontogenetic 
conclusions is the impossibility of determining the truth-value of the 
said premisses by means of ethnological comparisons alone. I propose 
now to consider the prospects for a move in the opposite direction, 
ie. from ontogenetic premisses established by clinical methods, to 
ethnological conclusions. It seems to me that this procedure is more 
promising. First, if it can be established that a behaviour pattern 
is innate - ie. not learnt - then there is good reason to expect it to 
be repeated throughout the species where this cannot be decided by 
other means. Likewise, if the behaviour is found to be learnt then
we would not expect it to be universal. Even if these inferences are 
doubted - they plainly are not fool-proof - the issue which primarily 
interests me is ontogenetic, and this, in the light of the previous 
arguments, is not best approached via ethnology. In the area of 
developmental psychology there is, of course, evidential under­
determination but not to the same degree as in ethnology. I will 
argue that in the light of the available evidence there is at least 
a persuasive hypothetico-deductive argument for innateness.
4.2 The strategy followed here will be analogous to some extent to 
that adopted for the appraisal of a classical empiricist approach to 
the ethnology of behaviour. The analogy to be pursued is not between 
the attitudes of the ethnologist and that of the developmental 
psychologist, but between the attitude of the former and the primitive
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cognitive condition of the infant on entering the world. Just as 
the empiricist who enters the field of ethnological investigation 
entirely without assumptions about physiognomic behaviour cannot 
begin to verify one or other of the theories considered previously, 
so the infant whose mind is ’a perfect and absolute blank’ cannot 
begin to learn how to behave or how to interpret the behaviour of 
others. Indeed, the empiricist aspires to a condition of innocence, 
as conceived by the behaviourism of Watson and his followers, free 
from preconceptions and predispositions. The methodology of the 
empiricist reflects the theory of the behaviourist. Against this,
I will argue that the infant must be equipped from the outset with 
a capacity for correct physiognomic perception and appropriate 
expressive behaviour. Without these initial advantages, it would be, 
if not impossible, at least extremely difficult to learn how to inter­
pret correctly and perform appropriately. It is worth reiterating, 
however, that no conceptual abilities are imputed to the neonate .
The psychological behaviourist, then, requires the infant to 
discover his own physiognomic repertoire and the significance of the 
physiognomies in his environment. How might he achieve this, and what 
evidence would determine whether or not he had done so? Starting with 
performance it might be suggested that the infant learns to exhibit 
expressive behaviour in appropriate situations by imitating the 
behaviour of adults in situations of that kind. In order to do this 
the infant must learn to distinguish appropriate from inappropriate 
situations. It is not clear how this would be achieved. One sugges­
tion would be that the infant learns to exhibit appropriate expressive 
behaviour in those situations which stimulate in him the emotion 
expressed. But there is no guarantee that a given situation will 
induce similar emotions in the infant and in the adults he is supposed 
to imitate. A second problem is this. How is the infant to appraise 
the success of his attempts at imitation? Presumably some kind of 
reinforcement mechanism has to come into play. However, there is no
evidence that physiognomic failure invites punishment or that physio-
12gnomic success invites reward. Rather, the infant would have to
12. Admittedly crying is sometimes regarded as a device for attracting 
sympathetic attention. In this way it is actually rewarded, but crying 
offers no support to the behaviourist. It occurs in most cases imme­
diately after birth and regularly thereafter (see Charlesworth and 
Kreutzer’s essay in Ekman (1973)). It is simply false that the infant 
is obliged to experiment with various noises and gestures until he 
discovers one which will produce the desired effect. He gets it right 
from the start.
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rely on adult expression of approval and disapproval, so he must first 
of all learn to recognise these.
If the learning theory is to be defended, therefore, an account 
must be given of how the infant first acquires the ability to interpret 
the behaviour of those around him. But the claim that this involves 
some kind of learning process faces parallel difficulties. As a first 
shot it might be argued that the infant is capable of recognising 
certain situations as elicitors of, say,pleasure. He then "observes" 
the way adults behave in those situations and "infers" that the 
observed behaviour expresses pleasure. The infant’s primary recogni­
tion of the relevant E-situations is determined, presumably, by the 
emotions induced in him by those situations. But if that is so, and 
it is difficult to see what alternative basis there could be for 
infantile discrimination of E-situations, then the theory is again 
vitiated by the absence of any guarantee that there are any situations 
which elicit pleasure in both adults and infants. It is, therefore, 
highly unlikely that the infant learns to understand adult behaviour 
by correlating it with the observable situations in which it occurs 
in the manner of a radical translator or empirical ethnologist.
4.3 It is open to the behaviourist at this stage to object that I 
have represented the learning situation in an unnecessarily complex 
way. The infant does not need to correlate adult behaviour with E- 
situations and then imitate it. Rather, if the infant proceeds by 
imitating adult behaviour as it occurs he will already be exhibiting 
appropriate expressive behaviour. In other words, we should focus on 
the question of how the infant learns to Teciprooate adult expressive 
behaviour and it is plausible to maintain that he does so by imitating 
it. "
However, there is a considerable gap between imitation and 
reciprocation. First, reciprocation is not always a matter of re­
producing emotionally similar behaviour, but in many cases involves 
producing complementary behaviour. The appropriate response to 
aggression is either mutual aggression or it is fear. The evidence of 
clinical psychology seems to suggest that the ability to express fear 
in response to aggression is manifested at a very early stage (see 
Charlesworth and Kreutzer (op cit.)). There is no justification for
13. For the contrast between reciprocation and imitation cp. Merleau- 
Ponty ((1964) p. 40) where he distinguishes authentic from inauthentic 
imitation.
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the claim that the ability is based on imitation; the infant may never 
have encountered fear-behaviour in others. Furthermore, the aggressive 
behaviour capable of eliciting fear-responses in infants is itself 
expressive and it is most unlikely that,the infant will have had the 
opportunity to discern a correlation between aggressive behaviour and 
actual danger or damage to himself.
Even if we confine our attention to simpler cases of a behaviour 
pattern, (p, which is appropriately reciprocated by cj)-ing, the learning 
theorist’s account is highly implausible. Among clinical psychologists 
there appears to be widespread agreement that infants begin to exhibit 
’social smiling’ between the fourth and sixth months (ibid.). In other 
words, within the first six months of his life the infant has begun to 
respond to adult smiles by smiling. The innatism defended here explains 
this as reciprocation rather than imitation. According to this view 
the infant recognises the adult smile as an expression of friendliness 
or affection and responds by expressing his own pleasure or mutual 
affection. The main ground for this view is the monstrously developed 
acumen imputed to the infant by the behaviourist alternative. In order 
to imitate the behaviour he encounters the infant must be in a position 
to compare it to his own behaviour. However, particularly in the case 
of facial expression, our own performances and those of others are 
experienced in entirely different ways. The proprioceptive or ’intro- 
ceptive’ sensations associated with the motor activity of our own 
faces and the visual or ’extroceptive’ experiences we have of the 
facial movements of others are incomparable.
It is worth noting in this connection an important, albeit 
self-evident, contrast between physiognomic and vocal behaviour. We 
experience vocal, but not physiognomic, performances by ourselves and 
by others via the same sense modality. This, combined with the fact 
that even the most rudimentary linguistic behaviour is not manifested 
until a considerable time after an extensive portion of the adult 
physiognomic repertoire has already been mastered, underlies the 
decisive plausibility of the claim that physiognomic behaviour is, in 
contrast to language, largely innate. Ordinarily the same linguistic 
skill is exhibited in understanding and performance. Indeed, it is 
plausible to attribute priority in the explanatory order to the former. 
The infant begins to produce correct linguistic utterances on the basis 
of the incipient understanding he has achieved of the linguistic 
behaviour of his seniors. But, for the reasons given, we cannot, in
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the case of physiognomy, appeal to interpretational competence to 
explain performative competence or vice-versa (cf. Chapter 6, §3.4).
Yet despite the absence of a potential explanatory link between the 
acquisition of performative and interpretational physiognomic skills, 
their manifestation in reciprocation is simultaneous in principle.
Again there is a contrast between physiognomic expression or communi­
cation and language; it is not impossible, or even unheard of, for 
interpretational competence with fragments of the latter to be acquired 
and manifested independently of and prior to the ability to utter the 
same sentences. (The reverse is also conceivable.) Obvious examples 
of this include infantile obedience to commands exhibited before any­
thing recognisable as a linguistic utterance has passed the infant's 
lips, and the possession of purely "passive" competence in a foreign 
tongue, professions of which are entirely commonplace.
At the risk of tedium, a caveat, by now familiar, needs to be 
reiterated. The innatism defended here does not involve attributing 
to the infant anything that would normally be identified as knowledge.
I am not claiming either that the infant knows of the smiling adults 
in his perceptual environment that they are expressing happiness or 
that the reciprocating infant is aware that he himself is smiling.
Such claims are certainly implausible, but the innatism defended here 
consists partly in the claim that no knowledge is required for there 
to be a disposition to smile under certain circumstances or a capacity 
for physiognomic perception. There is in this context, no justification 
for the view that we are non-inferentially aware that we are smiling. 
Admittedly there is available a kind of non-inferential awareness that 
our faces are moving. But to describe that movement as a smile is to 
say something about how it looks to others, not about how it feels to 
the agent. Nothing in the way of innate "knowing that" is attributed 
to the infant to explain his inborn ability and disposition to smile. 
Similarly, knowledge-that is not ascribed to the infant to explain 
his capacity for physiognomic perception and reciprocation. With 
respect to the former, the phenomenological claims defended earlier 
and the ontogenetic account being put forward here reinforce each other. 
Perception is intuitively thought to be a more primitive cognitive 
process than thought. To the extent that physiognomic perception 
resembles ordinary perception any intuitive resistance to the claim 
that the former is innate will be weakened. In order to accommodate 
physiognomic perception and reciprocation a biological theory might 
postulate the existence of phylogenetically fixed "receptor mechanisms"
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and "releasing mechanisms" respectively (Eible-Eibesfeldt (op cit.) 
p. 307). In less "scientific" terms this comes out as the claim that 
just as adult displays of aggression induce fear and its manifestation 
in the infant, so adult displays of affection attract a mutually 
affectionate response.
4.4 These reflections suggest a rather novel way of staging the 
conflict between innatism and learning theory with respect to physio­
gnomic expression. For, contrary, perhaps, to some expectations it 
transpires that the learning theorist, though committed to a tabula 
rasa theory of the neonate mind, must be prepared to attribute to the 
infant of four months or so far more knowledge than the innatist needs 
to attribute to him. Reciprocation does not require knowledge in a 
full-blooded sense : imitation does. In order to estimate our success 
in imitation we must have access of some kind to the way we look. 
Admittedly the issue of whether infantile physiognomic behaviour is to 
be explained on the basis of imitation or of reciprocation is not 
fully determined by any conceivable evidence (except in the case of 
behaviour, such as crying, exhibited virtually at the moment of birth). 
Thus, however implausible in principle, it is logically possible that 
the infant who smiles at the age of four months is imitating the 
behaviour of adults who smile at him.
However, there is indirect evidence which tells forcefully 
against such a claim. First, it seems that many motor activities which 
are not apparently more complex than facial expression, are not 
mastered until much later and are sometimes not mastered at all by 
children who are disabled in one way or another but who do, neverthe­
less, exhibit appropriate physiognomic behaviour (see Eible-Eibesfeldt 
(op cit.) p. 304). Secondly, and more pertinently, it appears that 
the acquisition of a 'specular image' (Lacan (1949)), postdates the 
exhibition of appropriate physiognomic behaviour by several months, 
if not years (see Merleau-Ponty (I960)). By 'specular image' in this 
context, I mean the conception of oneself as an entity possessing a 
physiognomic surface accessible to visual observation by others (I do 
not mean a precise internal image of oneself as qualitatively distinct 
from others which could only be obtained through portraits or 
reflected images). Phases in the development of the specular image 
are manifested in the individual's response to his own image reflected 
in a mirror. Roughly, there is an initial phase through which many 
animals pass in which the mirror image is regarded as a separate
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individual. According to Lacan (ibid.), pigeons never advance beyond 
this phase. An intermediate phase is marked by apparent indifference 
to the mirror image once it is discovered not to be another animal.
The development of most higher mammals, including primates, is arrested 
at this stage. In human children, however, these phases are followed 
by a third in which interest in the mirror image is restored. The 
explanation put forward by Merleau-Ponty (ibid.) is, in a highly com­
pressed form, that humans acquire a specular image which enables them 
to perceive the mirror image as an image of themselves.
Strictly this is inconclusive since it may be that all mammals 
acquire specular images but only humans are sufficiently vain to 
become interested as a result in how they look. Nevertheless the 
evidence is suggestive and its relevance here is plain. For the 
preceding criticism of learning theory can be recast thus : in order 
to imitate others successfully the infant must first acquire a specular 
image. But the evidence alluded to just now indicates beyond reasonable 
(ie. nonphilosophical) doubt that the specular image is not acquired 
until long after the human physiognomic repertoire has become operative. 
Consequently the elements of that repertoire cannot be obtained through 
imitation and it is doubtful whether any alternative learning or 
conditioning theory is available.
4.5 The arguments of §§4.3 and 4.4, relying as they do on apriori 
assumptions about when an individual can safely be regarded as capable 
of learning various cognitive skills and on the support of indirect 
evidence, are best summarised in a hypothetico-deductive form. This 
will be in keeping with the procedures adopted by innatists from 
Darwin to Ekman; the latter ((1973) p. 6) quotes the former as follows :
No one could be a good observer unless he was an active théoriser,
In the light of the impotence of unaided induction to settle the issues 
discussed in this chapter and given the respectability of deductive 
modes of inference even in modern physics, it is surely legitimate to 
argue that among the logically possible theories of the provenance of 
physiognomic competence which are compatible with the data delivered 
by observation of infantile behaviour, the theory of innate capacities 
for physiognomic performance and perception is the best available.
Of course, this claim needs to be fleshed out with some mention of the 
relevant criteria by which one theory is judged to be better than 
another in advance of its trial by observation and a justification of
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the assurance, implicit in hypothetico-deductive techniques, that 
all the competing theories have been considered in senso composito 
if not in sensu diviso, Fortunately, these requirements are fairly 
easy to meet in the present context.
Regarding the first requirement, there are a number of criteria 
whose general scientific applicability in the absence of empirical 
counter-indications is widely recognised; these include, notably, 
simplicity and conservatism. As analogues in developmental psychology, 
the following principles suggest themselves respectively :
(i) With respect to a given type of behaviour tokens of which 
individuals are manifestly able to perform, assume the lowest degree of 
cognitive development sufficient to generate behaviour of that kind.
(ii) Assume, as far as possible, the same degree of cognitive 
development to explain all the different kinds of behaviour exhibited 
by an individual at any given phase of his development.
It is plausible to maintain that as guiding principles, (i) and (ii) 
capture the most basic motivation of behaviourist learning theories 
in general. Yet the arguments of the preceding paragraph indicate 
that innatism with respect to facial expression approaches their 
satisfaction more nearly than learning theory.
As regards the second question - how can we be certain that 
all the coherent theories have been considered? - the reply is simply 
that the field is divided exhaustively by the theories we have con­
sidered at the level of generality at which we have considered them. 
'Either facial expression is innate or it is learnt' instantiates the 
law of the excluded middle. Insofar as a disposition or propensity 
is innate only if it is not learnt there is no conceivable intermediate 
theory. This is to be understood, naturally, in such a way as to 
allow for the subsequent intervention of conventions or pathognomic 
disturbances, conformity to which is a learnt disposition, which may 
have the effect of inhibiting the manifestation of innate propensities.
4.6 If it is true that there is an innate contribution to the 
ability to perform and understand some expressive behaviour, and the 
case for this claim is certainly strong, then how does this help the 
ethnologist? Probably it does not help him as much as it aids the 
infantile explorer of his own culture. The main contribution of the 
ontogenetic theory to ethnology consists in the permission it gives 
the ethnologist to trust his own physiognomic perception. He may, 
being a member of the same species as the subjects of his
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investigation and,as such, influenced by the same biological forces, 
rely, to some extent uncritically, upon the imponderable evidence 
supplied by native physiognomic behaviour. True, he cannot proceed 
without reservations, for while 0iii above appears to be false for 
such expressions as smiling, the potential interference of display- 
rules needs to be anticipated. However, if it is conceded that the 
investigator knows in advance what some native behaviour means, then 
he is in a position to draw substantial cultural conclusions from 
correlations between instances of such behaviour and the E-situations 
in which they occur. Sometimes, no doubt, he will be unable to 
determine, even after prolonged acquaintance, whether members of a 
particular cultural group actually feel what they express or merely 
express certain emotions in order to conform to some cultural conven­
tion. But a restricted indeterminacy of this kind may be insuperable; 
indeed, even in relation to the behaviour of our compatriots, or our 
own behaviour, we cannot always give a determinate answer to questions 
of this kind. Often we are not even disposed to raise the question.
It is, in some contexts, both a social solecism and an epistemological 
mistake to discriminate too sharply between sincerity and insincerity, 
honesty and hypocrisy, without sufficient sensitivity to the subtle 
exigencies of courtesy and decorum.
175
VIII. CONCLUDING NOTE ON THE PHILOSOPHICAL RELEVANCE OF NATURAL 
EXPRESSION
1. In Chapter 5 I stressed the impotence of theories of natural
expression to supply a refutation of scepticism about other minds.
However, in recent philosophical debate considerable emphasis has been 
placed on problems which occur at certain points of intersection 
between metaphysics, semantics and the theory of concept-acquisition.
I wish to conclude this essay by sketching, in a tentative and 
programmatic way, a possible solution to one such problem. The problem 
concerns the acquisition of psychological concepts, the formulation of 
semantic theories for the psychological parts of natural languages and 
the metaphysical issue of the reality of the mental. The suggested 
solution is to exploit the theory of natural expression whose relevance 
to the acquisition of psychological concepts was noted by Wittgenstein 
in The Fhitosophiaal Investigat-ions^
Difficulties are raised for standard truth-conditional semantics 
by sentences which cannot fully be verified by observation alone.
'Realist’ theories of this kind seem to be forced to mention, in their 
semantic descriptions of some sentences, truth-conditions which include 
sorts of circumstance inaccessible in principle to observation. If this 
is actually the case, then such theories fail to meet certain requirements 
reasonably stressed by proponents of verificationism. Specifically, 
they cannot explain how the ability to understand the sentences thus 
defined could possibly be acquired or manifested, or, indeed, how we 
can even justify the claim that we possess such conceptual abilities 
ourselves. More accurately realist theories appear to make the acquisition, 
possession and manifestation of possession of certain concepts impossible 
(for these points see Dummett, eg. (1959) p.67 : (1973) p.467 : (1976) 
p. 80f). Among the sentences which are problematic in this way are 
those which we use to attribute mental states to people other than 
ourselves. Indeed, for reasons shortly to be made explicit, self­
ascriptions are no less problematic than other-ascriptions (cf. Strawson 
(1959) p. 106). I suggest, however, that there is a form of realism 
about the mental which, in conjunction with the foregoing, goes some way 
towards overcoming these difficulties. The foregoing account of natural 
expression offers some support to a theory proposed by McDowell (1978) 
which, for brevity, I will label 'immanent realism', thus contrasting it
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as McDowell himself does, to the usual, transcendent variety of 
realism. The question, then, is whether realist theories of mental 
concepts are bound to be transcendent in a sense to be clarified 
shortly.
2. The transcendent realist thinks that he can avoid these diffi­
culties by appealing to a 'truth-value link' as the principle under­
lying competence with other-ascriptions of psychological predicates. 
According to this kind of realist, we learn the meaning of psychological 
predicates initially in their application to ourselves. This is assumed 
to be unproblematic, even by strict verificationist standards, the 
relevant truth-condition being readily accessible to the learner's 
consciousness. Then, having acquired a degree of competence in the 
use of personal pronouns - obviously in other, less problematic contexts 
- we combine the two skills in order to understand ascriptions to others 
of psychological predicates we already know how to apply to ourselves.
'He is in pain' is true just if 'I am in pain' uttered by the person 
to whom the third personal pronoun refers, would also be true 
(McDowell (1978) p.130). Thus the transcendent realist contends that 
although another person's being in pain is a circumstance in principle 
inaccessible to my consciousness, it is, nevertheless, an instance of a 
kind of circumstance other instances of which are accessible to me, namely 
when I am the person who is suffering.
While conceding that truth-value links of this kind constitute
an ineliminable aspect of the semantics of psychological discourse,
McDowell denies that they can contribute anything to the explanation
of the mastery of the concepts in question.
This, so far from solving the problem, simply ignores it. If 
someone cannot see how another person's being in pain - on an 
interpretation of that particular circumstance which makes it 
inaccessible - can possibly enter into the meaning one attaches 
to some form of words, one does not allay his worry by baldly 
reasserting that it does.' ((ibid.) p.132)
Admittedly, McDowell's presentation of the transcendent realist's case 
is partly vitiated by a certain oscillation between the sorts of 
circumstance to be considered and between taking sorts of circumstance 
and instances as primarily relevant. If the transcendent realist is 
represented as having made certain decisions on these points and sticking 
to them, then the quoted criticism loses much of its force. A consistent 
realist of this kind will deploy two hinds of circumstance in his 
explanation of the mastery of psychological concepts in general. One 
kind of circumstance, that of another person's being in a certain 
emotional state or having a certain sensation, is such that in principle
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instances of it are never accessible to consciousness. The other 
relevant kind of circumstance, that of someone being in the same kind 
of psychological state, is sometimes accessible, namely, when I am in 
that state. The transcendent realist's case depends crucially on the 
fact that all instances of the first kind are instances of the second 
kind of circumstance but not vice-versa.
McDowell, in effect, has slightly mislocated the defect in 
transcendent realism. Proponents of this doctrine, as portrayed by 
McDowell, assume as unproblematic the prior ability to apply psychological 
concepts to ourselves. True, this does not violate the requirement 
emphasised in the debate so far, which states only that the truth 
conditions of the relevant sentences must be accessible to the person 
whose competence with those sentences is to be accounted for. But 
satisfaction of that requirement alone simply is not sufficient for the 
explanation of the mastery of psychological concepts even if we confine 
our attention to their use in the first person. It is not legitimate, 
therefore, to start theorising from the assumption that we know what 
pain or distress is from our own case (McDowell (ibid.) p.131). The 
assumption is simply false if it is taken to refer to a phase in our 
cognitive development which is anterior to the acquisition of linguistic 
competence. The most that can be conceded is that, unless we are 
unusually fortunate, we are personally acquainted with distress from an 
early stage, and are able to recognise repeated instances of it as 
similar to past experiences. But the discovery that these experiences 
are instances of distress, the discovery, in other words, that on these 
occasions the concept of distress is applicable to ourselves, is no 
more or less problematic than the discovery that, on other occasions, 
the same concept is to be applied to others.
The transcendent realist, then, has no answer to Wittgenstein's 
point that the criteria for the use of a term must be public (Wittgenstein 
(1953) eg. §§ 257, 579). This is to say that the conditions for the 
application of psychological vocabulary, whether or not we regard them 
as truth-conditions, must be such that instances of them are at least 
sometimes accessible (in principle) to more than one observer simul­
taneously. Above all, this requirement must be met in the paradigm 
situations which permit the pedagogic transmission of the concepts to 
take place. In these situations it is crucial not only that the learner 
should be in a position to tell when it is correct to apply psychological 
terms to others, but also that the teacher should be in a position to 
tell when it is correct for the learner to apply those terms to himself.
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If the emotional states of others are in principle inaccessible, 
then competence with self-ascription of emotion could never be 
manifested, thus failing to meet two of Dummett's demands simultan­
eously. Self-ascriptions are no less problematic than other-ascriptions 
of psychological terms since, on the transcendent view, there is nothing 
accessible to the public gaze which will allow the teacher or the learner, 
or, indeed, anybody, to ascertain whether or not psychological terms are 
being correctly self-applied. The teacher cannot correct the learner's 
misapplications to himself of the problematic concepts, or reinforce his 
proper applications of those concepts to himself. Conversely, the learner 
cannot see why others use those concepts when they do so, and others 
will have no basis for applying them to the learner,
3. Immanent realism purports to solve these problems, and thereby
preempt anti-realism, by endowing physiognomic perception with a serious 
role in the explanation of the mastery of psychological concepts.
McDowell introduces this refurbished realism, which I believe to be 
vindicated by considerations advanced in Chapters 5 and 7, as follows :
In the view of this different realist, then, we should not jib 
at, or interpret away, the common sense thought that, on those 
occasions which are paradigmatically suitable for training in 
the assertoric use of the relevant part of a language, one can 
literally perceive, in another person's facial expression or 
his behaviour, that he is in pain, and not just infer that he is 
in pain from what one perceives.' (McDowell (1978) p.136)
Little needs to be added to what has already been said in Chapter 5 about 
the concept of physiognomic perception upon which immanent realism with 
respect to the emotions of others is based. Of course, the concept of 
immanence, as it occurs in the label, is not to be confused with the 
concept of perceptual immediacy considered in Chapter 5. All that 
immanent realism requires is that the kinds of objects to which it applies 
should sometimes be accessible to observation unaided by inference. 
Physiognomic perception permits us to make this claim about the affectivity 
of others. Realism based on physiognomic perception cannot be accused of 
demanding too much active intellectual participation from the infantile 
language learner (cf. McDowell (ibid.) p.140 where references to passages 
in Wittgenstein are also supplied). There are at this stage two available 
means of meeting objections of this kind and thus diminishing their 
tendency to support anti-realism. First, the infant relies in the 
relevant paradigm contexts on a kind of perception which is not sharply 
distinct from the perceptual abilities upon which he relies in coming to 
grips with purely material concepts. Secondly, the infant does indeed 
make some kind of active contribution to the learning process. In the
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acquisition of ordinary, non-psychological concepts, he is expected to 
make certain observations and to exploit certain primitive capacities 
for visual recognition and discrimination. The acquisition of 
psychological concepts also involves the operation of certain cognitive 
devices; devices with which it seems we are innately endowed (cf.
Chapter 7).
It would, however, be disingenuous to insist that immanent realism 
satisfies precisely the criteria stressed by anti-realists in the con­
struction of theories of meaning. To begin with, no realist can 
consistently attempt to respond to a need sometimes alleged to admit 
into the theory of meaning only sorts of conditions, instances of whose 
satisfaction can always be observed to hold. If anti-realism is based 
on the premiss that competence must be exhaustively manifested, ie. 
unequivocally disclosed on every occasion of its exercise, then it 
imposes a requirement which is implausibly stringent. I have nothing 
to add to McDowell's own thoughts on this issue (ibid. §7). A more 
central criticism would be the following : immanent realism, so-called, 
fails to provide a genuine response to the requirement that a theory 
of meaning should be genuinely empirical. It merely replaces that 
requirement insofar as it is imposed on the acquisition and manifestation 
of concept-mastery, with a different, phenomenologioal requirement.
This is true, but there is no justification for regarding this as 
a relaxation of the methodological principles observed by orthodox 
empiricists, as a movement away from a certain standard of rigour. A 
more accurate perspective is obtained by casting our thought in the 
spirit of Max Scheler, according to whom there is a certain sense in 
which
... phenomenological philosophy is the most radical empiricism
and positivism. (Scheler (1913) p.138 in (1973))
The peculiar rigour of the phenomenologist consists in a refusal to 
rely upon extraneous criteria of experience, preferring to focus upon 
what he calls lived experience itself. This involves an alternative 
but, in my opinion, authentic kind of investigative stringency exemplified 
not only (or even especially) by those writing within the "phenomenological 
movement", but also by those who, like Wittgenstein and Wollheim, refuse 
to take for granted traditional assumptions about the scope of 
observationality. Admittedly, as McDowell points out about Wittgenstein, 
the true phenomenologist will refuse 'to take sides in the typically 
philosophical debate between transcendent (truth-value-link) realism 
and anti-realism* (ibid. p.l36n). Here, however, the role of
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phenomenology is to provide a plausible description of a category of 
experience as a preliminary to deciding whether a given metaphysical 
theory, realism, is compatible with it or whether, should a negative, 
answer be confirmed, its antithesis, anti-realism, will be forced on us.
In sharp contrast to the "method" of phenomenology, there is the
'naturalistic* procedure adopted by Quine who relies upon a notion of
stimulation to be fixed by criteria involving 'the pattern of chromatic
irradiation of the retina' (see Quine (1960) pp.31f). Indeed, the
reliability of these criteria is severely impugned by visually ambiguous
figures, like the duck-rabbit, which interested Wittgenstein precisely
because of their bearing on the concept of perception in general
(cf. F^llesdal (1975) p.36 for an intriguing application of these
considerations to Quine's method of radical translation); their adequacy
is threatened also by a certain kind of illusion, the best known example
of which is probably the Muller-Lyer figure.^ Such illusions can be
explained only by admitting the intervention of a distorting influence
at a location, so to speak, somewhere between the retinal impact and
the receipt of a visual impression. It is surely obvious that where
experience and retinal activity diverge, or where the former is
inadequately described in purely optical terms, then we must favour the
experience itself, rather than an incomplete account of its mechanics,
as the basis for the acquisition of conceptual mastery and its
manifestation to those who, untrained as they are in the science of optics,
are nevertheless the best judges of such matters, namely, native speakers
2of the language in question.
Immanent realism, then, will provide an account of the acquisition 
of psychological concepts which goes some way toward meeting the 
requirement that meanings or concepts should be firmly anchored to 
experience, while at the same time preserving for the mental a degree 
of transcendence or 'privacy' sufficient to do justice to the ordinary 
preconceptions we have in this area. I think that these are at least 
good prima-facie reasons for attempting to develop and defend a theory of 
immanent realism in detail. Unfortunately the task cannot be undertaken here,
1. Other striking examples, involving chromatic as well as morphological 
distortion, are to be found in Gombrich (1960), illustration VI and 
Wollheim (1973).
2. Where such divergence is commonplace throughout the species (cf. 
Chapter 6 § 5.3) the innate mechanisms we postulate in order to explain 
the provenance of the relevant experiences (as in Chapter 7) should be 
accorded much the same explanatory status as the purely optical mechanism 
also involved.
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APPENDIX : SPONTANEITY AND PURPOSELESSNESS
1.1 In order to avoid a possible charge of negligence, it will be 
necessary to bring to the fore a feature, or, more precisely, two 
features of natural expression hitherto merely alluded to in passing.
Thus, at the close of Chapter 3, I indicated that there might be a 
teleological aspect to the difference between expressive and purposeful 
action. Again, at Chapter 4 § 2.3, I alluded to the spontaneity of 
much expressive behaviour which constitutes a ground for scepticism 
regarding any attempt to elucidate it on the basis of highly complex 
sets of communicative intentions. The relatively small number of 
philosophers who have discussed non-verbal expression in any depth includes 
Alston (1965) and Danto ((1973) Chapter 6). Both were struck by what 
they took to be the characteristically spontaneous nature of natural 
expression, but they approached this aspect from different angles.
Alston believed expression to be spontaneous in contrast to linguistic 
communication, allowing, however, for exceptions like interjections 
(Alston (op cit.) pp.26 f). Danto, on the other hand, introduces a 
'principle of spontaneity' intended to contrast expressive behaviour 
to intentional, or purposive action (no apparent distinction being 
registered between intentionality and purposiveness, see Danto (op cit.) 
p. 163). In fact these different routes generate slightly different 
concepts of spontaneity, and I will refer throughout to the concept 
disclosed by Danto as 'purposelessnesss'. There are parallels between 
the concepts nonetheless.
The reason for not stressing these aspects of expression earlier 
is that they do not strike me as essential even to the concept of natural 
expression. Danto's claim to have unearthed a necessary condition of 
expression in his principle of spontaneity (purposelessness) is, to my 
mind, profoundly suspect. Admittedly, a certain brand of popular 
wisdom has it that an inclination to "manipulate" others is incompatible 
with authentic expression. But from this it would follow at most that 
purposelessness is necessary for sincerity. To this it might be added 
that the concept of sincerity is logically bound to the concept of 
expression in ways somewhat analogous to the links between assertion 
and truth. However, it seems, prima facie, virtually impossible to 
provide an absolutely watertight distinction between manipulation and
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intentions to secure various kinds of uptake characteristic of, 
though not essential to, communication. It is surely misplaced to 
accuse one whose passion is genuinely felt, of insincerity in 
attempting, by expressing it, to obtain its requitement.
Similarly vague intuitions suggest that sincerely expressive 
behaviour cannot be in any way contrived. But if this is the measure 
of spontaneity, then it can hardly be appealed to in distinguishing 
natural expression either from speech or from intentional action in 
general. My aim in the paragraph which follows is to sketch a more 
precise notion of spontaneity and of purposelessness, concepts which 
describe features arguably characteristic of, but by no means universal 
to expressive behaviour.
1.2 The spontaneity of physiognomic expression can be captured by 
contrasting it to what are, in a sense, the simplest and most readily 
investigated kinds of assertion. The relevant utterances are those 
whose stimuli are accessible to observation by speaker and interpreter 
simultaneously. At the outset the radical interpreter is bound to rely 
almost exclusively on the availability of such utterances. However, as 
Quine pointed out, the presence of the stimulus whose description will 
eventually enter into the theory of the meaning of the associated 
utterance type, is not in itself sufficient to elicit a token of it. 
Further linguistic prompting is also required (Quine (1960) p. 30).
For example, with respect to a sentence, a, of the native's language, 
such prompting may take the form of interrogation to which, if the 
appropriate stimulus is present, the native will reply with an assertoric 
utterance of a. Alternatively, the interpreter may experiment by utter­
ing tokens of a in the presence of native speakers and stimulus conditions 
conjectured to be pertinent, in order to ascertain whether, under those 
conditions, assertions of a prompt assent or dissent. In general, 
utterances of, or assent to a will be elicited only by a combination of 
appropriate linguistic prompting and the presence of appropriate 
perceptual stimuli.
This is not the case for physiognomic expression. Here it seems 
that typically the presence of an appropriate stimulus is sufficient 
by itself to elicit the corresponding expressive behaviour. In this 
respect, the radical interpretation of expressive behaviour across 
cultures is somewhat simpler than that of linguistic behaviour (cf.
Chapter 2 §3.2), thus to some extent confirming the conception of its 
priority in ethnological research argued for in Chapter 7. Thus, for
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example, expressions of (as opposed to accurate descriptions of) 
distress are typically elicited by whatever causes and is the object 
of the distress suffered (cp. Danto (op cit.) p. 154). No additional 
prompting is required. In this sens 2 expressive behaviour is more 
spontaneous than linguistic assertion.
It might be objected to this that the phenomena of reciprocation, 
upon which the previous arguments for innateness heavily depend, 
involve something closely akin to linguistic prompting. Reciprocation 
might be conceived of as a transaction essentially involving the physio­
gnomic prompting of complementary physiognomic behaviour. However, if 
this is a potentially correct characterisation of reciprocation, it must 
be supplemented by indicating that it is a conspicuous feature of 
reciprocation that no stimulus external to the transaction itself is 
required. If reciprocation is a matter of prompting and the behaviour 
prompted, then the prompting behaviour is sufficient for the elicitation 
of the reciprocal behaviour without the aid of some further stimulus. 
Accordingly, the typical spontaneity of expressive behaviour consists in 
its capacity to be elicited either by prompting or by stimulation, but 
not typically by a combination of both. This is all that is needed to 
contrast it to the typical elicitation of assertoric observation 
sentences. Still, the matter could be rather differently construed.
The prompting physiognomic behaviour might be thought of as being itself 
the stimulus of the complementary behaviour it elicits. The choice 
depends to some extent on whether we describe the innate contribution 
to the capacity for physiognomic reciprocation in terms of innate 
releasing mechanisms, or confine the innate material to innate receptor 
mechanisms. Both conceptions will yield a conception of physiognomic 
expression as spontaneous in comparison to linguistic communication.
1.3 It would be gratifying, in view of developments in the argument to 
follow, if we could extract from the foregoing, rather modest conception 
of spontaneity, a conception of the explanation of expressive behaviour 
which was, in contrast to the radical interpretation of languages, non- 
holistic. This would permit the establishment of an elegant parallel 
between spontaneity and purposelessness, where the latter concept, 
insofar as it is applicable to naturally expressive behaviour, points 
to a contrast between it and (intentional) action in general in that the 
explanation of tokens of the latter, but not of the former, requires 
the holistic deployment of the concepts of belief and desire. However, 
the parallel cannot be insisted upon. In the case of radical
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interpretation the concepts to be deployed are that . of the meaning 
of an utterance and that of the relevant belief of the speaker (the 
'E-concepts', as Peacocke (1979) p. 18 calls them). These concepts 
might be thought to match stimulus and prompting in that the effect 
of the stimulus is to produce a certain belief while the effect of 
prompting through appropriate interrogation is to elicit an expression 
of that belief in words.
However, the attempt to express the contrast between language 
and physiognomic expression on the basis of an analogy between belief 
and emotion respectively, and linguistic meaning and physiognomic 
meaning (construed, as in Chapter 4, in terms of prima facie evidence) 
respectively, leads to falsehood. Sincere expressions of F-ness 
involve behaviour exhibited both because the agent is F and because the 
relevant behaviour constitutes prima facie evidence that the agent is F. 
But this ignores the crucial point that 'because' alludes to different 
kinds of explanatory project in each case (cf. Chapter 4, p.87 and 
Chapter 6, §4.2). The spontaneity of expressive behaviour, consequently, 
can be indicated by contrasting it to certain facts about the explana­
tion of token utterances. If we have a sentence, a, which means that p 
in a language, L, then token-utterances of a by L-speakers are not 
adequately explained by speakers' believing that p and the meaning of 
a. The explanation of an utterance of cr involves the speaker's belief 
that p and at least the speaker's belief that a means that p (cf.
Chapter 2, pp. 29f). But the agent of a token natural expression of 
F-ness may have produced that token just because he is F. He need not, 
and frequently does not, have any further beliefs about what his 
behaviour expresses. The way in which the latter fact enters into the 
explanation of such behaviour is not genuinely teleological (cf.
Chapter 4, loc cit.). To this extent, then, the spontaneity of natural 
expression is captured by contrasting it to the scheme of holistic 
explanation associated with radical interpretation.
2. The characteristic purposelessness of tokens of naturally 
expressive behaviour, noted by Danto (loc cit.) and Stuart Hampshire 
(cf. Chapter 3, p. 62 ), is readily captured by denying the application 
to such behaviour of the scheme of holistic explanation applicable to 
intentional action in general. In general, an action of #-ing will not 
be explained simply by attributing to its agent a desire to bring it 
about that p without also attributing to him a belief that if he (&-s 
then it will ensue that p (cf. Peacocke, eg. p. 5). Some instances
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of expressive behaviour may well be explained by applying a scheme of 
this kind, but the crucial point is that many will not. For example, 
a man incarcerated in a firmly wrought cage may express his desire to 
escape by violently shaking the bars that prevent the realisation of 
that desire. Our conviction that in such a case what the man is doing 
is expressing his desire, rather than trying to bring about its satis­
faction, depends in part on our belief that he is too intelligent to 
believe that he will win his freedom by manually destroying the obstacles 
to it. It is tempting, then, to say simply that ^-ing is an expression 
of F-ness if people tend to when they are F irrespective of any beliefs 
they may have about the probable consequences of ^-ing. This, however, 
fails to take into account the possibility of one who desired a certain 
state of affairs but believed that by expressing that desire he would 
not merely not contribute to its furtherance, but would actually impede 
it. The caged man, for example, would refrain from shaking the bars of 
his cage if he believed that were he to indicate in any way to his 
gaoler his desire to escape, the gaoler, being of a sadistic disposition, 
would thereby be encouraged to prolong his imprisonment. Some provision 
must be made, therefore, for the inhibition of expressive behaviour 
where that inhibition is itself motivated by beliefs and desires relating 
to the consequences of expression. Such an allowance is made in Danto's 
principle of spontaneity (loc cit.), and need not in any way impair the 
characteristic purposelessness of expressive behaviour. All that needs 
to be admitted is that people will often express their desires and 
emotions even if they have no beliefs about the consequences of doing so.
Two points need to be made here. Gombrich ((1972) pp. 374f) has 
pointed out that in many situations like that described in the last 
paragraph, it will be impossible to determine on the basis of observation 
alone whether someone is expressing or trying to satisfy a desire or 
inclination (cf. Chapter 3, loc cit.). A certain degree of indeterminacy 
must certainly be accommodated here. But the indeterminacy will be cut 
down considerably by allowing extended observation of the behaviour over 
a period, not possible in Gombrich's example of the representation of a 
calf struggling with its captor, and, as in the example above, 
assumptions about the agent's intelligence. The criterion of purpose­
lessness might best be formulated counterfactually. x's ^-ing because 
he desires the realisation of p is an expression of the desire that p 
if X would have #-ed even if he did not believe that by $ -ing he would 
bring it about that p (so long as he did not believe that $ -ing would 
impede the realisation of p). Given certain assumptions about
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intelligence, persistent #-ing on several occasions without results 
would most plausibly be regarded as expressive. A point that will 
help to confirm and clarify the conception of purposelessness being 
promoted here concerns the occurrence of conflicting desires. Desires 
conflict when their joint realisation is impossible. VThen one suffers 
from libidinal conflict of this kind, one cannot, if one recognises 
the impossibility of satisfying two desires, act with the purpose of 
satisfying both of them. There is, however, no impediment to the 
expression of both of them, albeit serially in most cases, not simul­
taneously.
Secondly, as indicated earlier, purposelessness is not, as Danto 
thought, a necessary condition of natural expression. People sometimes 
intentionally express their desires with the purpose of getting others 
to contribute to their realisation. Admittedly, purposes are not the 
same as intentions. In one sense people sometimes do things 
intentionally but for no purpose. Danto, however, thinks that the 
apparent spontaneity of natural expression entails that tokens of it 
are, at least characteristically, unintentional (op cit. p. 164).
Indeed, there is some connection between purposelessness as I have 
characterised it, anti-holistically, and lack of intention. For it is, 
arguably, a necessary condition (not a sufficient one) of an action's 
being intentional that it should be explained in the right way by some 
of the agent's beliefs and desires. Thus, for example, smiling may be 
intentional under the description, 'expressing pleasure', in which case 
the person smiling must believe that pleasure can be expressed by smiling,
One response to this may be to impose a limit on the degree of 
purposelessness admitted to be characteristic of expression. Expressive 
behaviour is behaviour characteristically unaccompanied by any ulterior 
motive, ie. by any purpose beyond that of expressing some emotion.
Danto, however, goes further, and argues that naturally expressive 
behaviour is behaviour characteristically unaccompanied by any purpose 
whatsoever, ie. is, at least primarily, unintentional. This puts 
Danto under some pressure to come up with an account of those cases in 
which expressive behaviour patently is intentional. His proposal is 
ingenious and, within limits, plausible. Our naturally expressive 
behaviour is intentional only in a derivative sense. We learn first to 
inhibit the expression of, to 'forbear' from expressing the emotions 
we feel. Having acquired this ability, we are then able to express 
ourselves intentionally by forbearing from forbearing from exhibiting 
the relevant behaviour (elements of a similar idea are discernible in
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Hampshire (1960) and Wollheim (1966) p. 102). This works tolerably 
well for Danto's chosen paradigms, laughter and crying. However, the 
principle is not plausibly extended to smiling. The possibility of 
doing so intentionally is not a matter of double forbearance. For 
surely smiling is, in Danto's idiom, unproblematically included in our 
repertoire of basic actions.
I conclude, then, that while spontaneity and purposelessness are, 
in a loose sense, characteristic but not definitive of expression, the 
point should not be construed directly in terms of intention. It is 
sufficient to bear in mind the inapplicability in many cases of the 
two schemes of holistic explanation. True, those cases in which neither 
scheme is applicable, will be cases of unintentional expression, 
spontaneous and purposeless. In some cases, however, beliefs about what 
our behaviour expresses will have a role in its explanation. These 
cases are correspondingly less spontaneous, though they may still be 
purposeless , The crucial point is that our expressive behaviour
often is not explicable by reference to such beliefs or to ulterior 
purposes. In this large class of cases, the explanation of expressive 
behaviour is non-holistic.
5. Danto does not apply the principle to his third major example, 
tumescence of the male organ as an "expression" of sexual desire (op 
cit. pp. 151f), presumably because genital movements are not in any sense 
directly subject to voluntary control. My own intuition is that erections 
should not be counted as expressive. However, the temptation to explain 
this precisely on the basis of the absence of voluntary control should 
be avoided. Otherwise it would be impossible to accommodate blushing as 
an expression of shame or embarrassment... I-Ihat excludes tumescence is, 
rather, its failure to conform to the functional clause in the definition 
of expression proposed in Chapter 4. The function of tumescence in 
humans is procreation, not display. In those primates for whom genital 
display has an expressive function, this is unrelated to mating; it 
seems generally to be an expression of aggression.
188
BIBLIOGRAPHY.
Aldrich, Virgil (1978), " ’Expresses" and "Expressive"’, Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism, XXXVII, 203-17.
Alston, William S. (1965), ’Expressing’ in Philosophy in America, 
ed. Max Black (London: Allen and Unwin).
Anscombe, G.E.M. (1957), Intention (Oxford: Blackwell).
Argyle, Michael ( 1975), ’The Syntaxes of Bodily Communication' in 
Benthall and Polhemus (1975).
Beardsley, Monroe C. (1971), 'Musical Expression' in Hospers (1971). 
Bennett, Jonathan ( 1976), Linguistic Behaviour (Cambridge University 
Press).
Benthall, J. and Polhemus, Ted (eds.) (1975), The Body as a Medium 
of Expression (London: Allen Lane).
Bergson, Henri (1911), Laughter (translation) (London: Macmillan). 
Birdwhistell, Roy (1971), Kinesics and Context (London: Allen Lane). 
Bouwsma, O.K. (1971),'The Expression Theory of Art' in Hospers (1971). 
Chihara, C.S. and Fodor, J.A. (1965), 'Operationalism and Ordinary 
Language' in Pitcher (1966).
Chomsky, N. (1975), 'Knowledge of Language' in Minnesota Studies in 
the Philosophy of Science, vol. VIII, eds. Keith Gunderson and Maxwell 
Grover (1975) (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press).
Chomsky, N. (1976), Reflections on Language (New York, London: Temple 
Smith, Fontana).
Collingwood, R.G. (1938), The Principles of Art (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 
Cooke, J.W. (1969), 'Human Beings' in Studies in the Philosophy of 
Wittgenstein ed. Pi. Winch’ ( 1969) (London: Routlege and Kegan Paul). 
Danto, Arthur (1965), 'Basic Actions', American Philosophical 
Quarterly, II.
Danto, Arthur (1973), Analytical Philosophy of Action (Cambridge 
University Press).
Darwin, Charles (1872), The Expression of the Emotions in Man and 
Animals, republished 1965 (London and Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press).
Davidson, Donald (1963), 'Actions, Reasons and Causes', Journal of 
Philosophy, LX, 685-700 (page refs, to Davidson 1980).
Davidson, Donald (1967), 'The Logical Form of Action Sentences' in 
The Logic of Decision and Action, ed. N.Rescher (Dordrecht: D.Reidel). 
Davidson, Donald (1970), 'Mental Events', in Experience and Theory, 
eds. Lawrence Foster and J.W.Swanson (Amhurst: University of
189
Massachusetts Press). Page refs. to Davidson (1980).
Davidson, Donald (1971), ’Agency’, in Agent, Action and Reason, ed.
R.Binkley et. al. (Toronto University Pre&s).
Davidson, Donald (1973), ’Radical Interpretation', Dialectica, 27, 313-27 
Davidson, Donald (1974), 'Belief and the Basis of Meaning', Synthèse, 27, 
309-23.
Davidson, Donald (1975), 'Thought and Talk' in Guttenplan (ed.) (1975). 
Davidson, Donald (1980), Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
Dennett, Daniel (1976), 'Conditions of Personhood' in The Identities of 
Persons, ed. A.O.Rorty (University of California Press).
Donagan, A. (1966), 'Wittgenstein on Sensation: Cartesianism vs. 
Behaviourism' in Pitcher (1966).
Douglas, Mary (1971), 'Do Dogs Laugh? A cross-cultural approach to body 
symbolism' in Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 15, 387-90. Page refs, 
to Polhemus ( 1978) .
Douglas, Mary (ed.) (1973), Rules and Meanings (Harmondsworth: Penguin).
Dummett, M. (1959), 'Truth', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
59, 141-62. Reprinted in Strawson (ed.) (1967).
Dummett, M. (1973), Frege: Philosophy of Language (Duckworth).
Dummett, M. (1976), 'What is a Theory of Meaning? II' in Evans and
McDowell (1976).
Efron, D. (194 1), Gesture, Race and Culture (The Hague: Mouton (1972)). 
Eible-Eibesfeldt, I. (1972), 'Similarities and differences between 
cultures in expressive movements' in Hinde (1972).
Ekman, Paul (1973), 'Darwin and Cross-Cultural Studies of Facial 
Expression' in Ekman (ed.) (1973).
Ekman, Paul (ed.) (1973), Darwin and Facial Expression: A Century of 
Research in Review (New York: Academic Press).
Ekman, Paul (1980), 'Biological and Cultural Contributions to Body and 
Facial Movements in the Expression of the Emotions' in Explaining 
Emotions. ed. A.O.Rorty (University of California Press).
Ekman, Paul, Friesen, Wallace and Ellsworth, Phoebe (1972), Emotion 
in the Human Face (New York: Pergamon Press).
Evans, Gareth and McDowell,J.(eds.)(1976),Truth and Meaning: Essays 
in Semantics (Oxford:Clarendon Press).
F^lllesdal, D. (1975), 'Meaning and Experience' in Guttenplan (ed.) (1975). 
Freud, S. (1905), Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, (transla­
tion (I960)) (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul).
Gardiner, P. and Hare, R.M. (1964), 'Pain and Evil', Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. 1964.
190
Goldman, A.I.0970), A Theory of Human Action (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice Hall) .
Gombrich, E.H. (I960), Art and Illusion (London: Phaidon).
Gombrich, E.H. (1963), Meditations on a Hobby Horse (London: Phaidon). 
Gombrich, E.H. (1972), 'Action and Expression in Western Art' in Hinde 
(ed.) (1972).
Goodman, N. (1976), Languages of Art (Indianapolis: Hackett).
Grice, H.P. (1957), 'Meaning', Philosophical Review, 66, 377-88.
Grice, H.P. (1961), 'The Causal Theory of Perception', Proceedings of 
the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. 1961, 121-52.
Grice, H.P. (1968), 'Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning and Word- 
Meaning' in Foundations of Language, 4, 225-42.
Gurney, E. (1971), 'Music as Impressive and Expressive' in Hospers (1971). 
Guttenplan, S. (ed.) (1975), Mind and Language: Wolfson College Lectures 
1974 (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
Hampshire, Stuart (1959), Thought and Action (London: Cbatto and Windus). 
Hampshire, Stuart (1960), 'Feeling and Expression' in Hampshire (1972), 
Freedom of Mind (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
Harrison, Bernard (1979), An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language 
(London : Macmi11an).
Hinde, R.A. (ed.) (1972), Non-Verbal Communication (Cambridge University 
Press).
Hinde, R.A. (1975), 'The Comparative Study of Non- Verbal Communication' 
in Benthall and Polhemus (eds.) (1975).
Hintikka, Jaako (1969), 'On the Logic of Perception' in Models for
Modalities (Dordrecht: D.Reidel).
Hooff, J.A.R.A.M. van (1972), 'A Comparative Approach to the Phylogeny 
of Laughter and Smiling' in Hinde (ed.) (1972).
Hookway, C. and Pettit, P. (eds.) (1978), Action and Interpretation
(Cambridge University Press).
Hornsby, Jennifer (1980), Actions (London; Routledge and Kegan Paul). 
Hospers, John (ed.) (1969), Aesthetics (New York; The Free Press).
Hospers, John (ed.) (1971), Artistic Expression (New York: The Free Press). 
Howell, Robert (1972), 'Seeing As', Synthèse. 23. 400-22.
Ishiguro, Hide (1967), 'Imagination', Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society. Supp. Vol. XLII.
Jackson, Frank (1977), Perception (Cambridge University Press).
Kenny, Anthony (1965), Action. Emotion and Will (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul).
Kenny, Anthony (1976), Will. Freedom and Power (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul).
191
La Barre, Weston (1947) 'The Cultural Basis of Emotions and Gestures', 
Journal of.Personality, 16, 49-68. Reprinted in Polhemus (ed.) (1978). 
Lacan, Jacqes (1949), 'Le stade du miroir comme formateur du fonction 
du je'. Revue Française de Psychanalyse, 13.
Leach, Edmund (1970), Lévi-Strauss (London: Fontana).
Leach, Edmund (1972), 'The Influence of Cultural Context in Non-Verbal 
Communication in Man', in Hinde (ed.) (1972).
Lévi-Strauss, Claude (1962), The Savage Mind. Translation (1966)
(London: Weidenfield and Nicholson).
Lewis, D.K. (1969), Convention, (Harvard University Press).
Lewis, D.K. (1973), 'Causation', Journal of Philosophy, 70, 556-67. 
Reprinted in Sosa (ed.) (1975), Causation and Conditionals, (Oxford 
University Press).
Lorenz, Konrad (1963), On Aggression. Translation by Marjorie Latzke 
(1966), (London: Methuen).
McDowell, John (1978), 'On "The Reality of the Past'" in Hookway and 
Pettit (eds.) ( 1978).
McDowell, John (1980), 'Meaning, Communication and Knowledge', in 
Z.-van Straaten (ed.) (1980), Philosophical Subjects; Essays Presented 
to P.F.Strawson (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1945 a). The Phenomenology of Perception. Translation 
by Colin Smith (1962), (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul).
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1945 b),'The Film and the New Psychology' in 
Merleau-Ponty ( 1948) .
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1947), 'The Primacy of Perception' in Merleau-Ponty 
(1948).
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1948), Sense and Nonsense. Translation by Hubert L. 
and Patricia Allen Dreyfus (1964) (Northwestern University Press). 
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1960), 'The Child's Relations with Others'. Translation 
in Merleau-Ponty (1964 a).
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1964 a). The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays 
(Northwestern University Press).
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1964 b), 'Consciousness and the Acquisition of 
Language', Translation (1973) (Northwestern University Press).
Peacocke, Christopher (1976), 'Truth Definitions and Actual Languages' 
in Evans and McDowell (1976).
Peacocke, Christopher (1979), Holistic Explanation (Oxford:Clarendon 
Press) .
Pitcher, G. (ed.) (1966), Wittgenstein, The Philosophical Investigations:
A Collection of Critical Essays (New York: Doubleday).
192
Platts, M. (19.79), Ways of Meaning (London; Routledge and Kegan Paul). 
Polhemus, Ted (ed.) (1978), Social Aspects of the Human Body, (Harmonds­
worth, Penguin).
Quine, W. van Orman (1956), ’Quantifiers and Prepositional Attitudes', 
Journal of Philosophy, 53, Reprinted in Quine (1976), The Ways of 
Paradox (Harvard University Press).
Quine, W. van Orman (1960), Word and Object (Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology).
Quine, W. van Orman (1969), 'Ontological Relativity' in Ontological 
Relativity and Other Essays (Columbia University Press).
Ricoeur, Paul (1971),'The Model of the Text; Meaningful Action 
Considered as a Text', Social Research, 38, 529-62.
Ryle, G. (1949; 1970), The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson; Harmonds­
worth: Penguin).
Sartre, J.P. (1939), Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions. Translation 
(1962), (London: Methuen).
Sartre, J.P. (1945), Being and Nothingness. Translation by Hazel E.
Barnes (1957), (London: Methuen).
Scheler, Max (1913),The Nature of Sympathy. Translation by Peter Heath 
(1970),(Connecticut: Archon).
Schiffer, S. (1972), Meaning (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
Schwayder, D. (1965), The Stratification of Behaviour (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul).
Searle, J.R. (1964), 'How to derive "ought" from "is"'. Philosophical 
Review, 73, 43-58. Reprinted in Philippa Foot (ed.) (1967), Theories 
of Ethics (Oxford University Press).
Searle, J.R. (1965), 'What is a Speech-Act?' in Max Black (ed.) (1965), 
Philosophy in America (London: Allen and Unwin).
Searle, J.R. (1970), Speech Acts (Cambridge University Press).
Sircello, G. (1972), Mind and Art (Princeton University Press).
Stevenson, Charles L. (1944), Ethics and Language (Yale University Press). 
Stich, Stephen P. (1971), 'What Every Speaker Knows', Philosophical 
Review, LXXX, 476-96.
Strawson, P.F. (1954), 'Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations',
Mind, 63, 70-99. Reprinted in Strawson (1974), Freedom and Resentment 
(London: Methuen).
Strawson, P.F. (1964), 'Intention and Convention in Speech-Acts', 
Philosophical Review, 73, 439-60. Page refs, to Strawson (1971).
Strawson, P.F, (ed.) (1967), Philosophical Logic (Oxford University r 
Press) .
193
Strawson, P.F. (1970), 'Meaning and Truth' in Strawson (1971).
Strawson, P.F. (1971), Logico-Linguistic Papers (London:Methuen).
Taylor, Charles (1979), 'Action as Expression' in Cora Diamond and 
Jenny Teichman (eds.) (1979), Intention and Intentionality: Essays in 
Honour of G.E.M.Anscombe (Sussex: Harvester).
Tormey, Alan (1971), The Concept of Expression (Princeton University 
Press) .
Unger, Peter (1972), 'Propositional Verbs and Knowledge', Journal of 
Philosophy, LXIX.
Urmson, J.O. (1952), 'Parenthetical Verbs', Mind, LXI, 480-96.
Urmson, J.O. (1968), The Emotive Theory of Ethics, (London: Hutchinson). 
Vesey, G.N.A. (1955), 'Seeing and Seeing As', Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, 56, 109-24.
Warnock, Mary (1976), Imagination (London:Faber).
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1958), Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: 
Blackwell).
Wollheim, Richard (1964), 'On Expression and Expressionism', Revue 
Internationale de Philosophie, nos. 68-9, fascs. 2-3, 270-89.
Wollheim, Richard (1966), 'Expression' in Royal Institute of Phil­
osophy Lectures 1966-67, Vol.1 : The Human Agent, ed. G.N.A.Vesey (1968) 
(London). Page refs, to Wollheim (1973).
Wollheim, Richard ( 1968; 1970), Art and its Objects (New York: Harper 
and Row; Harmondsworth: Penguin).
Wollheim, Richard (1970), 'Nelson Goodman's Languages of Art', Journal 
of Philosophy, LXXII, 531-9. Page refs, to Wollheim (1973).
Wollheim, Richard (1973), On Art and the Mind (London: Allen Lane). 
Wollheim, Richard (1980), 'Seeing-as, Seeing-in and Pictorial 
Representation' in Art and its Objects, 2nd Edition (Cambridge 
University Press).
Ziff, Paul (1958), 'About Behaviourism', Analysis, XVIII. Page refs, 
to Ziff (1966), Philosophic Turnings (Cornell University Press).
